DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION FLOWS WITHIN THE EU

LITERATURE REVIEW

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Literature review

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the existing empirical literature that helps understand the factors and considerations driving mobility within the European Union. First, cross-national studies are considered to grasp the overall picture; second, an in-depth analysis of five focus countries (Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, and Spain) is offered. Overall, the existing body of literature seems to suggest that the two most common reasons are labour and family-related. While this is true for both males and females, there appears to be a persisting traditional gender divide, with family being relatively more common for women, as labour is for males. People who have migrated in the past are more likely to migrate again, which underlines the relevance of shorter-term education mobility in long-term European migration. Other factors, common especially among EU15 movers, include motivations tied to lifestyle and personal enrichment. The review process, which included nearly 200 studies from the past decade (or two decades), also allows the authors to note some general patterns and trends regarding the state of the literature. For example, the authors find that the existing empirical literature on intra-EU movements observes almost exclusively the movements of EU nationals (omitting onward movements of third-country nationals), and has a strong focus on migration from EU12 to EU15 countries and labour migration. Emerging topics include the consideration of non-economic factors, as well as North-South and circular and return corridors directed towards EU12 countries. The paper concludes with recommendations on improving the existing body of literature on the determinants of intra-EU mobility.
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<td>German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees</td>
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<td>EB</td>
<td>Eurobarometer</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU15</td>
<td>The 15 countries that formed the EU before the 2004 enlargements: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom</td>
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<td>EU10</td>
<td>The 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia</td>
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<td>EU2</td>
<td>The 2 countries that joined the EU in 2007: Romania, Bulgaria</td>
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<td>EU12</td>
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<td>EU13</td>
<td>EU12 + Croatia (joined the EU in 2014)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIMSS</td>
<td>European Internal Movers Social Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>International Passenger Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFS</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>New Member States (usually refers to EU12; in studies before 2007, to EU10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>TCN</td>
<td>Third-country national</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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1. Introduction

The right to move and reside freely within the 28 European Member States is one of the foundational principles of the European Union. Over the last decades, free movement rights of Europeans have progressively expanded, and, especially with the two enlargement rounds in 2004 and 2007, the topic of intra-European migration\(^1\) has attracted widespread public and scholarly attention. A common perception suggests that international migration in the region is in large part driven by income differentials and relative inequalities. Migration scholars, however, increasingly stress intra-European mobility can no longer be seen solely through the paradigm of economically motivated labour migration (Schroedter, De Winter, & Koelet, 2015; Hadler, 2006). What, then, are the factors driving movements across European countries? What are the incentives and what are the obstacles? How do different types of motivations rank against each other? How does the ‘main motive’ differ across individual countries of origin and destination? How do motivations differ across socio-demographic characteristics of movers?

The objective of this paper is to scan the existing empirical literature tackling these questions, in order to provide a comprehensive overview on the key decision-making factors of individuals moving within the European Union. Additionally, we aim to capture the remaining gaps in the existing literature on intra-EU mobility.

The necessity for this effort is clear to any scholar or policymaker who has attempted grasp the overall state of knowledge on why people are moving within the EU. For the most part, past reviews of the literature on European\(^2\) movements focus on the overall size and/or direction of mobility flows, rarely looking into the underlying reasons that shape those movements (see Benton & Petrovic, 2013; Bonin u. a., 2008; Verwiebe, Wiesböck, & Teitzer, 2014). An important contribution to the landscape of literature reviews was made in the early 2000s by Russell King. King drew attention to the complexity of European migrants’

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\(^1\) Note: for the purpose of this study, the terms migration, movement(s) and mobility are used interchangeably (as are the terms migrant(s) and mover(s)) to refer to individuals changing their place of residence (further conceptual details, e.g. length, distance of move depend on the individual studies/data examined).

\(^2\) Note: given EU28 focus of this review, for the purpose of this study, “Europe” is used to refer to the Member States of the European Union, unless otherwise indicated; therefore, the term “European movements/mobility” is used here to refer to intra-EU movements.
experiences and explored new migration motivations that contribute, among others, to the emergence of new forms of European migration (King, 2002). The most relevant previous attempt to gather and summarise the existing empirical literature on intra-EU migration can be attributed to Santacreu et al. (2009), who provided a short overview of prior research findings (mostly from the early- to mid-2000s) before presenting their results from the European Internal Movers Social Survey (2004) – the most relevant survey on the topic to date. Yet, even this brief review is nearly a decade old. Overall, no project to date of a comparable scope has attempted to investigate the drivers of long-term European mobility with an exclusive focus on intra-EU processes. As the first of its kind, this paper provides a comprehensive overview of the existing evidence base on the factors shaping intra-EU mobility – an invaluable asset both to orientate future migration research and to inform the policy discourse on migration within Europe.

Our methods for finding literature largely relied on the use of online search engines (mainly Google Scholar, complemented with the library catalogue of Maastricht University), using the keywords listed in the table below (Table 1). In addition – particularly in case of very scarce literature on a topic – literature was “snowballed” by browsing the sources used in other studies.

<table>
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<th>Determinants</th>
<th>Intra-European</th>
<th>Migration</th>
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<td>Within Europe</td>
<td>Migration flows</td>
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<td>Drivers</td>
<td>Within the EU</td>
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<td>Decision-making</td>
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<td>Long-term movements</td>
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<td>Motives</td>
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<td>Motivations</td>
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<td>Encouraging/discouraging factors</td>
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<td>Barriers</td>
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Studies were deemed appropriate if they addressed intra-EU movements – ideally based on the movers’ change of residence between two EU countries (regardless of citizenship), or, alternatively, based on the movers’ EU nationality or country of birth and current (or future intended) residence in another EU country. Studies on EU nationals typically fall into the latter category; while this ignores the possibility of secondary movements on the part of EU nationals, assuming that these types of movements are less prevalent it can be estimated to
correctly capture the start and end-point of most of these movers. Third-country nationals’ migration corridors within the EU, however, can only be captured if the study focuses on changes of residence together with nationality. While intra-European mobility is commonly associated with European citizens, we found it important to also consider – as much as the existing literature allows – the factors driving third-country nationals (TCNs) to move within the EU, including how these factors may differ from those of EU citizens.

This connects to our second main criterion: studies had to address one or more reasons for moving – or deciding not to move, either to another EU country in general, or to a specific country (including actual movements and potential future movements). Reasons could range from personal (e.g. follow a family member) to structural (e.g. a better social protection system). The indication of a ‘main’ reason, or better yet a ranked list of reasons was considered useful to be able to create a hierarchy between drivers. Rich background information on the mover (nationality, country of birth, sex, age, socio-economic background), as well as information on previous or future movements were considered an asset. The objective of the paper is to explain current and recent migratory trends, due to which primarily research from the past decade was included. Throughout this process, a total of about 250 studies were considered and 180 were selected to be included in this review.

Given the vast nature of our undertaking, finding a balance between comprehensiveness and depth was only possible by outlining some clear priorities in our methodology, and include two stages of observation: a ‘large-picture’ analysis, relying on EU-wide studies, and an in-depth analysis involving a handful of selected countries. Thus, we first browsed cross-national studies in order to gain an overview of main drivers of mobility on an EU-wide level. We also used these studies for a first look into country differences (both at the sending and receiving end), as well as socio-demographic differences in motivations. The next step was an in-depth examination of five focus countries: Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, and Spain. These five Member States were chosen to gain a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of European mobility via a detailed analysis of some key destination countries with a diverse representation of geographical areas, labour markets, and linguistic characteristics. Due to their involvement in some of the major corridors on
intra-EU mobility – sometimes on the receiving side, other times on the sending side – the five Member States are examined both as countries of immigration and of emigration. (The diversity captured by choosing these five countries of focus is further discussed in Section IV.)

Overall, we find that while intra-European mobility has long been a popular topic of research, studies that focus on the motivations behind movements across the European Union remain rare. The PIONEUR research project has been one of the first attempts to fill this knowledge gap with a large-scale study conducted in 2004. Given that the study focused on the five most populous destination countries of Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Spain, the results of this project provide insightful evidence of the motivations of mobile European citizens. Other empirical studies have been conducted by Eurostat and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, but the intentions to move within the EU constitute often only a minor part of the survey. Examples of relevant Eurobarometer surveys include EB 64.1 (2005), EB72.5 (2009), EB75.1 (2011), EB79.2 (2013) as well as the ad-hoc module of the 2014 Labour Force Survey. While these surveys all produced valuable information on this under-researched topic, the generalizability of their findings is limited by varying sample sizes and divergence in the topics addressed by each survey.

Broadly, the literature differentiates between three phases of mobility within the European Union: the pre-enlargement phase before 2004, the post-enlargement phase after 2007, and the time span following the economic crisis in 2008 (Benton & Petrovic, 2013). We can state with certainty that the lion’s share of the existing literature is focused on the analysis of East-West migration before and after the Eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007 (Favell, 2008; Dobson, 2009; Kahanec & Pytliková, 2017). A growing body of literature, however, explores the push factors brought on by the economic and financial crisis in the context of South-North intra-European migration (Koehler, Laczko, Aghazarm, & Schade, 2010; Lafleur & Stanek, 2016). More recently, we see an emerging trend of studies that shed light on new forms of mobility within the European Union, such as love or lifestyle migration (Van Mol, de Valk, & van Wissen, 2015; Huete, Mantecón, & Estévez, 2013; Olsson & O’Reilly, 2017). In contrast to the literature focusing on intra-European migration of EU citizens, much less
literature is available that explores the mobility patterns of third-country nationals and especially their underlying motivations. One of the largest and most recent studies is the European Migration Network Study 2012 that aims to further our understanding about intra-European migration of TCNs (European Commission, 2013b). While the study acknowledges that the mobility of TCNs within Europe is an under-researched area, it is a first attempt to fill this knowledge gap.

In order to put the empirical literature in context, in the following section the paper offers a brief review of the theoretical discourse concerning drivers of migration, as it concerns the European case. The review of the existing empirical work begins in section three, which presents the main results of the major cross-national studies from the last 10 years that produced data on and analysed the factors driving intra-European migration. While most major studies focus on EU nationals, a sub-section discussing TCN-relevant studies is included. Following the larger picture, section four delves into country-specific literature, specifically looking into a few selected Member States, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK, which are examined both as destination and origin countries of intra-EU mobility. The paper finishes with a summary of the overall picture on drivers of European mobility that emerges from the current body of literature, as well as some observations regarding the state of the literature.

2. Theoretical background

The following section gives a brief overview of theories that help to explain why people move from one country to another. These theories presented are largely drawn from the literature on international migration. This list is by no means exhaustive: theories were included based on their applicability to intra-European migration. It should be noted that the majority of theories dealing with the determinants of migration focus on labour migration (Arango, 2000); since non-economic factors seem to play an increasing role in contemporary intra-European migration, this focus constitutes a considerable limitation (King, 2002).

One of the first and most influential theories on the determinants of human migration is the neo-classical theory of migration. This theory puts emphasis on economic factors such as
rational decision-making, utility maximisation and expected net returns (Arango, 2000). The neo-classical model combines a micro- and macro-level approach in that it assumes that individuals are rational actors who decide to move in order to maximise their own income; therefore, they move wherever they can expect to earn the highest wages. At the macro-level, the labour force will eventually be optimally allocated and wages converge, leading to a cessation of migration in the long-run (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014). The neo-classical approach has been further expanded by the human capital theory developed by Sjaastad (1962). He proposed to see migration as a form of investment that increases one’s productivity in the long-run. The human capital model expects that people accept initial costs incurred as part of the migration process, hoping to gain a higher return from one’s labour in the destination country. Thus, Sjaastad (1962) adds a socio-economic dimension to the economic motives in that a migrant seeks work in another country also to accumulate knowledge and skills. Thus, the human capital theory could also be applied to the migration of students moving temporarily to another country for the purpose of study.

Even though the neo-classical theory is helpful to understand labour migration, it has frequently been criticised for its failure to account for non-economic factors, making it “incapable [to explain] real-life migration patterns” (Castles et al., 2013, p. 31; Arango, 2000). Its critics point to the facts that individuals are not isolated, purely rational actors who base their decision to move solely on income maximization; factors such as age, gender, education, social contacts and cultural habits are certain to play a role in the decision to leave their home (Castles et al., 2014; Arango, 2000). In addition, people rarely possess perfect knowledge about wages and working conditions in the destination countries. Alternatively, they might face structural constraints such as a lack of information or monetary means that hinder the migratory movement (Castles et al., 2014).

Based on this criticism, another theory has developed out of the neo-classical model: the new economics of labour migration (NELM), commonly associated with Oded Stark (Stark & Bloom, 1985). Even though rational choice remains at the core of the theory, it places the household at the centre of the decision-making process, rather than the individual alone (Arango, 2000). It stresses that other factors might influence the decision of a family member to move, such as financial risk diversification concerns or remittances. Even though
NELM is mostly used to explain migration in developing countries, it can also be applied to disadvantaged groups in wealthy countries, who lack social security and are dependent on risk sharing within the family (Castles et al., 2014) – for instance, this has been the case for many migrants using the East-West corridor within Europe.

Overall, these theories are best understood as complements to each other, not mutually exclusive, competing explanations (De Haas, 2010). Indeed, a single theory never captures all factors involved in the decision-making process. As Arango (2000) puts it: “Migration is too diverse and multifaceted to be explained by a single theory” (p.283). Rather, it involves a highly complex interplay of economic, social and cultural factors. With regards to social explanations, for example, network theory plays an important role in understanding factors that can facilitate migration.

Migration networks can be defined as “interpersonal relations that link migrants or returned migrants with relatives, friends or fellow countrymen at home” (Arango, 2000, p. 291). On one hand, these relations can help in the planning process by conveying important information about the destination country and by helping to find employment and accommodation upon arrival. In that sense, they can be seen as a form of social capital, in that the networks give access to crucial resources. On the other hand, however, networks are also important to maintain social ties to the country of origin, potentially stimulating further out-migration as part of family reunification (Arango, 2000; Castles et al., 2014).

Notwithstanding the above theoretical branch, a frequent critique of the existing migration literature concerns the neglect of family- and love related migration in the theoretical literature, an aspect that was suppressed by the strong economic focus in the literature (Kofman, 2004; Moskal, 2011). Similarly, theoretical endeavours have remained scarce in the student migration literature (Van Mol & Timmerman, 2014).

A recent strand of literature reflects a more general approach, encompassing multiple “types” of migration by shifting the focus towards the aspirations and capabilities of migrants. In his study on emigration from Cape Verde, Carling (2002) uses the aspiration and ability model. He stresses that “migration first involves a wish to migrate, and second, the realization of the wish” (p.2). Thus, he addresses not only the question of why people wish
to migrate, but also why they might not be able to do so. For Carling (2002), *aspiration* refers on a macro-level to the “social, economic and political context which is largely common to all members of the community” (p. 9), whereas *ability* refers in essence to immigration policies, including related costs and risks. In the European context, the enlargements of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 and with it the expanded rights to freedom have certainly facilitated the ability to migrate. On a micro level, one’s aspiration and ability to migrate is influenced by individual characteristics like age, gender, the socio-economic status or social networks. Carling (2002) fills a gap in traditional theory by including different features of migration and non-migration.

Similar to Carling, De Haas (2010) applies the concept of human capability developed by Sen (2001) to migration in order to advance the understanding of why people do or do not engage in mobility. Economic resources, good education, access to information and communication means are all factors that can increase an individual’s *capabilities* to emigrate. At the same time, these factors can raise awareness about conditions elsewhere and thus increase one’s *aspirations* to emigrate at the same time. While further development increases one’s capabilities to emigrate, it is expected that one’s aspirations to leave for another place decrease with higher levels of development (Castles et al., 2014).

While this theory is traditionally applied to countries with higher differences in their levels of development than any two European countries, it can still be useful to understand, for example, how the changes in economic performance of relatively poorer Member States can affect the volume of migration flows to relatively wealthier Member States. Nevertheless – in the European context as in any other – the aspirations to emigrate do not necessarily revolve around economic factors but may also include the wish to study abroad, join a partner or family member, or enjoy a different lifestyle. Besides types of motivations, non-economic factors can influence aspirations: in any of these scenarios, for instance, access to information is crucial for movers to judge the extent to which moving to another European country may or may not fulfil their aspirations.
3. Drivers of intra-EU mobility: the larger picture

Intra-European migration has classically been portrayed as being largely motivated by economic factors (Kofman, 2004; Verwiebe et al., 2014). According to this line of thought, Europeans typically make their way to another member state in order to accept a job offer, enjoy better working conditions or higher wages. However, recent research reveals that the motives for migration within Europe are increasingly diverse and driven by a plurality of factors (Castro-Martín & Cortina, 2015). The final decision to migrate is usually the result of a complex decision-making process, and the factors involved heavily depend on individual characteristics. Therefore, a single “prototype” of the mobile European does not exist (Schroedter et al., 2015; Hadler, 2006). The diversity of factors that shape intra-European migration decisions is clearly confirmed by the empirical studies presented in the sections that follow.

3.1. EU nationals

3.1.1. Who is moving across the EU?

Before digging into the main determinants and the main obstacles of intra-EU mobility, it is important to understand the profile of those EU residents who are most likely to make these decisions.

First of all, macro-level differences have been observed in country comparisons: the EB64.1 (2005) found that potential intra-European mobility (measured in individuals expecting to move within the next five years) was in general higher among those living in the New Member States (NMS)\(^3\) compared to EU15 nationals.\(^4\) As of 2006, Latvia, Poland, Lithuania and Estonia showed by far the highest mobility intentions with 6% of the population expecting to move to another Member State within the next five years (Vandenbrande, 2006). To better understand the scope and geographical distribution of intra-EU migration, in the following some statistics are provided.

\(^3\) Here: countries joined in the 2004 accession round, also referred to as EU10 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia)

\(^4\) The 15 countries that formed the EU before the 2004 round of enlargements: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
The graphs below provide a quick snapshot of intra-EU migration figures as of 2015 and 2015, outlining the main receivers and main senders of intra-EU mobility, with the origin of migrants being defined either by place of previous residence (being an EU country) or the (EU) country of citizenship of the migrants. A total of 1.87 million EU residents moved to another EU country in 2015, accounting for about 40% of all immigration to EU28 countries. Counting nearly 1.4 million movers, foreign EU citizens (i.e., excluding a country’s own) made up 30% of total immigration to EU countries in 2015 (see Table 2; Figure 1).

Table 2: Scope of intra-EU migration (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receiving country</th>
<th>People previously residing in another EU country</th>
<th>Own citizens</th>
<th>Other EU28 citizens</th>
<th>Third-country nationals</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All EU28 (total)</td>
<td>1,873,628</td>
<td>860,389</td>
<td>1,390,389</td>
<td>2,353,016</td>
<td>4,650,963</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ own calculations based on Eurostat (2017a, 2017b)

As shown in Figures 2-3, the hosts of the largest EU-origin stocks in 2016 were Germany, the UK, Spain, France, and Italy. The picture was roughly similar for flows in 2015, with the receivers of the largest EU-origin flows including Germany, the UK, Spain, France, Italy, but also Poland. The list of the main “sending” countries varies significantly depending on

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5 Note that this figure may include EU nationals who were previously residing in a non-EU country
whether origin is defined by previous residence or citizenship (Figure 4), but top countries include Romania, Spain, Poland, Italy, and Germany, among others.

**Figure 2. Main hosts of intra-EU migrant stocks (2016)**

![Main hosts of intra-EU migrant stocks, 2016](image)

Source: authors’ own calculations based on Eurostat (2017c)

**Figure 3. Main receivers of intra-EU migrant flows (2015)**

![Main receiving countries of intra-EU migration flows, 2015](image)

Source: authors’ own calculations based on Eurostat (2017a, 2017b)
Aside from country differences, the existing empirical evidence shows a relatively clear pattern of mobility intentions with respect to demographic differences. Concerning gender, EB64.1 (2005) suggests that men are slightly more inclined than women to move within the EU in the next five years (4% vs. 3%) (Vandenbrande, 2006). Focusing on work-related movements in particular, EB79.2 (2013) finds an even larger gender difference, both concerning past moves (11% of males vs. 6% of females) and intended future moves (29% of males vs. 21% of females) (European Commission, 2013).

When it comes to age and education differences, the overall consensus seems to be that the young and highly educated are more inclined to move within Europe. Results from EB64.1 (2005) show that among those with high future mobility intentions, 75% are below 35 years of age (Vandenbrande, 2006). Concerning labour mobility in particular, EB79.2 finds that those aged between 25 and 39 are most likely to have worked or currently work in another European country (12%), compared to those in the 40-54 age group (9%) and those older than 55 years (7%). This trend is also apparent in future intentions: the propensity to consider working in another member state seems to decrease with age. More than half of respondents in EB79.2 (2013) aged between 15 and 24 would consider working in another member state (56%), compared to 36% in the age group 25-39, 23% of those aged between 40 and 54 and 5% of Europeans older than 55 years (European Commission, 2013).

With respect to differences among young groups with different education levels, the EIMSS (2004) finds that highly educated people have a high degree of mobility compared to those with low and average education levels (Santacreu et al., 2009). The EB64.1 (2004) results

**Figure 4. Main senders of intra-EU migration flows (2015)**

Source: authors’ own calculations based on Eurostat (2017a, 2017b)
show that among those with high future mobility intentions, one-third are students (34%) and one-third are highly educated (32%) (Vandenbrande, 2006).

Finally, past movers are more likely to move again: evidence from EB64.1 (2005) suggests that those who have made long-distance moves in the past are more likely to intend to move again in the future (Vandenbrande, 2006). For work-related migration, the results of EB72.5 (2009) reveal that not only personal experiences abroad, but also the experiences of acquaintances can make individuals more likely to imagine working abroad in the future, including work beyond European borders (European Commission, 2010). Lastly, EB79.2 (2013) confirms the important impact that past migratory experiences have on future plans; around half of those who have already worked in another member state would consider doing so again (48%), compared to those without such past experiences (22%) (European Commission, 2013).

3.1.2. What are the main drivers of intra-EU mobility?

In this section we aim to gain a comparative overview of the major categories of factors influencing migration decisions within the EU. This overview is based on those available cross-national studies which explore the relative popularity of different types of intra-European migration motivations, such as work, family, education, and other general categories. The two major surveys to date that have yielded such analyses are the aforementioned EIMSS, from 2014, and the special wave 64.1 of the Eurobarometer carried out in 2005 (EB 64.1).

EIMSS explores migration motivations from a broader life-course perspective for migrants (from/in the UK, Germany, France, Spain, and Italy); in case the migrants had undertaken a previous migration to the current host country before their latest move to that country, the survey asked respondents both for the motivation behind the first move and why they decided to settle. The sample of respondents who had moved before, and therefore answered the first question (Reason for first move) consisted of 1,203 individuals, while the second question (Reason for the most recent move to the country), included both second-time and first-time movers, making up a total of 4,879 respondents. In both cases, respondents could choose up to two reasons (Alaminos et al., 2007).
As shown in Figure 5, among those respondents who had moved to the host country before, the most popular reasons cited for their first moves were work-related reasons (32%), followed by family-related reasons (24%), and study-related reasons (22%). Meanwhile, the most popular reasons for the latest move, or, choosing to settle in the country (note that this sample includes both first-time and second-time movers) were family-related reasons (35%), followed by job-related reasons (33%) and environment-related reasons (29%). Study-related reasons were only mentioned by 6% of respondents in this sample (Alaminos et al., 2007).

Looking at a gender breakdown of the data (Figures 10-11), we notice some differences in priority. For both gender groups, the top three reasons for the first (previous) move included reasons related to work, family, and study. In the case of males, the job-related reasons ranked first in popularity (41% of males in the sample indicated this as a reason), followed by family (20%) and study (19%); for females, family-related reasons were the most common (27%), followed by study (25%) and work (23%). Regarding reasons for the most recent move, the top three reasons related to jobs, environment, and family. Once again, job-related factors were most common for males (41%), and family-related factors were most common for women (43%). Environmental factors rank second in popularity for both (ca. 30% for both), while at the third place we see family-related factors for men (27%) and job-related factors for women (24%) (Alaminos et al., 2007).

The EB 64.1 conducted in the following year (2005), with a sample spanning the EU25, had a slightly different formulation of possible motivations to move, but findings on the most popular reasons driving movers were similar to those found in EIMSS: family-related motivations were mentioned most often (42%), followed by employment-related motivations (38%), other motivations (25%) and housing-related motivations (15%) (Figure 6) (Vandenbrande, 2006).

The EB 64.1 survey also looked into future intentions to move across the EU25 (Figure 8). These motivations seemed somewhat different from those driving movements that had already happened; this may suggest that when reporting on past moves, respondents rationalise their motives differently than when imagining a hypothetical scenario. The most often indicated motivation for future moves was the opportunity to meet new people and
discover new places (40%), followed closely by economic reasons, i.e. more money or better quality of employment (38%); next was better weather (22%), better housing conditions (17%) and better local environment (17%) (if we combine local environment and better weather into a single “environment-related” category, this factor makes up 39%, becoming the second-most popular answer-choice) (Vandenbrande, 2006).

Concerning factors that discourage respondents from a potential future move (Figure 9), personal relationships once again were paramount: 44% indicated the fear of losing direct contact with family or friends, and 27% indicated missing support from family and friends; the challenge of learning a new language was also a common perceived obstacle, indicated by 19% of respondents (Vandenbrande, 2006).

A gender analysis of the EB64.1’s results (Figure 12) reveals similar patterns as the EIMSS: work-related motivations are the primary driver for males (indicated by 49% of male respondents), while females are predominantly motivated by family-related reasons (52%). The second-most popular answer options are reversed: family-related motivations for males (32%) and work-related motivations for females (30%). Household-related motivations rank fourth for both (13% of males, 17% of females) (Vandenbrande, 2006).

The most prominent barriers to going to live in another EU country mentioned in the focus group discussions of the Qualitative Eurobarometer of 2011 were language, family, and finding employment. The benefits thought to outweigh the obstacles included experiencing new things (as a tool for personal enrichment), higher wages, and improving academic qualifications. Among these, new experiences and work confirm two of the major perceived benefits of a potential future move found in the EB 64.1 six years earlier, while study was a prominent reason for first moves in the results of the EIMSS survey.

To the best of our knowledge, the Qualitative Eurobarometer of 2011 is, unfortunately, the latest available EU-wide study with an available analysis on the relative importance of different types of factors in the decision-making process of intra-EU movers. (The Eurobarometer’s special waves EB 75.1 (2011) and EB 79.2 (2013) both focus exclusively on specific work-related factors, therefore their results are discussed in the upcoming section.) It is important to note that both the 2008 and 2014 ad-hoc modules of the Labour Force
Survey include a variable on main reason for migration, which, together with information on the respondent’s citizenship and current country of residence, could be narrowed down to analyse intra-EU movers. While we do not find an existing analysis of the LFS data with this specific focus, in Figures 7 and 13 we provide a preliminary analysis based on data available on Eurostat.6

According to data from the 2014 LFS ad-hoc module, family reasons were by far the dominant reason for working-age EU nationals to move to another Member State. A total of 27% of respondents migrated for work, only a third of which had already found a job before migrating. A further 5% migrated for education. As in the earlier studies mentioned above, we still see a relative higher share of work-related reasons among males (33% compared to 22% for women), and a relatively higher share of women migrating for family reasons (59%, compared to 46% for males).

In summary, the existing studies depict intra-EU migration as being largely driven by work-related motivations and personal relationships – studies contrast on which one is dominant. Other, less prevalent reasons include studies, quality of life, housing and personal enrichment. We observe a persistence of traditional gender roles across studies, with a relatively higher share of males migrating for work and a relatively higher share of females migrating for family and personal relationships. Past migrations in the EU seem to increase Europeans’ propensity to migrate again. However, the reasons for moving again are often different from the reasons that first drove individuals to migrate; for instance, while studies rarely seem to be the reason for long-term migration, they are a much more commonly indicated reason for the first migration that inspired the mover’s eventual return to the destination country (Alaminos et al., 2007).

Following this overview of the existing evidence on the main factors influencing intra-EU mobility decisions, the following section provides a more detailed analysis of the major categories of migration drivers outlined above.

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6 Note that an extensive original analysis of the data is beyond the scope of this literature review.
Figure 5. Reasons for intra-EU migration(s), EIMSS

Source: authors’ own calculations based on Alaminos et al. (2007);  
Note: multiple answer options were possible; N(first migration)=1,203; N(most recent migration)=4,879

Figure 6. Reasons intra-EU migration, EB64.1

Source: Birindelli & Rustichelli (2007); N= 827
Figure 7. Reasons for migration, LFS 2014 ad-hoc module

Reasons for migration for first-generation immigrants of EU nationality (LFS 2014)

- Family reasons: 53%
- Education reasons: 18%
- Work, job found before migrating: 9%
- Work, no job found before migrating: 5%
- International protection or asylum: 8%
- Other: 5%
- No response: 2%

Source: Eurostat (2016) Note: 100% = 23,129,000 individuals (estimate)

Figure 8. Factors encouraging future intra-EU migration, EB64.1

Future intentions to move, main motivations
EB64.1, 2005

- Meet new people and discover new places: 40%
- Economic reasons (more money or better quality of employment): 38%
- Better weather: 22%
- Better housing conditions: 17%
- Better local environment: 17%

Source: Eurofound (2007)
Figure 9. Factors discouraging future intra-EU migration, EB64.1

Source: Eurofound (2007)

Figure 10. Reasons for first intra-EU migration by gender, EIMSS

Source: authors’ own calculations based on Alaminos et al. (2007); Note: multiple answer options were possible; N=1,203
Figure 11. Reasons for most recent intra-EU migration by gender, EIMSS

Source: authors’ own calculations based on Alaminos et al. (2007); Note: multiple answer options were possible; N=4,879

Figure 12. Reasons for intra-EU migration by gender, EB64.1

Source: Birindelli & Rustichelli (2007); N= 827
3.1.3. An in-depth look into the main drivers

Mobility within Europe for the purpose of employment

As mentioned above, employment-related factors are still a major determinant of European mobility. It should be noted that labour mobility encompasses four different types of workers: regular mobile workers who move to another member state in order to take up work; cross-border workers who perform labour in one country while residing in another; posted workers who take up work in another member state on a temporary basis; and mobile self-employed workers (Barslund & Busse, 2016). This paper focuses mainly on the first category: long-term regular mobile workers. In 2015, around 8.5 million EU movers of working age were active in other member states; an increase of 4% compared to 2014.

The overwhelming majority of labour mobility in Europe is directed towards EU15 Member States, with 98% of EU labour migrants residing in these countries and only 2% in the EU13 countries in 2017 (Fries-Tersch, Tugran, & Bradley, 2017). The flows can be broadly subdivided into an active East-West corridor and a less active South-North corridor, which emerged mainly as a consequence of the 2008 economic crisis (Barslund & Busse, 2014).

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7 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
In order to stimulate and facilitate the movement of workers within the European Union, the EC put several measures in place (Barslund & Busse, 2016). Examples include the job matching portal EURES (EUropean Employment Services), the initiative “Your First European Job” (YFEUJ), which serves as a connecting link between employers and young job seekers, and the European Professional Card, which should facilitate and speed up administrative processes related to the transfer of certain professions (Barslund & Busse, 2016; Dittrich & Spath, 2016; Barslund, Busse, & Schwarzwälder, 2015). However, the uptake of these supportive measures seems to be limited. The EB72.5 (2009) survey shows that only 2% of Europeans have made use of the EURES service, whereas 12% have heard of it (Dittrich & Spath, 2016; European Commission, 2010).

On a macro-level, the free movement of labour is theorised to reduce labour market imbalances between member states by “matching labour supply to demand, ironing out inefficiencies in national markets and reducing unemployment” (Boswell & Geddes, 2010, p. 182). The principle of free movement could thus be a means to enhance the efficiency of the European labour market. On the one hand, labour mobility allows the individual to improve their employment prospects and personal situation; on the other hand, employers can widen their recruitment process to the whole European Union (Boswell & Geddes, 2010).

To gain a deeper insight into the work-related determinants of intra-EU mobility, Figures 14-16 show the main factors driving decisions to another Member State for work, both for actual past movements (EIMSS, EB64.1) and future intentions (EB75.1, EB79.2). A new job was the predominant reason respondents had decided to move to work in another Member State, both in EIMSS (2004) and EB64.1 (2005) (15% and 32%, respectively). In EIMSS data, this is followed by moving to look for a job in another Member State (11%), moving because of one’s current occupation (at the time) (5), and finally, moving to start a business (1%) (Alaminos et al., 2007). In the results of EB64.1, new job or job transfer is very predominant compared to other reasons, which are to look for a job (5%), to be closer to work (3%), and retirement (1%) (Birindelli & Rustichelli, 2007). Concerning factors that would make one consider working in another Member State, EB79.2 (2013) finds a better salary to be paramount (indicated by 50% of respondents); other common reasons include professional development or career opportunities (28%), difficulty in finding a job in the origin country.
(28%), and better working conditions (aside from salary) (22%) (European Commission, 2013) (see Figure 16).

Figure 14. Work-related reasons for intra-EU mobility, EIMSS

![Bar chart showing work-related reasons for migration, EIMSS, 2004.]

Source: Alaminos et al. (2007); Note: multiple answer options were possible; N(first migration)=1,203; N(most recent migration)=4,879

Figure 15. Work-related reasons for intra-EU mobility, EB64.1

![Bar chart showing work-related reasons for migration, EB64.1, 2005.]

Source: Birindelli & Rustichelli (2007)
Barslund et al. (2015) argue that income differences are the key driver of labour mobility within Europe especially between the EU15 and EU10 countries. This gap was particularly wide prior to enlargement and continues to function as a driver of migration even as it narrows (Galgóczi, Leschke, & Watt, 2011; European Commission, 2013). While income differences can explain a good part of the East-West labour migration corridor, Barslund et al. (2015) argue that income differentials are not large enough to stimulate high levels of worker movements when it comes to mobility within EU15 countries; this could serve as an explanation for the relatively low volume of labour-motivated flows taking place between the old member states. Aside from income differences, the general situation of the labour markets in the sending and receiving country is also a key element of migration decisions, with unemployment rates in particular being a prominent influencing factor (Galgóczi et al., 2011).

The EB79.2 (2013) investigates the differences between nationals of the new Member States (NMS) and the EU15 countries in more depth as they concern factors encouraging mobility. Based on this data, the European Commission finds that the main difference lies in the

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Source: European Commission (2013)

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Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.
The proportion of Europeans considering moving to another member state for the purpose of a better salary: twice as many citizens of the NMS indicate this as a reason to move (80% vs. 42%). Also, more NMS citizens consider moving for better working conditions (28% vs. 20%) and better social guarantees (17% vs. 8%). By comparison, citizens from the EU15 countries more frequently indicate “professional development or career opportunities” (31% vs. 18%), the desire to live or work in another country (19% vs. 8%) and family reasons (17% vs. 10%) (European Commission, 2013). The EB72.5 (2009) confirms that Europeans of the NMS are generally more motivated by economic opportunities, whereas EU15 citizens are more likely to be driven by personal reasons and factors that enhance their self-development (European Commission, 2010).

What are, then, the perceived obstacles to work in a different Member State? Results from EB75.1 (2011) and EB79.1 (2013) underline predominantly the language barrier (mentioned by 39% and 47% of respondents, respectively) and family reasons (23% and 20% respectively; note: multiple answers were possible). Figures 17 and 18 list some further – less widely shared – perceived discouraging factors, such as the difficulty to find a job in the new country, better opportunities in the origin country, bureaucracy and problems with having qualifications recognised. At the country level, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic tend to mention language to be the most problematic factor with 36%, 36% and 38% respectively. Instead Austria, Cyprus, and Denmark are most likely to refer to family reasons (65% in each case) (European Commission, 2013a).
The widespread role of (lacking) language skills in preventing labour mobility is confirmed by Barslund and Busse (2016), who describe language proficiency as “the most important challenge to achieving a single EU labour market” (p.8). The EC seeks to address this issue in the long-term through the “mother tongue + two foreign languages” policy, which aims to enable citizens in Europe to communicate in two languages in addition to their native language (Barslund & Busse, 2016, p. 8).

The obstacle to movements posed by the – real or feared – imperfect recognition of professional qualifications, skills and education (which may affect the individual’s
employment status as well as remuneration) is also echoed in other studies (Capuano & Migali, 2017; Barslund & Busse, 2016). Empirical evidence suggests that higher levels of recognition of foreign education and qualifications could help member states attract higher numbers of European immigrant workers (Capuano & Migali, 2017). In fact, the over-qualification and hence the under-employment of mobile workers is a recurring issue, particularly among immigrants from EU12 countries these immigrants experience significant “down-skilling”, that is employment below ones qualification level (Galgóczi et al., 2011; Kahanec, 2013). A recent study confirms this phenomenon among EU13 movers: 37% of all participating EU13 movers feel that they are overqualified for their job, compared to 27% of EU15 movers and 20% of nationals (Fries-Tersch et al., 2017). While some migrants may be willing to accept skill mismatches as long as they can accumulate savings, over-qualification may trigger a return move for others (Galgóczi & Leschke, 2014; Fries-Tersch et al., 2017). These empirical findings support the argument made by Dittrich and Spath (2016), which stresses the importance of distinguishing between the de jure freedom of movement and the de facto mobility of labour within Europe; the former refers to the legal provisions that allow for the free movement of workers, while the latter points to the structural barriers that hinder workers’ successful mobility, as discussed above.

Mobility within Europe for family and love reasons

The results of the EIMSS (2004) and EB64.1 (2005) mentioned in the previous section both provide evidence for the importance of family and romantic relationships in European mobility (Santacreu et al., 2009; Vandenbrande, 2006). These findings seem to confirm Mai and King (2009) in that “the decision to migrate and to continue living and working abroad can only be understood by bringing into the analytical equation the affective, sexual and emotional dimensions” (p.297). Purely focusing on the economic factors that might stimulate a movement within Europe would result in a misleading picture. Gaspar (2008) states that “intra-European love is [...] one of the driving forces behind individual intra-EU migration” (p.14). This, the author stresses, fosters a Europe of the people from below, alongside the European institutions that enable the free movement of persons (Gaspar, 2008).
While intra-European partnerships might stimulate migration within the European Union, European mobility often plays an important role in the formation of these relationships in the first place (Schroedter et al., 2015). Schroedter et al.’s (2015) study confirms that long stays abroad, related to either occupational or educational activities, positively influence the likelihood that a bi-national partnership emerges. This finding can also help explain the empirical evidence claiming that past experiences motivate future movements. Furthermore, intra-European relationships are closely associated with a stronger sense of European identity or feeling, since bi-national couples are more strongly opposed to the idea of “European otherness’ in their relationship” (Van Mol et al., 2015, p. 471), due partly to the partner’s networks abroad and visits in the respective country. Nonetheless, empirical evidence suggests that the number of intra-European marriages has remained stable over the last decade, while marriages involving one non-EU partner have increased sharply (De Valk & Medrano, 2014).

Compared to the literature that focuses on romantic partnerships as the drivers of mobility, family-related migration has received less scholarly attention (Kofman, 2004; Moskal, 2011). Here, the term family migration primarily refers to family reunification and formation within Europe (Kofman, 2004). This type of migration might become more important in the future as families are increasingly prone to have more than one place of residence (Moskal, 2011). Furthermore, Ackers (2004) points to the overlooked topic of care migration within Europe, both in theory and in practice. Not only has the topic been neglected by scholars, but also the EU social rights for those non-workers who wish to migrate in order to provide unpaid care for their family members are limited, putting those citizens in a vulnerable position (Ackers, 2004). Thus, Ackers (2004) calls for the need to recognize the importance of family care-giving in Europe.

**Mobility within Europe for the purpose of study**

In empirical studies examining motives for long-term intra-EU migration, education tends to play a minor role, since student flows are most often of temporary nature (A. Findlay, King, Stam, & Ruiz-Gelices, 2006). However, this motive gains importance in the context of long-term mobility as it might trigger later migration to the respective country; this is apparent, for instance, in EIMSS’ results comparing reasons for the first migration to the country vs.
the reason that triggered settling: study-related reasons are indicated by 22% of respondents in case of the former, but only by 6% for the latter (Alaminos et al., 2007).

In particular through the European Erasmus exchange programme (European community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students), the European Commission devotes considerable funding to the development of mobility schemes that aim to foster European identity and a sense of “Europeanization” of the higher education system (Findlay et al., 2006). In the past 20 years, more than 4 million students have spent some part of their degree in another European higher education institution via the Erasmus program (European Commission, 2017). Since a large part of short-term student mobility in Europe is directly connected to the Erasmus exchange program, the causes and consequences of participation in this program in particular have received much scholarly attention (see Rodriguez, Fernandez-Mayoralas, & Rojo, 2004; Teichler & Janson, 2007), similar to the so-called short-term credit mobility in general (students pursuing only part of a degree program) (see Byram & Dervin, 2009; King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003). In contrast, other scholars have focused on degree mobility, referring to those students who pursue a whole degree program in another European country (see Findlay, King, Smith, Geddes, & Skeldon, 2012).

Empirical studies examining the more detailed motivations behind student mobility in Europe are fairly consistent in their findings. As part of a large Erasmus evaluation study, Vossensteyn et al. (2010) find that the strongest incentives to participate in Erasmus and to move temporarily to another European country concern personal development. Students primarily wish to experience living abroad (93%), improve their language skills (90%), meet new people (90%) or develop “soft skills” (86%). These results match the findings of Van Mol and Timmerman (2014) and King and Ruiz-Gelices (2003), who similarly find that language improvement as well as personal growth and experimental goals dominate the motivations of mobile students.

Regarding perceived obstacles to student mobility, the biggest barrier to mobility seems to be of financial nature. In Vossensteyn et al.’s (2010) study, 56% of students find it too costly to participate in the Erasmus programme; finances are followed by family reasons (46%) and a lack of language skills (41%) as other crucial perceived barriers. Once again, these results match the findings of Van Mol and Timmerman (2014). Vossensteyn et al. (2010) find
that the problem of lacking financial means is most prominent in Spain (69%) and Poland (68%) and lowest in Sweden (19%) and Finland (19%). Even though the compatibility of the education system at home and abroad was not found among the top barriers to mobility, one-third of Erasmus participants still reports uncertainty regarding the education system abroad and a possible non-recognition of the diploma, fearing that this leads to a study delay (Vossensteyn et al., 2010).

With regards to demographic differences, it is frequently highlighted that student mobility flows in Europe are skewed towards highly educated students and those from higher-income families (Gonzáles, Mesanza & Mariel, 2010; Vossensteyn et al., 2010; King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003). Kuhn (2012) brings forward the criticism that Erasmus “misses its mark” (p.994) in fostering European identity across the young population, since the exchange program mainly addresses the highly educated students who are already more likely to feel European, compared to the less educated. In contrast to these findings, Van Mol and Timmerman (2014) find that differences in socio-economic background are not statistically significant and that one should be careful when painting student mobility in Europe as a purely elitist phenomenon. The authors speculate that students from higher-income families might be less motivated to participate in exchange programs because they already have frequent access to international experience and are therefore not in need of these programs in the way their less wealthy peers are (Van Mol & Timmerman, 2014)

Lastly, some evidence supports the hypothesis that study exchange experiences can trigger future movements. King and Ruiz-Gelices (2003), who investigated whether a study period in a foreign European country stimulates migration after graduation, find “convincing evidence that the year abroad serves as a trial run for further geographical moves, often back to the year abroad country” (p.246). This finding has been confirmed by Favell’s (2011) qualitative study of highly mobile Europeans, the so-called “Eurostars”, of whom many made their first experience abroad through the Erasmus or other Lifelong Learning (formerly Socrates) programmes. More specifically, Parey and Waldinger (2011) find that studying abroad in the context of the Erasmus exchange program increases the likelihood of an individual to work in a foreign country by 15%. These findings provide support to King’s (2002) earlier results in
which student migrations form a crucial part of internal mobility of young adults in Europe, not only directly but through their influence on future long-term movements.

Mobility within Europe for lifestyle reasons

The EIMSS (2004) finds “quality of life” to be the second-most frequently stated reason for settling in the country by the respondents of the five European focus countries, with 16% indicating the wish “to live in a better natural environment” and 14% the desire “to live in better/healthier weather, enjoy climate” (13.7%) (Santacreu et al., 2009). Furthermore, results from EB79.2 (2013) indicate that 17% of the participants indicated that they would consider working abroad even if economic conditions were no better in the receiving country, principally motivated by lifestyle reasons instead (European Commission, 2013). It is therefore important to take a closer look at this phenomenon within the context of intra-European mobility. The growing body of literature investigating lifestyle migration within Europe mainly focuses on Spain as the main destination country of European lifestyle migrants (see O’Reilly, 2007; Gustafson, 2008; Janoschka & Durán, 2013; Kordel, 2016). Section 4.5 discusses the findings regarding lifestyle migration to Spain in greater detail.

The term lifestyle migration is closely connected to Michaela Benson and Karen O’Reilly, who define the concept as “the relocation of people within the developed world searching for a better life” (Benson & O’Reilly, 2016, p. 608). Often, the term lifestyle migration is used interchangeably with sunset migration or retirement migration, as retirees form the largest group among lifestyle migrants (Boswell & Geddes, 2010; Benton & Petrovic, 2013). They mostly come from Britain and Germany, but also the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and the Nordic European countries (Gustafson, 2008). It should be noted that lifestyle migration is not always a long-term phenomenon; some migrants might also move back and forth or seasonally to another European country (Benton & Petrovic, 2013). By making use of modern communication means and accessible air travel, some of the latter group enjoy “transnational lifestyles”, thereby sustaining strong ties to their home country (O’Reilly, 2007, p. 282).

Even though both labour and lifestyle migrants are in search for a better way of life in some way or the other, King (2002) describes lifestyle migration as “the very antithesis” (p.100) of economically motivated migration, as migrants of the former group are affluent enough to
prioritise quality of life reasons over economic factors. Or, as Benson and O’Reilly put it in their 2016 paper: “the migrants themselves [are] distinct in their structural positioning as people who can approach migration as a form of consumption in contrast to the production orientation attributed to most other migration flows” (Benson & O’Reilly 2016, p.22). In a 2009 paper, the authors stress that the motivation of lifestyle migrants to move is a combination of desirable factors in the host country and unsatisfying conditions in the home country. The former includes a slower pace of live, cheaper living costs, climate and with that health benefits, and a feeling of community. Push-factors refer to rising crime and unemployment levels, a lack of community feeling and generally a low quality of life. However, the advantages perceived by the migrants are often romanticised, whereas shortcomings in the home country are overstated (Benson & O’Reilly, 2009).

A study conducted by Casado-Díaz, Kaiser, & Warnes (2004) finds that the majority of Northern Europeans moving to the South of Europe indicate climate reasons as their motivation to move (64.3%), followed by financial reasons (32.6%) and the Mediterranean way of life (28.5%), including aspects such as the cuisine and a generally slower pace of life. In line with the empirical evidence from the Eurobarometer studies, their study finds that previous holidays play an important role when choosing the destination for permanent settlement. Whereas Benson and O’Reilly (2009) stress that mainly affluent individuals move permanently or seasonally to another place, Casado-Díaz et al. (2004) argue that retirement migration is no longer exclusively a phenomenon of the rich and that cost-of-living advantages are most frequently mentioned by lower income groups. Also, Casado-Díaz et al. (2004) find that it is mainly couples that migrate and that they do so in their fifties or early sixties.

Mobility within Europe for other reasons

The welfare system

In recent decades, especially after the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, there have been widespread concerns that immigrants from the new member states move primarily in order to take advantage of more generous welfare systems elsewhere in Europe – the so-called “welfare-magnet hypothesis” (Remeur, 2013; Giulettei & Kahanec, 2013). However, most existing research has not found evidence for this hypothesis so far (Giulettei & Kahanec,
The one paper that finds support for the welfare-magnet hypothesis among intra-EU migrants is Razin and Wahba’s study from 2014 (Razin & Wahba, 2015). Even in cases where some effect is found, it is typically still relatively weak compared to the magnet effects of higher wages and lower unemployment (Giulettei & Kahanec, 2013). Fóti (2015) stresses that since work is the main reason for the mobility of EU10 citizens, they also tend to claim unemployment benefits more often. However, the take-up of welfare benefits from EU10 nationals is still lower than that of the native population. In addition, health services are used relatively less by the migrant population since a large proportion of migrants from the new member states are from the younger age groups (Fóti, 2015). Thus, the existing evidence suggests that welfare benefits are not a dominant motive for Europeans to move to another member state.

Political dissatisfaction

The scholars Bygnes & Flipo (2017) point to a systematic lack of attention regarding political dissatisfaction as an influencing factor for intra-European migration. In a first attempt to fill this gap, the scholars interviewed Spaniards moving to Norway and Romanians moving to Spain. They find that the migrants’ decision to leave and their reluctance to return home frequently has a political component. Thus, economic, social or lifestyle motives are often “interwoven with a distaste for the political situation at home” (Bygnes & Flipo, 2017, p. 208). In times of a changing political landscape in Europe and growing populist movements, it becomes even more important to include the dimension of political discontent when analysing factors that play into the decision-making of mobile Europeans.

3.2. Third-country nationals

Next to EU nationals, third-country nationals (TCNs) enjoy movement rights within the European Union that enable them to change their place of residence for various reasons. These movement rights, however, are much more limited than those applying to EU-born nationals. Since these different measures regulating the intra-European mobility of TCNs are likely to also influence the decision of TCNs to migrate to another member state, the following provides a brief overview of the applying provisions (European Commission, 2013; see also: EB79.2 results above).

10 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
Afterwards, general trends are explained before some country-specific data on the motivations of mobile TCNs are presented. It should be noted that this section focuses on those TCNs who are not yet naturalized yet, i.e. who have not acquired citizenship in one European country.

Within the EU acquis, only selected categories of third-country nationals enjoy the right of free movement. These categories include long-term residents (Directive 2003/109/EC); highly skilled workers and EU Blue Card Holders (Directive 2009/50/EC); researchers (Directive 2005/71/EC); students (Directive 2004/114/EC) and posted workers (Directive 96/71/EC) (Pascouau, 2013a; European Commission, 2013b). The EU member states have adopted a range of different rules and policies at national level to implement the EU Migration Directives and to determine which specific conditions apply to TCNs. Denmark, Ireland and the UK completely or partially opted out of some of the Directives, which is possible as they are not part of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (European Commission, 2013b; Herlin-Karnell, 2013). Those TCNs who do not belong to one of the categories mentioned above are not covered by the EU Directives, and are therefore subject to national immigration rules for any stay over three months. In other words, most TCNs with a residence permit in an EU country are able to freely visit other Member States as tourists, but will need a second residence permit in the second Member State in order to become residents there (Ferraresi, 2016). This obstacle may in itself prove to be a disincentive for TCNs’ intra-EU mobility, or may result in differences in the indicated reasons for moving within the EU, as compared to EU nationals (for instance, given the relative difficulty, they may only decide to move for more “severe” reasons than those EU residents who enjoy total freedom; alternatively, predominant “reasons” for movement may be connected to factors that facilitate receiving a residence permit, such as marriage, or being sponsored by a future employer). In the following, we provide a brief look into the scope of TCNs’ secondary movements within the EU, before presenting the existing empirical evidence regarding the drivers behind these movements.

Despite a lack of statistics on the exact scope of intra-European mobility of TCNs, the European Commission (2013b) recognizes a general upward trend in all member states. This trend is most remarkable in Germany, where the number of TCNs who arrived from a EU28
country or one of the four countries of the European Free Trade Association increased by over 200% from 2007 to 2011 (from 3,784 to 11,532). Also in the UK, migration of non-EU citizens whose last country of residence was within the EU rose from approximately 1,000 to 3,000 TCNs between 2007 and 2011 (European Commission, 2013b). As a proportion of the overall number of working-age individuals who have arrived from another member state, TCNs constituted 10% in 2011 compared to an average of 7% in 2004-2010, confirming the increasing trend (Dhéret, Lazarowicz, Nicoli, Pascouau, & Zuleeg, 2013). In general, however, secondary movements of TCNs make up only a small proportion of total intra-European mobility, which can partly be explained by the limited movement rights themselves (European Commission, 2013b). Lindley & Van Hear (2007) note that the term onward migration is more appropriate than the term secondary movement in the context of intra-European mobility of TCNs as the migration process might involve more than two steps.

Scanning the existing literature about onward migration of TCNs within Europe, it is apparent that little scholarly attention has been paid to the underlying motivations of mobile TCNs. Instead, existing literature tends to explore the legal side of TCNs’ mobility rights (see Sánchez, 2009; Pascouau, 2013b; Thym & Zoeteweij-Turhan, 2015), the integration of TCNs in the European Union (see Morano-Foadi & Malena, 2012; Carrera & Wiesbrock, 2009) and the attraction of qualified TCNs, especially health workers (see European Commission, 2013c; Schultz & Rijks, 2014). More recently, the UK received attention as a main country of destination for onward migration within the EU; however, the literature focuses largely on naturalised former TCNs as opposed to those who have not yet acquired citizenship in a European country (see Kelly, 2013; Ahrens, Kelly, & Van Liempt, 2016). Detailed information about onward movements to the UK can be found in section 4.2.

The one significant recent effort to investigate drivers of intra-EU mobility of TCNs on a European level found in this review is European Migration Network’s (EMN) study from 2013, which aims to further the understanding about key issues related to intra-European migration of TCNs to the different Member States. Within the context of this large-scale study, each Member State submitted available national data, but information was very limited regarding the reasons for TCNs to migrate to the respective country (European Commission, 2013b). In lieu of truly comprehensive EU-wide evidence on the drivers of
intra-EU migration of TCNs, some country-specific highlights available from the EMN study as well as from limited other sources are provided below.

In the case of Belgium, data covering the period 2008-2011 shows that most TCNs who are resident in another European member state apply for a visa for the purpose of family reunification (31.4%), followed by purposes of study (27.8%) and labour (18.6%) (De Bauche & De Bruycker, 2013). In France, data on the number of visas that have been issued by French consulates in other EU member states reveals that in 2011, only 5% of the total number of visas were issued for professional reasons (EMN, 2013). Labour was a more prevalent reason in some Eastern European destination countries: in the Czech Republic, between 2010 and 2012, most of the TCNs who were resident in another member state made their visa application for employment and business reasons, followed by reasons related to study and family (EMN, 2013c). Similarly, data from Poland reveals that in 2011, most visa applications submitted from other Member States were made for the purpose of economic activity and work, followed by the wish to engage in cultural activities and participate in conferences (EMN, 2013b). With regards to Hungary, data shows that between 2008 and 2012, most long-term visa applications were made for the purpose of study or employment, followed by family reunification and other reasons (EMN, 2012). In Ireland, most visa applications have been made for the purpose of visit (21.2%), “other” (19.8%) and conference (18.8%), however, this data includes both short-term and long-term visa applications (Quinn, 2013).

For some other countries, there only seems to be data on the scope of intra-EU TNC movements and/or the profile of movers. For the UK, the only relevant information available in the EMN study was that non-EU citizens applying for a visa from within the EU for the purpose of work made up only 2% of the total 161,000 work visa applications made in 2011 (EMN, 2012b). For Germany, data on the reasons of TCNs for entering the country from another member state is lacking; the country’s contribution to the EMN study only shows that the majority of TCNs who emigrated from another member state in 2011 were nationals of India (1018), Turkey (847), Morocco (838), Ghana (741) and the United States (687). They mostly came from Italy (2834), Spain (2171), France (989), the United Kingdom (977) and Austria (882), probably also as a consequence of the economic crisis (Müller, 2013). Finally,
in the case of France – besides the statistics mentioned above – data from 2008 shows that most of the TCNs entering France from another member state are of working age (between 25 and 39 years) and that a large part is highly educated (30.9%), followed by TCNs with high school education (14.5%) (EMN, 2013).

The sparse data that is available on the mobility motivations of TCNs moving within Europe creates a scattered picture, suggesting the drivers of intra-European migration vary considerably among the member states. Overall, the findings support the European Commission’s (2013b) observation that the mobility motivations of TCNs are an under-researched area that needs more attention both on a national and on an academic level. In order to understand the phenomenon at an EU level, it is essential to quantify and analyse the reasons for migratory movements of TCNs within the European Union.

4. In-depth analysis of five focus countries

As mentioned in the introduction, the five countries of analysis in this study were chosen for their potential to provide a diverse picture regarding some of the main actors of intra-EU mobility. In the following, we elaborate further on the characteristics represented by the individual Member States.

To begin with, Germany, UK, Italy, and Spain have consistently been among the top five host countries for EU-origin immigrants, both as defined by nationality and country of birth (Eurostat, 2017a, 2017b). Sweden is also typically found among the top ten countries in the absolute number of EU migrant stocks; moreover, given its relatively smaller size, it is also a predominant host country in terms of the relative size of the migrant stock compared to the native population. All five countries are also important hosts of immigrants from third-countries, and represent a varied group of immigrant flows. To mention a few: Germany has recently become a major destination for Syrians; Sweden has also remained a key receiver of refugees, including Iranians and Iraqis; the UK has strong migration from the Commonwealth; Spain is a major destination for Latin American and Moroccan immigrants; while Italy has been the most closely involved country in the situation of the Mediterranean Sea arrivals.
The five countries also attract diverse populations of EU migrants – not just in terms of origins but also socio-demographic profile, as is further presented in the respective country sections. This is unsurprising given not only the geographical, but also cultural (e.g. linguistic) and structural differences represented among the five countries. The flexibility of the UK labour market, compared to the inflexibility of the German and Swedish labour markets, for instance, as well as the large informal labour market in Italy and Spain, present migrants with vastly different contexts. On a final note, most of these countries (Germany, Italy, UK, Spain) are not just receivers but also majors senders of migrants within Europe; therefore, all five countries are examined as countries of emigration as well as immigration.

Figure 19. Migration reasons in the five focus countries (LFS, 2014; relative freq.)

The figure above provides a first comparative overview of the relative popularity of different motivations of EU immigrants in each of the five focus countries (and overall EU28), based on data from the 2014 ad-hoc Labour Force Survey (Eurostat, 2016). In the following, we note a few key differences that stand out from the figure above. Firstly, it is apparent that Sweden has by far the largest relative share of EU nationals coming for international protection and asylum-related reasons, while this is almost entirely irrelevant in the cases of Italy and Spain. Family-related migration is dominant in all focus countries, particularly
Sweden and Italy. Italy and Spain have a relatively large share of work-related migrants in general, and also looking specifically who arrived without having found a job first. The latter case is very rare in Sweden. Among the five countries, the UK has the largest relative share of education-related EU immigration. This data, as well as other country-specific findings are discussed in more detail in the respective country sections that follow.

4.1. Germany

4.1.1. Immigration from EU countries to Germany

According to the latest available Eurostat data, total inflows of both EU nationals and people previously residing in an EU country have been increasing in recent years: the number of incoming EU nationals rose from 354,000 in 2013 to 460,000 in 2015, while the number of immigrants who previously resided elsewhere in the EU (including non-EU nationals) grew from ca. 405,000 in 2013 to 513,000 in 2015 (Eurostat, 2017a, 2017b). According to the latest available OECD data, the largest inflows of foreign European nationals to Germany in 2015 were comprised by nationals of Romania (221,400), Poland (190,800) and Bulgaria (86,300), followed by Croatia (61,000), and Hungary (58,100) (see Figure 19) (OECD, 2017).

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Note: we generally rely on Eurostat data, but a country-level disaggregation for origin of immigration flows is not currently available for Germany in Eurostat data.
Looking at stocks of foreign-born immigrants, as shown in Figure 20, Poland (1,334,000) and Romania (547,000) also stand out as the origin countries for the two largest stocks of European-born immigrants living in Germany, followed by stocks of Italian (442,000), Greek (257,000) and Croatian-born (255,000) migrants (OECD, 2017).
For a first look into the main drivers of EU citizens’ migration to Germany, in the above figure we show the relative share of each type of indicated reason as suggested by LFS AHM 2014 absolute values available via Eurostat (2016).\textsuperscript{13} Family reasons were indicated by 46% of EU citizen respondents living in Germany as immigrants. By comparison, combined work reason categories only made up a total of 23% of responses; most of these migrant workers had not found a job before migrating. Education and humanitarian reasons were only indicated by a respective 3% and 6% of EU-citizen migrant respondents residing in Germany. The prominence of family-related reasons somewhat contradicts the existing body of literature outlined in the following, which seems to largely focus on inflows driven by economic motivations.

The OECD (2017) estimates that around 80% of European migrants who arrived in Germany between January and September 2016 were from EU countries for which mobility restrictions were lifted in 2011, 2014 or 2015. For the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, Germany exhausted the period of a maximum of seven years for which a country has the option to impose restrictions on the free movement of workers (Hanganu, Humpert, 2017).

\textsuperscript{13} Note: while a more detailed analysis of this LFS data would be useful, to our knowledge such a study has not yet been conducted for intra-EU movements in particular. We therefore calculate some basic relative frequencies, but a detailed original analysis of the data falls beyond the scope of this literature review.
Thus, free mobility has applied to workers from the EU8\textsuperscript{14} and EU2 countries since 2011 and 2014, respectively. The latest expansion of the European Union, with Croatia joining in 2013, and a subsequent lift of mobility restrictions in 2015, help explain the recent increases in immigration flows from Croatia to Germany (OECD, 2017). Broadly, immigrant flows to Germany can be subdivided into two main groups. While over two thirds of European immigrants came from the EU10\textsuperscript{15} countries and Croatia in 2016, the BAMF (2017) estimates that 14.5\% came from Southern European countries hit hard by the economic crisis, like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

The movement of persons from the new member states to Germany has been described as “a key issue in the German-EU relationship since 2004” (Geddes & Scholten, 2016, p. 96). It is therefore unsurprising that a large part of the literature focuses on these movements and especially on migration flows from Romania and Bulgaria (see Hanganu et al., 2014; Brücker, Hauptmann, & Vallizadeh, 2013; Jobelius, 2015). Other scholars investigate the consequences of these migration flows for the Germany labour market and the economy (see Baas & Brücker, 2010; Baas, 2014; SVR, 2013). Literature that investigates the micro-level determinants of migration flows is lacking, similarly to literature that seeks to explain mobility streams within the EU15\textsuperscript{16} that have Germany as their destination.

Migration from EU12\textsuperscript{17} countries to Germany is commonly explained with the final removal of all restrictions on labour mobility, alongside the relatively large income and prosperity differences between these countries and Germany (Engler & Weinmann, 2015; Hanganu et al., 2014; Kovacheva, 2014). For instance, differences in purchasing power and differences in minimum wages persists at high levels with 8,84 Euros in Germany compared to 1,65 Euros in Romania and 1,42 Euros in Bulgaria (Statista, 2017). Large income differences between Germany and the EU12 are an important pull factor for a growing number of immigrating health care personnel. In 2009, the average wage level in the health care sector was more than four times as high in Germany than in Bulgaria and Romania (Rada, 2016). The results

\textsuperscript{14} Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia

\textsuperscript{15} Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia

\textsuperscript{16} Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

\textsuperscript{17} Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria
confirm Barslund et al. (2015) in that the “main engine of intra-EU mobility during the past decade has been the large income gap between the EU15 and the new EU10” (p.2).

A second key development in the past decade relates to the economic crisis, which has led to increased outflows from the crisis-hit countries to Germany due to growing levels of unemployment (Teney, 2017; Engler & Weinmann, 2015). Despite being among the countries most affected by the economic crisis, Germany’s unemployment rate increased only modestly between 2008 and 2009 and has been declining again since 2009 (Klekowski von Koppenfels & Höhne, 2016). The recession seems to have played a particularly important role for Southern European immigrants: as argued by Klekowski von Koppenfels and Höhne (2016), the relatively strong position of the German economy, combined with high unemployment levels in Southern Europe was the major trigger behind the increase in intra-European migration to Germany from these countries since 2009.18

Nonetheless, Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2014) note a lack of research on the motivations of emigrants from Southern Europe. Their own empirical study, an online survey that collected responses from 919 Greek citizens who emigrated between 2007 and 2013, aimed to be a first step to better understand the emigration wave. The scholars find that the motivations of Greek emigrants are less related to poverty and absolute necessity than to better career opportunities and overall more attractive prospects, along with an overall disillusionment in their own country. They conclude that a relative deprivation experienced as a result of the crisis, coupled with frustration of domestic conditions, encouraged Greek citizens to move to countries like Germany in search for better future prospects (Triandafyllidou & Gropas, 2014). Apart from these push-factors, labour flows to Germany are also officially encouraged, for example through the MobiPro-EU programme (Klekowski von Koppenfels & Höhne, 2016). Developed after the economic crisis, the Federal Employment Agency together with the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs assist

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18 It is worth noting that the presence of Southern European immigrants in Germany is hardly a new phenomenon. In fact, Pichler (2017) describes the inflow of migrants from Southern Europe as a “revival of immigration to Germany” (p.25), referring to the historical Gastarbeiter (guestworkers) flows that took place between the mid-1950s and 1973, during the Wirtschaftswunder (economic upturn) following World War Two (Pichler, 2017). Against the expectation that most of the immigrant workers from Southern Europe would return to their home countries, many of them settled permanently and family members have joined in the following decade (Steinhardt, Galgóczi, Leschke, & Watt, 2009).
young people in taking up a vocational training programme or employment. Approximately 60% of all applicants in 2013 were of Spanish nationality; however, no data exists on the relative importance of these services in the migrants’ decision-making (Klekowski von Koppenfels & Höhne, 2016).

Bertoli, Brücker, and Moraga (2013) point to a third crucial development to help explain the increased migration flows to Germany: the diversion of migration flows from Bulgaria and Romania. These flows formerly targeted Southern countries, but shifted their course towards Germany because of the slower recovery from the economic and financial crisis in their former destination countries (Bertoli et al., 2013). Until 2010, Italy and Spain were by far the main destination countries for Bulgarian and Romanian migrants, due to these countries’ high demand for low-skilled workforce in the agriculture and construction sector (Jobelius & Stolciu, 2014; Hanganu et al., 2014). Since 2010, however, Germany has attracted more and more migrants from the EU10 countries, while Italy and Spain have experienced lower flows (Hanganu et al., 2014). Bertoli et al. (2013) estimate that almost 80% of the increase in immigration to Germany from Bulgaria and Romania can be attributed to the worsening situation in alternative countries of destination, whereas only 20% can be explained by the labour market situation in Germany itself.

Lastly, a key trend emerging from the literature shows that Germany has attracted a large number of highly skilled workers from central and Eastern Europe since the enlargement, especially from Bulgaria and Romania, and findings also note that Germany benefits from this immigration (Teney & Siemsen, 2017; Hanganu et al., 2014; Klekowski von Koppenfels & Höhne, 2016). Engler and Weinmann (2015) find that the share of academics from Bulgaria and Romania is 3 percentage points higher than the share of academics among those without migration background, causing a “qualitative immigration gain” (p.15). Klekowski von Koppenfels and Höhne (2016) confirm that Germany has shown a higher ability to attract a younger and more skilled workforce in recent years, especially when compared to the post-war Gastarbeiter flows to Germany. However, even though the proportion of highly skilled immigrants is relatively large, at the same time, many EU2 (Romania, Bulgaria) citizens are employed below their qualifications and earn significantly less than other groups (Jobelius, 2015). Moreover, Jobelius (2015) points to systematic exploitative and illegal
employment of central and Eastern European immigrants in Germany and the significant occurrence of human trafficking and forced labour.

4.1.2. Emigration from Germany to other EU countries

Germany has seen slowly growing emigration flows to other European countries, recently rising from ca. 133,000 in 2013 to 183,000 individuals in 2015, according to UNDESA data available for the 2001-2008 period as well as current Eurostat data (Eurostat, 2017b; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2015). Below, Figure 22 shows the main countries of destination for individuals leaving Germany for another EU country in 2015, which include Austria, the UK, Netherlands, Spain, and Italy (note that this figure includes both German nationals and foreigners).

![Figure 22: Emigration flows from Germany to other EU countries (2015)](image)

Source: authors’ own calculations based on Eurostat (2017b) mirrored immigration data; note possibility that significant countries may be left out due to data gaps.

Figure 23 (below) shows the EU countries with the largest stocks of German-born immigrants. The order is different, but the group of the top five countries is the same; the United Kingdom hosts the largest stock of German-born individuals, followed by Austria, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands (Eurostat, 2017c).
In our review, we find that the bulk of the existing literature on intra-EU emigration from Germany focuses on the return intentions of former guestworkers, whilst more recent scholarship has focused on circular migration patterns among EU10 workers. There is relatively little literature that focuses on the motivations driving the emigration of German nationals, with a few exceptions (presented below). No literature was found on the return or onward migration of recent migrants from the crisis-hit Southern European countries, perhaps because this is such a recent phenomenon.

Several studies have analysed the emigration intentions of immigrants in Germany using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSEOP), looking in particular at immigrants from former guestworker-sending countries in Southern Europe (see, for example, Constant & Massey, 2002; Gundel & Peters, 2008; Haug, 2008; Kirdar, 2009; Uebelmesser, 2006; Yahirun, 2009). Unfortunately, these studies are of limited relevance for this paper, given that they mostly use data from the 1980s to the early 2000s and make little distinction between EU and non-EU countries of origin and destination. Given the small number of recent and relevant studies, the following section includes some findings from those studies that stretch at least into the mid-2000s.
Using data from 1984-2007, Yahirun (2009) finds that immigrants from Greece and Spain are more likely to migrate onwards than immigrants from Turkey; and, using data from 1984-2006 Gundel & Peters (2008) find that immigrants from EU countries are more likely to migrate onwards than immigrants from non-EU countries. Other findings offered by these studies relate particularly to the effect of economic and social integration and life-cycle considerations on return decision-making among guestworkers in Germany. The strength of emotional attachments to Germany and, conversely, to the country of origin, particularly in terms of family and social ties, is found to affect guestworkers’ inclination to return home (Gundel & Peters, 2008). Economic outcomes also have an effect: Gundel & Peters (2008) find that more qualified immigrants are more likely to return to their countries of origin. Meanwhile, Yahirun (2009) looks at the return propensities of older foreign-born men in particular and finds that older returnees tend to have lower education levels and are less well integrated into the German labour market than those who stay in Germany. The importance of lifecycle stages is also emphasised: Gundel & Peters (2008) find that return is much more likely among immigrants of retirement age.

A recent strand of literature looks into the return migration of Poles (and Romanians) across different European countries. While many of these studies are cross-national, in the following we highlight some findings relevant the German case. In a comparative study of Polish migrants in Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and Ireland, Luthra et al. (2014) find comparing responses from the UK and Germany, they find that similar a proportion of Poles stated intentions to return to Poland (42% vs. 38%, respectively), remain in the host country (29% vs. 24%), or migrate onwards to another country (8% vs. 6%). The share of those who did not know what they would do was also similar (9% vs. 10%). However, a larger proportion of respondents intended to move back and forth between Poland and Germany (22%) than between Poland and the UK (12%) (Luthra et al., 2014).

Luthra et al. (2014) apply a latent class analysis to distinguish between the intentions of “circular”, “temporary”, “settled”, “family” migrants and so-called “adventurers”. The study finds that circular migrants who intend to move back and forth between Poland and their chosen receiving country are motivated primarily by work, as are temporary migrants. Settled migrants who do not intend to return or who intend to move onto a third country at
a later point also state work as their primary motivation, but also cite family and study reasons, as well as moving "just because". Family migrants show greater diversity in their intentions to settle, return, or move onto a third country, as do those migrants classed as "adventurers" (migrants who report deciding to leave Poland "just because"), although only 13% of these adventurers state an intention to return to Poland. Students are more likely to intend to return to Poland than these last two other types of non-economic migrants, but are also likely to want to move onto a third country.

The emergence of such “back and forth” migration patterns is also discussed by Fihel & Grabowska-Lusinska (2014), whose qualitative analysis of Polish migrants finds that continuous mobility may not be the result of disappointed expectations upon return but may rather be a deliberate migration strategy employed by individuals such as housewives, students and seasonal workers. Such individuals may move back and forth between EU countries in order either to take advantage of higher potential earnings abroad, or as a way of earning income alongside their other employment, educational, or caring commitments in their place of residence, or who otherwise prefer not to commit to full-time employment in Poland (Fihel & Grabowska-Lusinska, 2014). Although this study does not distinguish between countries of destination, particular attention is paid to back and forth mobility between Poland and Germany, for which the costs of circular movements are particularly low (Fihel & Grabowska-Lusinska, 2014).

Kopetsch (2009) provides some analysis of the emigration of German doctors. Based on annual statistical reports provided by Germany’s medical associations, the author finds that between 2001-2006 the emigration of German doctors accelerated from 1437 to 2575. 78% of the emigrants recorded in 2006 were German nationals. Switzerland and Austria, both German-speaking countries, are the preferred destination countries for these emigrants, followed by much smaller numbers to the UK, USA and the Scandinavian countries. Citing evidence from Ramboll Management (2006) the authors explain that German doctors are motivated primarily by the higher salaries and better working conditions (for example, more regular working hours and less hierarchical working relations) offered in the countries of destination.
One study analyses the motivations of young Germans in their twenties and thirties living in London (King, Lulle, Conti, & Mueller, 2016). Based on qualitative data, King et al. describe this outflow as “cautious migration from ‘boring' Germany” (p.7): young Germans consider their emigration to London as a temporary break from their more routine lives in Germany, and perceive London as offering a more exciting social and cultural scene and greater opportunities for self-realisation. German migrants are described as “cautious”: whilst they live in another country (the UK), life in London is not radically different from life in Germany, which is also accessible via budget airlines. Unlike the young Italian immigrants interviewed in this comparative study, interviews with the German participants revealed that their decision-making is not based on economic or employment incentives. Rather, for some of the German emigrants interviewed, temporary migration to London meant putting their career development plans on hold.

4.2. United Kingdom

4.2.1. Immigration from EU countries to the United Kingdom

According to Eurostat data, a total of almost 300,000 people have left the territory of another EU country (including both EU nationals and TCNS) to move to the UK in 2015, and a total of nearly 270,000 EU nationals migrated to the UK in 2015. The inflow of EU nationals, as well as former residents of another EU country have both increased in recent years (growing from 201,000 to 269,000 EU nationals, and 220,000 to 295,000 EU residents between 2013 and 2015), although the rate slowed down between 2014 and 2015. Looking at countries of previous residence and at nationality, of the largest groups of migrants for both came from Romania and Poland, followed by Italy, Spain and France (see Figure 24) (Eurostat, 2017a, 2017b).

However, as flow data from Eurostat is only as recent as 2015, it fails to record the effects of recent events that the “Brexit” vote may have had on intra-EU migration to the UK. In fact, as reported by the Migration Observatory (2017), between July 2016 and June 2017 – the first full year since the UK’s vote to leave the EU – the UK experienced a “great slowdown” in EU immigration: the decline of ca. 100,000 in net migration compared to the previous year.

Note that this citizenship-based statistic might include EU citizens arriving to the UK from a non-EU country (while the previous statistic includes all types of citizens who were previously residing in another EU country).
(from 336,000 in mid-2016 to 230,000 in mid-2017, 107,000 of which EU citizens) has been the largest recorded single-year decline in net migration to the UK. It was driven by changes in the number of EU citizens (both due to reduced immigration and also slightly increased emigration). The EU8\textsuperscript{20} and EU15\textsuperscript{21} were driving the decline, with their net migration falling by 63,000 together in this time period.

“Emigration is up but it’s not exactly a ‘Brexitodus’ at this point – the vast majority of EU citizens are not leaving. This is not surprising since most have been in the UK for several years and have put down roots here. Despite the slowdown, there are also more EU citizens arriving than leaving, so the EU population in the UK is still growing – it’s just growing more slowly than in the recent past. In other words, developments in the past year may have slammed the brakes on EU net migration but have not put it into reverse” (The Migration Observatory, 2017, para. 7).

\textbf{Figure 24. Main EU-origin immigrant flows to the UK (2015)}

According to the latest available Eurostat stock data, as of 2016 the UK had a foreign stock counting over 3 million EU-born residents. Polish-born individuals represented the largest group of foreign-born residents in the UK, followed by Irish-, German-, Romanian- and

\textsuperscript{20} Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
\textsuperscript{21} Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
Italian-born immigrants (see figure below) (Eurostat, 2017c). According to the 2016 Annual Report on Intra-European Mobility, the UK is still the top destination country of working-age European citizens who have been living in their current country of residence for not more than 10 years, the so-called recent movers (Fries-Tersch et al., 2017).

Figure 25. Main EU-origin stocks in the UK (2016)

Concerning motivations, data from the International Passenger Survey (IPS) 2015 suggests that the majority of European immigrants came for work-related reasons (72%), followed by formal education (15%) and intentions to “accompany/join” someone (7%). Whereas the majority of EU15 citizens had a definite job before moving to the UK, most EU8 movers came with the intention to look for work (Figure 26). The proportion of people intending to accompany someone else is similar for EU15 and EU1022 movers. However, a much higher proportion of EU15 citizens come to the UK for the purpose of study (Office for National Statistics, 2016). Given these results, European citizens’ migration to the UK seems to be predominantly motivated by work-related concerns.

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22 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
Figure 26. EU nationals’ reasons for moving to the UK (IPS 2015)

The picture is starkly different in the results of the 2014 LFS AHM: work related reasons only make up a combined 34% of responses from UK immigrants who are EU citizens. A third of these respondents had a job before migrating, while two-thirds did not. Instead of work, family related motivations are the most prominent in the LFS’s results, with 47% indicating this as their main reason for migration. With 11% of responses, education-related EU migration is more prominent than in other focus countries (where this accounts for 2-4% of responses). Asylum-related reasons are fairly rare (3%) (Eurostat, 2016).
A considerable amount of literature focuses on migration from Eastern European countries to the UK after the 2004 enlargement (see Anderson, Ruhs, Rogaly, & Spencer, 2006; Burrell, 2010; Akhurst et al., 2014). Since the post-accession migration period from Eastern European countries arguably constitutes the “single largest migration wave to the UK” (Sporton, 2013, p. 454), this focus is not surprising. The large population movement may at least be partly attributed to the UK’s policy not to impose any restrictions on migratory movements from the countries that newly joined the European Union in 2004. Of all 28 member states only the UK, Ireland and Sweden opened up their borders fully in the 2004 accession round, leading – at least in the UK – to migration flows far exceeding the expectations of the country (White, 2016). Despite some predictions that the UK might become an alternative country of destination to Germany, it was estimated in 2003 that between 5,000 and 13,000 EU10 migrants could enter the UK per year after the enlargement (Dustmann, Casanova, Fertig, Preston, & Schmidt, 2003). Eventually, more than half a million EU8 migrants entered the UK between 2004 and 2009, not counting an additional number of workers who took up work without registering (Drinkwater, Eade, & Garapich, 2009; Galgóczi et al., 2011). The developments spurred large public concerns about the economy and the strains imposed on public services as well as local infrastructures (Drinkwater & Garapich, 2015).
While many researchers argue that the full opening of the UK labour market is what explains the large-scale migration flows to the country, others point to other economic phenomena as the main push and pull factors (Burrell, 2010; Recchi & Favell, 2009; White, 2016); these factors include large income differentials, high levels of unemployment and a generally much lower standard of living in the accession countries, as well as considerable labour demand in the UK (Pollard, Latorre, & Sriskandarajah, 2008; Burrell, 2010; Benton & Petrovic, 2013).

Among the literature on UK immigration originating from Eastern Europe, we note an outstanding focus on Polish immigration. Drinkwater et al. (2009) explain this particularly large body of literature with the fact that an estimated 65% of all new immigrants from the EU8 countries to the UK came from Poland (see Burrell, 2016; Drinkwater et al., 2009; White, 2016; Parutis, 2014). This body of literature overwhelmingly points to economic factors as the main determinants in migrants’ decision to relocate from Poland to the UK (Pollard et al., 2008a; Drinkwater & Garapich, 2015; Akhurst et al., 2014). For instance, Drinkwater et al. (2009) point to extremely high unemployment rates in Poland, reaching 20% in 2003, combined with very low wages. By comparison, unemployment in the UK at the time was amongst the lowest in Europe. Remittances have also played an important role in the Polish migrants’ decision to settle in the UK (Drinkwater et al., 2009). As part of a qualitative study conducted in 2010 with 700 Polish migrants, Drinkwater and Garapich (2015) find that those sending higher amounts from abroad show a higher likelihood of staying in the UK for a longer period of time.

Nevertheless, Akhurst et al. (2014) and Pollard et al. (2008) stress that migration from Poland to the UK is not purely an economic phenomenon. They find that especially among the younger Polish migrants, the prospect of new adventures and greater autonomy, alongside the desire to learn or improve English skills, prevail over economic motives. Burrell (2016) stresses that Polish immigrants to the UK form a very distinct group, as many are very young (72% are aged between 20 and 29), with only 16% older than 35 years. In addition, out of all destination countries, the UK attracts the largest number of Polish university graduates (Burrell, 2016). Despite the high level of education of Polish immigrants, their returns to education tend to be lower than those of other immigrants in the UK; they are
often employed in low-paying jobs that do not match their education level (Drinkwater et al., 2009; Currie, 2007). Lastly, Sporton (2013) points to the role played by recruitment agencies in sustaining high levels of migration flows from Eastern Europe, as they offer placement of workers in flexible employment.

Despite the UK’s status as the largest net importer of European students (Van Bouwel & Veugelers, 2013; Rahimi & Akgunduz, 2017), the literature on European students’ motivations to choose to come to the UK in particular is limited. Rather, selected literature focuses on the outward mobility of UK students (see Findlay et al., 2006; Brooks & Waters, 2009; Behle, 2017) and the drivers behind international student mobility to the UK (Naidoo, 2007; Maringe & Carter, 2007). However, the high quality of education is considered to be the main factor driving the high volume of European students who move to the UK (Rahimi & Akgunduz, 2017; Rodríguez González, Bustillo Mesanza, & Mariel, 2011). Furthermore, Rahimi and Akgunduz (2017), who focus on student migration from Eastern Europe to the UK, find that the eligibility of EU students for low-interest government loans constitutes another pull factor.

**Immigration of EU citizens born in a third-country**

Within the context of Europe, the UK seems to be a particularly attractive destination for third-country nationals (TCNs) who have acquired citizenship in one European country and subsequently moved to another European member state – also referred to as naturalised TCNs, or, in this paper, EU-naturalised former TCNs (Ahrens et al., 2016). Although Ahrens et al. (2016) argue that the topic is still highly under-researched, we note that a growing number of qualitative studies exist which investigate this category of intra-European movers further (Ahrens et al., 2016; Nielsen, 2004; Van Liempt, 2011; Kelly, 2013).

Based on LFS data, the Migration Observatory (2015) has reported some key statistics on immigrants who are naturalised EU citizens, that is EU citizens who were born outside the EU and acquired the citizenship of an EU country (not the UK) before migrating to the UK. As of 2015, immigrants who were EU nationals but were born outside the EU citizens accounted for ca. 3% of the UK’s foreign-born population in the first quarter of 2015. Between 2004 and 2015, the number of these people has increased by an estimated 186,000, from about 78,000 to about 264,000 (for comparison, the number of native EU citizens has increased...
from 0.94 million to 2.6 million in this period). Since the overall immigration of overall EU citizens has increased significantly from 2004 to 2015 (with the number of native EU citizens growing from 0.94 million to 2.6 million), the relative share of non-EU born among EU-citizen migrants has only changed slightly, fluctuating between 6% and 9% since 2004 (falling from 9% in 2005 to 6% in 2007, and rising again to 9% in 2015).

In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, immigrants in the UK who are EU citizens born in a third country are a little older, on average, than other EU citizens and other non-EU born immigrants. The higher average age is likely due to the fact that many of them had to spend some time in another EU country (several years are usually necessary to gain citizenship through residence) before migrating onwards to the UK. EU citizenship is a major facilitator of bureaucratic obstacles to employment, which may help explain why the employment rates of EU citizens born outside the EU (73% in 2015) is closer to other EU citizens (80%) that to other non-EU born (73%) immigrants. In terms of the skill levels of their employment, EU citizens born in non-EU country are more likely to be in high-skilled work than other EU citizens (The Migration Observatory, 2015).

Figure 28. Countries of nationality of EU immigrants born outside the EU (UK)

![Countries of nationality of foreign, non-EU born EU nationals living in the UK, 2015](source: LFS as cited in the Migration Observatory (2015))
A recurring motivational factor for migration to the UK for former TCNs who have acquired an EU citizenship, as identified in the literature, is the discrimination and exclusion from society experienced in the first countries of residence, namely Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden (Ahrens et al., 2016; Nielsen, 2004; Van Liempt, 2011; Kelly, 2013). (Nielsen, 2004) finds that Somalis in Denmark construct an idyllic image of Britain that is marked by “freedom, tolerance and opportunities” (p.10), the opposite of their perception of and experience in Denmark. (Van Liempt, 2011) takes a closer look at Dutch-Somalis who engage in onward migration because they cannot establish a feeling of belonging in the Netherlands, adding how anti-Muslim sentiments in the media increase alongside daily encounters of racism. Similarly, Ahrens et al. (2016) stress that discrimination in the previous country of residence plays a key role in the decision to migrate onwards. Through interviews with Somalis, Iranians and Nigerians who previously resided in the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany, respectively, they find that these EU citizens who were born in a third-country migrate onwards in order to escape discrimination and racism. Thereby, they attempt to “complete certain aspects of their integration process in another Member State” (Ahrens et al., 2016, p. 84). Thus, it seems as if for many EU-naturalised former TCNs, the UK is the top destination for onward migration due to its perceived high levels of cultural diversity and tolerance, lower levels of discrimination and larger diaspora communities.
Kelly (2013) points out that next to the desire for a stronger sense of belonging in the UK, the hope for better employment opportunities is likely to have played into the decision-making of the Iranian refugees who onward migrate from Sweden to the UK. These migrants tend to be highly educated, but face difficulties in finding employment. Similarly, a growing number of Latin Americans have left Spain in the post-2008 period in order to escape unemployment and existing debts in the country (Mas Giralt, 2017). This empirical evidence shows that the motivations of third-country nationals to migrate onwards to the UK differ greatly from the motives of EU nationals, not only due to their limited mobility rights, but also due to a substantial lack of integration in their first country of residence in Europe.

4.2.2. Emigration from the United Kingdom to other EU countries

Emigration from the UK to other EU countries has been growing only slightly in recent years (from ca. 114,000 to 125,000 individuals between 2013 and 2015) according to Eurostat data (Eurostat, 2017b). As shown in Figure 30, the main countries of destination recorded were Spain, France, Germany, Poland and Italy (note that this figure includes both UK nationals and foreigners). As of 2016, Ireland and Spain hosted the largest stock of UK-born immigrants, followed – distantly – by Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden (Eurostat, 2017c).

![Figure 30. Emigration flows from the UK to other EU countries (2015)](image)

Main destinations of emigrants leaving UK for another EU country, 2015

Source: Eurostat (2017b); note possibility that significant countries may be omitted due to data gaps.
A report commissioned by the UK Home Office provides a snapshot into the composition of these flows (Murray, Harding, Angus, Gillespie, & Arora, 2012). The authors report estimates from the Long-Term International Migration (LTIM) data which shows that 43% of respondents emigrating from the UK in 2011 with the intention to stay in their country of destination for more than a year were British citizens. Other EU citizens and non-EU citizens, most of whom were returning to their countries of origin, made up approximately equal proportions of the remaining 57%. Spain and France were the most popular EU destinations for emigrating British citizens during this period, according to International Passenger Survey (IPS) data from 2000-2010 (also reported by Murray and colleagues). British emigrants to France and Spain tend to be older than British emigrants to other destination countries, reflecting lifestyle migration trends already discussed (Murray et al., 2012). Between 2001 and 2010, emigrating EU citizens mainly left the UK for their respective areas of origin: over 90% of EU8 left for EU8 countries, and around 85% of EU15 citizens left for EU15 countries (Murray et al., 2012).

Generally speaking, the literature on emigration from the UK focuses on a wider range of motivations for emigration compared to the literature on emigration from the other case countries considered in this paper. Murray et al. (2012) overview the range of motivations...
for UK emigration, whilst Findlay & King (2010) focus on the emigration of UK students specifically, and other studies look at lifestyle migrants (see section 4.5). Furthermore, a relatively large body of literature focuses on secondary migration patterns among EU10 migrants, especially Poles, given the vast flows of Poles to the UK post-accession.

Moving on to the main findings on motivations for emigration, Murray et al. (2012) report data from the 2011 IPS which asks people leaving the UK for a year or more (both EU and non-EU citizens) about their main reason for emigrating. In 2011, 72% of all emigrants – to both EU and non-EU destinations – who provided a reason were leaving either to take up a job offer (44%) or to look for work (28%). Between 2002 and 2011, very similar proportions of British and other EU-citizens have left to take up definite jobs, but a much larger proportion of EU citizens have left to look for work (34%) relative to the same proportion of British citizens (18%). Spain was found to be a popular destination among British citizens emigrating for work. Although work-related reasons were most frequently cited among those individuals who provided a reason for their emigration to all destination countries between 2002 and 2011, the intention to accompany or join someone, and to undertake formal study, were also commonly cited. However, the proportions of British and other EU-citizens giving these reasons differ substantially. A much higher proportion of British citizens said they were going to accompany or join someone (23%) compared to other EU-citizens (9%). Germany was the second most popular destination country for British citizens emigrating between 2000 and 2010 to accompany or join someone (after Australia) (Murray et al., 2012).

Only 4% of the British citizens who provided a reason for their emigration between 2002 and 2011 said that they were leaving in order to undertake formal study, in comparison to 13% of other EU-citizens with the same intention. However, it is important to note that trends in UK student migration may have changed since 2012 when tuition fees for universities in England were substantially increased (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, 2010). In a report commissioned by the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Findlay and King surveyed UK students studying abroad in universities in the USA, Ireland, Australia, France, Germany and the Czech Republic (Findlay & King, 2010). With the exception of the Czech Republic, these countries were reported to be the popular countries of destination for
UK students studying abroad. Findlay and King found that the most important motivations for UK students to study outside of the UK were, in order of importance: 1) because they were “determined to attend a world class university”; 2) to “study outside the UK was an opportunity for a unique adventure”; 3) the move represents “the first step towards an international career”; 4) due to “limited course places at a UK university to study a favoured discipline”; and 5) due to “family encouragement to study outside the UK”. Unfortunately, besides some interview data which provides limited insight into how the importance of these motivations differ across chosen destination countries (for example, Irish universities are preferred particularly by those UK students aiming for top universities), the report does not distinguish particularly between motivations to study in different EU countries (Findlay & King, 2010). The motivations for lifestyle migrants emigrating from the UK are discussed in section 4.5.1 (Immigration from EU countries to Spain).

Using a survey of Polish migrants who had returned from the UK, Pollard et al. (2008) find that return was planned by almost half of the respondents. 16% of the returned Poles said that they had always intended to return once they had earned a certain amount of money. For 15% of respondents their plan was to return after a certain amount of time, and for 18% return was foreseen at the point that their temporary or seasonal work came to an end. A more recent working paper by Luthra et al. (2014) surveyed 777 Polish immigrants in London between 2010-2011 within the first 18 months of their arrival in the UK, and found that 42% of respondents stated that they intend to return to Poland. Among the remaining respondents, 29% intended to remain in the UK, 12% intended to move between Poland and the UK, 9% intended to re-migrate to another country (whether this would be within the EU is not known), and 9% stated that they were uncertain of their future plans (“don’t know”). In his 2014 study, White (2014) discusses evidence that about half of the Poles that moved to the UK since Poland’s accession in 2004 have since returned to Poland.

White (2014) challenges the argument that the return of Polish migrants from the UK is driven primarily by rising unemployment, citing lower unemployment rates in 2011 for Poles in the UK relative both to the general UK population and to unemployment in Poland. Return decision-making is instead often related to a migrant’s stage of life, White argues. For example, the author notes that Polish migrants may choose to return to Poland at the point
that they decide to ‘settle down’ or retire (White, 2014). Many studies also point to the primacy of family-related considerations in return decision-making (Pollard et al., 2008; White, 2014). For example, a survey by Pollard found that the most commonly given reason for Poles’ return migration from the UK was related to their family or personal life. 36% of respondents said that they returned because they missed home, 29% left because they wanted to be with their family in Poland, and 7% left because their spouse, partner or other family members were returning to Poland.

Furthermore White (2014) finds that disappointed expectations among Polish returnees upon returning to Poland, both in terms of the economic opportunities available to them there as well as their experience of social re-integration, may spur “double” or re-migration. Some migrants may adapt their original migration strategies and choose to settle permanently in, for example, the UK, while others may engage in more flexible, circular migration patterns (White, 2014).

4.3. Sweden

4.3.1. Immigration from EU countries to Sweden

According to Eurostat data, Polish immigrants constituted the largest single immigrant group of EU nationals moving to Sweden in 2015 (ca. 5,500), followed by Finland (2,800), Romania (2,300), Germany (2,300) and Denmark (2,100). As shown in Figure 32, the ranking among origin countries is somewhat different for immigration statistics based on country of previous residence, but the main countries are similar. In recent years (2013-2015), the size of the inflow of EU nationals has roughly stagnated, while the inflow of individuals previously residing in another Member State (both EU nationals and TCNs) has increased slowly, from ca. 36,000 individuals in 2013 to 38,000 in 2015 (Eurostat, 2017a, 2017b).
Meanwhile, the largest part of the stock of the foreign-born population in Sweden in 2016 was of Finnish origins (156,000), followed by Polish (85,500), German (49,600), Danish (41,900) and Romanian-origin (26,400) residents (Eurostat, 2017c).23

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23 It should be noted – although not EU – but geographically European Norwegian-born immigrants are consistently among the main immigrant groups in Sweden.
The figure below provides a first look into the motivations of EU citizens’ migration to Sweden, according to the results of the 2014 LFS AHM (Eurostat, 2016). Family reasons were by far the largest driver in this data, accounting for 58% of responses. Work-related motivations were relatively rare, accounting only for a combined 9% of responses. Instead, asylum-related migration was higher than in other focus countries, accounting for 20% of respondents. Education played a minor role, indicated by 4% of respondents (ibid.).

Figure 23. Main reasons for migration of EU citizens to Sweden (LFS, 2014)

Generally speaking, the literature on intra-EU migration to Sweden is limited, especially with regards to the drivers of specific immigrant flows. Since Sweden made its labour market accessible to Europeans during the 2004 enlargement, much attention has been paid to the consequences of this policy (Baltruks, 2016; Doyle, Hughes, & Wadensjö, 2006), while other scholars have focused on the intra-EU1524 migration flows between Finland and Sweden (Hedberg & Kepsu, 2008; Saarela & Rooth, 2006; Wahlbeck, 2015).

Like Ireland and the UK, Sweden was one of the few countries that did not impose mobility restrictions on citizens from the eight countries that joined the European Union in 2004 (Benton & Petrovic, 2013). However, while the UK and Ireland experienced large inflows of citizens from the new member states, inflows to Sweden increased in relative terms but

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24 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
were quantitatively low (Benton & Petrovic, 2013; Galgóczi et al., 2011; Wadensjo, 2007). It is frequently argued that linguistic factors might have played a crucial role in the direction of flows (Doyle et al., 2006). However, Galgóczi et al. (2011) point to the fact that Norway, a country culturally and linguistically similar to Sweden, has attracted a disproportionately large number of migrants from the new Member States, making it less likely that the Swedish language is what caused the relatively low inflow of immigrants from these countries. Rather, Galgóczi et al. (2011) suggest that the UK’s high labour demand, caused by a decade of uninterrupted economic growth, made it a preferred destination over Sweden. A general easier accessibility of the labour markets in the UK and Ireland might have played a role too (Doyle et al., 2006; Baltruks, 2016). The widespread concerns that EU10\textsuperscript{25} nationals would “benefit shop” in Sweden once it fully opens up its labour market were not confirmed after the enlargement (Doyle et al., 2006; Ruist, 2014).

Thörnqvist and Bernhardsson (2015) investigate what motivates Polish workers to migrate to Sweden and in particular, why they stay even though they often experience unfair treatment and exploitative working conditions. They find that earning more money for a set time period to be the main reason for working in Sweden; for all interviewees, this money was meant to finance a life project, such as building a house back in Poland, setting up a company, starting a family or saving for retirement. Thus, the decision to migrate seems to be exclusively economically motivated, with the intention to return home eventually. Wolanik Boström and Öhlander (2012), who investigate the migration of Polish health workers to Sweden, also find better working conditions and higher wages in Sweden as the main motives to move. Following the 2004 enlargement, immigrant workers from EU10 countries have been overrepresented in the health care sector (Gerdes & Wadensjö, 2008).

Next to immigration from the EU10 countries, Finn-Swede migration flows receive much scholarly attention. Migration from Finland to Sweden has been one of the largest post-war migration flows within Europe and still today, Finnish nationals constitute the largest stock of foreign nationals in Sweden, even though they no longer comprise the largest group of immigrants (Wahlbeck, 2015; Weber & Saarela, n.d.). Historically, this migration flow could be explained by economic factors: Finnish people moved away from a country severely

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\textsuperscript{25} Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
affected by the second world war to seek better employment opportunities in Sweden (Hedberg, 2007). At the time, Swedish companies recruited Finnish workers actively, and abundant job opportunities in Sweden attracted mostly young and low-skilled workers from Finland. Movements between the two countries were facilitated by the Nordic agreement in 1954, which allowed free travel and residence in the five Nordic states.

After a long period of predominantly labour migration, in the 1970s, the social characteristics of Finnish immigrants became increasingly diversified and their migration patterns more complex (Wahlbeck, 2015). For instance, Hedberg and Kepsu (2008) find that due to the interwoven labour markets of Sweden and Finland, many career migrants become mobile in order to promote their career. The authors compare these movers to the so-called nest-leavers, who move from Finland to Sweden “as a means of stepping out of the parental home” (Hedberg & Kepsu, 2008, p. 105). Most of these migrants return to Finland within a few years. Overall, it is estimated that more than half of the 500,000 Finns who moved to Sweden in the last five decades returned to Finland after a few years (Saarela & Rooth, 2006). Later studies confirm that return migration and repeated migration between Finland and Sweden is common (Wahlbeck, 2015).

On a macro-level, Saarela and Rooth (2006) identify the geographical proximity and similarities in institutions, work life and culture as factors that promote the flow of migrants between the two countries. In addition, skills and human capital seem to be relatively easy to transfer (Weber & Saarela, n.d.). The language difference does not seem to discourage many migrants – in fact, Swedish is an official language in Finland (Weber & Saarela, n.d.). Moreover, a sizeable minority of Swedish-speakers lives in Finland; in fact, this group constituted around 30% of the half million Finns who migrated to Sweden between 1945 and 1994 (Hedberg, 2007). Hedberg (2007) goes one step further and argues that the migration stream of Swedish-speaking Finns to Sweden may be categorized as internal migration, based on the strong ethnic links between the countries. It should be emphasized that the migration between Finland and Sweden constitutes one of the few intra-EU15 corridors that receive considerable scholarly attention, not least due to its historical link.
4.3.2. Emigration from Sweden

According to Eurostat data, the rate of emigration from Sweden to other EU countries has stayed fairly constant in recent years (2013-2015) at around 21,000 individuals. As shown in Figure 35, the main destinations of these flows in 2015 included the United Kingdom and Denmark (both ca. 3,800), Germany, Finland (both ca. 2,500), and Spain (1,500) (Eurostat, 2017b). The EU countries hosting the largest stocks of Swedish-born immigrants in 2016 were Finland (32,000), the UK (31,600), Denmark (22,400), Spain (19,400), and Italy (6,000) (Eurostat, 2017c).

Figure 35. Emigration flows from Sweden to other EU countries (2015)

Source: Eurostat (2017b)
Altogether, we find very little literature on the drivers of emigration from Sweden to other EU countries. A few studies we identify on Swedish emigration relate to migration flows in earlier decades and/or do not look at intra-EU migration specifically. For instance, Nekby (2006) analyses the propensities of working-age Swedish and foreign nationals to out-migrate during the period 1991-2000. She finds differences in terms of how these out-migrants are positively selected in terms of education, and suggests that Sweden’s comparatively generous welfare system and compressed income distribution makes low-skilled immigrants more likely to remain in Sweden where they can benefit from these structures, while more highly skilled immigrants may be attracted by better employment and higher earnings opportunities to try their luck in other countries. Nekby (2006) also notes the onward migrations of refugees, who may be able to take advantage of employment opportunities in other EU countries once they have obtained citizenship rights in the first country of residence.

In the only recent and relevant study we find, Kelly & Hedman (2016) analyses the onward migration of refugees in more detail. Specifically, the author looks at onward migration as a strategy employed by Iranian-born refugees who are frustrated by their limited opportunities for professional development and social integration in Sweden. As discussed
in Section 4.2.1 on onward migration to the UK, London is a popular destination for such secondary movements; in this study, the Iranian migrants perceived London as a more open society where they could obtain more meaningful work, lead more fulfilling lives, and feel more valued by their host society (Kelly & Hedman, 2016).

4.4. Italy

4.4.1. Immigration to Italy from other EU countries

A total of about 63,500 EU nationals and 73,800 residents of other EU countries migrated to Italy in 2015 according to Eurostat data (Eurostat, 2017a, 2017b). These flows were largely dominated by a single country of origin – Romania. As shown in Figure 37, Romania is the number one country of origin, exceeding by far the next major countries of origin, which include Germany, the UK, France and Spain. Based on Eurostat data from 2014, Castro-Martín and Cortina (2015) find that between 2003 and 2007, the overall largest intra-European migration flows were recorded from Poland to Germany and from Romania to Italy, confirming the size and significance of the Romanian-Italian migration corridor. Circa one-third of Italy’s stock of foreign-born residents were born in another EU country in 2016, with Romanian nationals constituting by far the largest stock of EU-born immigrants (1,024,800), followed – distantly – by German- (211,600), French- (128,400), Polish- (114,400) and British-born (62,500) groups (see Figure 38) (Eurostat, 2017c).
Figure 37. Main EU-origin inflows to Italy (2015)

Main EU-origin inflows to Italy by nationality and country of previous residence, 2015

Source: Eurostat (2017a, 2017b)

Figure 38. Main EU-origin stocks in Italy (2016)

Main EU-origin immigrant stocks in Italy by country of birth, 2016

Source: Eurostat (2017c)
As in the case of previous focus countries, we look at results from the 2014 LFS AHM to gain a first overview of the drivers of EU migration to Italy. Family reasons once again were paramount among respondents, in Italy’s case accounting for 54% of responses. However, work-related reasons were also widespread, indicated by a total of 42% of respondents, only about a quarter of which had found a job prior to migration. Education-related moves are rare (2%), but even more rare are asylum-related moves of EU citizens to Italy (below 1%). The latter may indicate that while Italy is an important country of first arrival for asylum seekers, it is not a country to which they choose to migrate once they have EU citizenship (unlike Sweden, for example) (Eurostat, 2016).

![Figure 24. Main reasons for migration of EU citizens to Italy (LFS, 2014)](image)

Source: authors’ own calculations based on Eurostat (2016). Note: 100% = 2,322,900 individuals (est.)

In line with the stock and flow statistics mentioned, a large volume of empirical literature investigates the flows of Romanians to Italy (see Ban, 2012; Mara, 2012; Popescu, 2008). Other scholars focus on labour migration to Italy and the employment situation in the country (see Fullin & Reyneri, 2011; Finotelli & Echeverría, 2017; Bettin, 2011). Some attention has also been paid to Ukrainian migration to Italy, which is for a large part female-driven and concentrates on the domestic and care sectors (see Marchetti & Venturini, 2014; Fedyuk, 2011; Montefusco, 2008).\(^{26}\) The literature that explores intra-European migration to

\(^{26}\) Since this is not an intra-EU corridor, it is not discussed further in this paper.
Italy focuses almost exclusively on immigration from Eastern Europe, whereas literature about immigration from EU15 countries is strongly lacking.

Similar to other Southern European countries, Italy has changed its status from a country of emigration to an immigration country over the last few decades (Ambrosini, 2011; Triandafyllidou & Kosic, 2007). After having experienced massive outflows of Italian emigrants after the two World Wars, often referred to as the gastarbeiter flows, Italy began to turn into an immigration country from the late 1980s onwards, as it experienced an economic upturn and a resulting increase in demand for low-skilled workers in the manufacturing, construction and services sectors (Finotelli & Echeverría, 2017; Geddes & Scholten, 2016). Migration is seen as having played an important role in facilitating economic and social change in Italy and Spain from the late 1980s onwards (Geddes & Scholten, 2016). Even in the pre-accession period, specific bilateral agreements between Italy and Romania and Bulgaria were already facilitating movements towards Italy. Moreover, several rounds of regularization policies have increased the official figures of Eastern European immigrants in Italy (Brücker et al., 2009).

Fearing that inflows from Eastern Europe would increase even further following the two rounds of Eastern European enlargement (2004 and 2007), the Italian government decided to engage in transnational arrangements to limit the immediate access of EU8 and EU2 members into the Italian labour market (Castagnone, Salis, & Premazzi, 2013; Monti & Debenedetti, 2012). From 2004 to 2007, unconditional access to the Italian labour market was only granted to self-employed EU8 workers, whereas other types of workers had to apply for a work permit – the accessibility of which was limited by quotas. The government increased these quotas in 2006 (Monti & Debenedetti, 2012). In the context of the 2007 enlargement, some temporary restrictions were applied again. However, simplified access was granted for highly skilled and self-employed workers as well as for those active in so-called “strategic sectors”, such as the construction sector, metal-working or the domestic

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27 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

28 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia

29 Bulgaria, Romania
and care sectors (Monti & Debenedetti, 2012). While immigration rates from the EU10 more than doubled after 2004, immigration from Romania has been the most striking – to the point that Romanian immigrants represent the largest diaspora community in Italy today (Monti & Debenedetti, 2012; Ricci, 2015).

An important characteristic of the Italian labour market with regards to its appeal for some EU migrants seems to be its large underground economy, which makes it relatively easy to find an irregular, low-paid job (Triandafyllidou & Kosic, 2007; Bettin, 2011; Bleauhu, 2007). In fields including the construction, household, agriculture and tourism sectors, the high levels of informality are linked to a high demand for “flexible” migrant workers (Geddes & Scholten, 2016). Accordingly, a large number of irregular migrants have arrived in Italy over the last decades, many of them Romanian (Triandafyllidou & Kosic, 2007). Even though their number cannot be estimated exactly, Bleauhu (2007) roughly estimates that for every officially registered migrant, there are one to three irregular, unregistered Romanian migrants residing in the country. Bettin (2011) points out that many Romanians have become irregular by overstaying after entering with a valid temporary tourist visa. Thus, in combination with the existing shadow economy, the two enlargement rounds boosted European immigration to Italy, “with Romanian immigration taking the absolute lion’s share in the whole process” (Castagnone et al., 2013, p. 13). Contrary to expectations, migration flows to Italy did not experience a significant slow-down with the economic crisis (Bettin & Cela, 2014). In Spain, migrant labour has been hit much harder by the economic downturn, but foreign workers have not been affected to the same extent in Italy (Finotelli & Echeverría, 2017). These findings challenge Bertoli et al. (2013), who find that the economic crisis diverted flows of the EU2 away from Southern countries towards Germany and the UK.

Studies investigating motivational factors display an almost exclusive focus on Romanian immigration to Italy. In a quantitative study covering 1,000 Romanians who had moved to Italy after 2004, Mara (2012) finds that most of them are economically motivated. Over 85% of male Romanian migrants indicate economic reasons, including factors of looking for work,

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30 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
31 Bulgaria, Romania
taking a job offer or earning more money. Economic motives also prevail for female Romanian migrants, but to a slightly lesser extent. The study confirms the strong network effect on mobility patterns of Romanian migrants. Existing networks play a crucial role in the choice of location and in finding employment (Mara, 2012). In his case study, Ban (2012) finds that 50% of workers find their jobs through family members and 13% through “friends”, which often refer to informal recruiters. Furthermore, he finds that another important pull factor is created by specialized agencies for labour recruitment that form part of a “complex governance structure of labour flows between Romania and Italy” (Ban, 2012, p. 11). Brücker et al. (2009) note that in comparison to Spain, immigration from the new member states in Italy is largely female-driven; nonetheless, female movers also dominate flows from Poland and Romania. The demand in traditionally female jobs in the domestic and healthcare sector is high in both Spain and Italy, thereby attracting a multitude of foreign female workers (Geddes & Scholten, 2016). Moreover, Brücker et al. (2009) find that migrants from the NMS concentrate in the age group of 25 to 44 years – i.e. prime working age – further stressing employment as the main reason to enter and stay in Italy for most migrants from these countries.

All in all, while recent literature on migration motives of immigrants in Italy is limited (especially in its focus), existing studies consistently suggest that migration movements are largely driven by economic motivations.

4.4.2. Emigration from Italy to other EU countries

A total of about 87,000 people have emigrated from Italy to another EU country in 2015, according to Eurostat data, following recent years’ slowly growing trend (2013 marked 68,100 EU-bound emigrants). The top countries of destination were Germany (20,300), the UK (19,200), France (12,700), Romania (12,200) and Spain (5,000) (Figure 40) (Eurostat, 2017b). The largest stock of Italian-born immigrants in the EU is found in the UK, which hosts 165,100 individuals. This is followed by Belgium (120,100) and Spain (114,200), and, more distantly, Romania (49,000) and Austria (31,000) (see Figure 41) (Eurostat, 2017c).
Starting with the former, a discussion paper by Del Boca & Venturini (2003) notes that, following the country’s long history of mass emigration, nowadays Italian emigration is characterised by a relatively small number of highly skilled Italians who leave the country in
pursuit of better job opportunities. King et al. (2016) offer a qualitative investigation of the migration experiences of young Italian graduates in London. Interviews conducted between 2009 and 2013 find that for many of these highly skilled Italian-born emigrants in their twenties and thirties, there are ideological as well as economic and career-related aspects to their emigration decisions. More than just due to the effects of the economic crisis in Italy, these emigrants perceived of their career development in Italy as being blocked by a culture of hierarchical and corrupt practices in the labour market. London, on the other hand, was seen as a more meritocratic and socially liberal society, where these emigrants have the opportunity to develop their careers, earn higher incomes, and lead more independent lives.

In his comparison of “old” and “new” Italian emigration, Scotto (2015) confirms this trend. Three fifths of the “new” Italian emigrants interviewed for this study between 2008 and 2010 (and who had arrived from 1980 onwards) reported that their main reason, or one of their main reasons for emigrating to the UK was work-related, and another fifth reported that their main reason was related to their studies. But unlike earlier waves of Italian emigrants to London who were driven by the need to find employment, Scotto emphasises that contemporary Italian emigrants come to London not to find any job, but rather to find employment that is appropriate to their qualifications and in which they can put their skills to use. Likewise, these emigrants are attracted by London’s perceived culture of greater open-mindedness which offers young adults greater autonomy and opportunities for self-realisation (Scotto, 2015).

Other literature focuses on the onward and return movements of immigrants formerly residing in Italy. Although of limited relevance for this study given that it makes little distinction between EU and non-EU nationals, di Belgioioso and Ortensi (2013) model migrant return intentions based on survey data collected between 2010 – 2012 and which includes in its sample naturalised and second-generation immigrants. The authors conclude from their analysis that onward and return decisions are shaped differently. According to the study, onward migration intentions are more likely among men, graduates, and those who are long- or short-term unemployed. Onward migration intentions are also more likely among those with EU citizenship or a long-term EC residence permit. On the other hand, return migration intentions are more likely among migrants with no education and who
work or have worked in male niche sectors where jobs are commonly low-skilled. Return migration intentions are also less likely among those who report the ability to put aside monthly savings. The authors therefore conclude that, whereas onward migration can be seen as the search for better opportunities on the part of those with the highest potential, return migration might rather be considered as the decision by migrants with lower capabilities to “give up” on their migration project (Di Belgiojoso & Ortensi, 2013).

A significant emigration flow from Italy is comprised by Romanian returnees – according to Hinks, nearly half of the Romanian migrants surveyed in a range of destination countries in 2010 (but mostly in Spain and Italy) planned to return home (Hinks & Davies, 2015). Based on her qualitative study of migrant Romanian couples who have returned home from Italy, Vlase (2013) argues that family-related reasons (for example, the benefits of raising children in Romania) are often used by married Romanian men to justify their preferences to return to Romania. These preferences, according to the author, are in fact based on the empowerment the men experience in re-establishing themselves in Romania, due to the more patriarchal Romanian culture and because their increased financial capital and economic autonomy confers on them enhanced social status.

4.5. Spain

4.5.1. Immigration to Spain from other EU countries

For the first time since the economic crisis, in 2015 Spain experienced positive net migration. The inflow of EU residents from other countries has been growing slightly in recent years, from 102,300 individuals in 2013 to 119,500 in 2015. Of the 106,100 EU nationals that newly registered in Spain in 2015 (this figure was 90,400 in 2013), the largest flows came from Romania (28,800), followed by Italy (18,600), the UK (15,000), France (9,000) and Germany (6,700) (Eurostat, 2017a, 2017b). A stock total of nearly 2 million EU-born individuals were living in Spain as of 2016. While the size of the Romanian-born stock of migrants in Spain is much smaller than in Italy, it still constitutes the largest group of foreign-born Europeans living in Spain (627,800), distantly followed by those born in the UK (300,300), France (204,400) and Germany (197,300) (Eurostat, 2017c). Benton and Petrovic (2013) estimate that over three-fourths of Romanians living in another European country live either in Italy or in Spain.
Figure 42. Main EU-origin inflows to Spain (2015)

Main EU-origin inflows to Spain by nationality and country of previous residence, 2015

Source: Eurostat (2017a, 2017b)

Figure 43. Main EU-origin stocks in Spain (2016)

Main EU-origin immigrant stocks in Spain by country of birth, 2016

Source: Eurostat (2017c)
A first look into the migration motivations of EU citizens to Spain with LFS AHM 2014 data reveals a similar picture to Italy. The largest part of respondents was driven by family-related reasons, while a combined 39% moved for work (again, only about a third had found a job prior to migration). Education reasons accounted for 3% of responses. Asylum-related moves were very low (below 1%); like Italy, Spain is presumably a country of first arrival for refugees, rather than a country of resettlement (Eurostat, 2016).

The literature regarding intra-European migration to Spain largely focuses on emigration from Eastern Europe and predominantly from the EU2 countries 32 (see Stanek, 2009; Bleauhu, 2007; Marcu, 2012; Mestres, Molina, Hoeksma, & Lubbers, 2012). Nevertheless, Spain also attracts some scholarly attention as the most popular destination country of lifestyle migrants, particularly British retirees (Huber & O’Reilly, 2004; Casado-Díaz, 2009; Huete et al., 2013; Olsson & O’Reilly, 2017).

Since joining the European Community in 1986, Spain has experienced major economic growth, which peaked in the years before the financial crisis in 2009 (Stanek, 2009). A large share of this economic success could be attributed to the labour intensive sectors, in which high labour demand was met by massive inflows of foreign workers (Royo, 2009; Stanek, 32 Bulgaria, Romania

Source: authors’ own calculation based on Eurostat (2016). Note: 100% = 2,500,100 individuals (est.)
With the turn of the century and warming relations between Western and Eastern Europe, Mediterranean countries have become the main destination for Romanian and Bulgarian nationals; more specifically, the number of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe to Spain has multiplied by a factor of over 20 (Stanek, 2009). During the 1990s, when Bulgarian and Romanian citizens still required visas for many European countries, Spain was a popular destination country due to its relatively higher tolerance for irregular migrants and clandestine work (Stanek, 2009; Vîrgă & Iliescu, 2017; Markova & Reilly, 2015).

When Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, Spain adopted a period of two years in which workers from EU2 countries were still required to apply for a work permit, with an exemption only for the self-employed among them (Holland, Fic, Rincon-Aznar, Stokes, & Paluchowski, 2011). In the following year, the economic crisis put an abrupt end to Spain’s economic bonanza (Lafleur & Stanek, 2016). In 2014, the unemployment rate of the foreign-born reached 33.3%. According to Lafleur & Stanek (2016), the economic crisis decreased the flows of migrants from Romania to Italy. Moreover, Barcevičius, Iglicka, Repečkaitė, and Žvalionytė (2012) find that the onset of the economic crisis in 2008 has increased circular migration, a finding that echoes those of Marcu (2011) regarding the intensification of Romanian migrants’ circular movements to Spain after 2008.

As noted by Stanek (2009), the existing literature describes the large presence of Eastern Europeans in Spain as the result of primarily economically-motivated migration, supported by empirical evidence on the migrants’ age structure: Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants are mostly young, concentrating in age categories with the highest labour activity. Bleauhu (2007) finds that most Romanian immigrants in Spain are target earners, seeking to accumulate financial resources that improve their well-being, for example by building a house, paying school fees or buying land. They often accept unpleasant conditions on the irregular market in order to earn higher incomes that they would in their home countries. In interviews with young Romanians in 2010, Marcu (2011) also finds that most of his respondents leave their country in search for better employment opportunities. Yet, he also confirms the findings of the Labour Force survey 2014, in that employing of immigrants in jobs beneath their level of education is a “distinctive character of the Spanish labour market” (Marcu, 2012, p. 212; Lien & Toleikyte, 2015).
The motives of Northern European immigrants to Spain seem in sharp contrast with those of their Eastern European counterparts, according to Ciornei (2016). While the latter are mainly motivated by labour, the former are driven by lifestyle preferences. Findings from multiple studies suggest that British nationals form the biggest group of retirement migrants in Spain, followed by German and Swedish nationals (Rodriguez et al., 2004; Olsson & O’Reilly, 2017; Schneider, 2010). To give an impression of the extent, by 2005, an approximated one million British home-owners were counted in Spain, alongside 750,000 British people living permanently in the country. Since then, while the balance has remained positive, the stock of Britons in Spain has dropped significantly, due to a decrease in flows and significant return flows; furthermore, the effect of Brexit is yet to be seen. Meanwhile, the number of Swedish citizens living in Spain has increased consistently since the 1980s was estimated to exceed 90,000 in 2015 (Olsson & O’Reilly, 2017). Apart from British and Swedish nationals, origin countries for retirees emigrating to Spain include the Netherlands, Belgium and the Nordic countries (Gustafson, 2008). However, statistics are often unsatisfactory because many retirement migrants do not register with the Spanish municipalities or move only seasonally to the Southern country (Huber & O’Reilly, 2004); (Gustafson, 2008, p. 455).

With regards to the motivations driving North-to-South corridors, it is apparent that the climate conditions in Spain play by far the most important role in the decision-making process. The Mediterranean climate is not only attractive due to its mild temperatures, the many hours of sunshine and the little rain fall, but also because it is a precondition for good health as it lessens physical ailments (Rodriguez et al., 2004; Kordel, 2016). Other important factors in the decision to move to Spain include its lower costs of living and the Spanish lifestyle, which entails a life close to nature and the consumption of regional products (Kordel, 2016). Past experiences also play a role. Gustafson (2008) points out that migration of retirees from Northern Europe is largely a consequence of tourism, as most migrants have developed an impression of the area while visiting as tourists (Kordel, 2016). This result is in line with the strand of empirical evidence suggesting that past mobility experiences within Europe positively influence future moves.

33 Note: Eurostat’s official figures only count ca. 20,000 individuals, but this is registration-based data
Concerning discouraging factors, Rodriguez et al. (2004) find that the difficulty in speaking the language constitutes a major drawback of the retirement movement. However, rather than holding back migration entirely, language barriers often result in the decision to join established communities of Northern European nationals in Spain (Kordel, 2016). Lastly, Olsson and O’Reilly (2017) find that the financial crisis has caused some return migration and fewer immigrants to Spain in subsequent years. Moreover, the impact of the Brexit on British migration flows to Spain is yet to be observed.

4.5.2. Emigration from Spain to other EU countries

According to Eurostat, emigration rates from Spain to other Member States have decreased in recent years – from 215,400 individuals in 2013 to 179,500 in 2015. The largest part of these outflows targeted Romania (46,100), followed by the UK (34,900), Germany (24,200), France (24,000), and Bulgaria (8,700) (Eurostat, 2017b). As of 2016, the Member State with the largest foreign Spanish-born population was the UK (126,900), Belgium (47,000), followed by Italy (32,000), Romania (36,800), the Netherlands (26,300), and Sweden (10,200) (Eurostat, 2017c).

Figure 45. Emigration flows from Spain to other EU countries (2015)

Source: Eurostat (2017b)
We find very scarce literature on the drivers behind recent emigration flows from Spain to other EU countries. A common assumption seems to be that the motivations to leave Spain are largely economic and related to the effects of the economic crisis in the country. For example, Izquierdo et al. (2015) report that, against a background of slowing GDP growth from 2007, total migration outflows from Spain (of both EU and non-EU nationals) began to increase, rising substantially further as the effects of economic downturn took hold. Izquierdo et al. (2015), explain these rapidly increasing outflows in terms of the high mobility of foreign-born nationals, mainly European and South American, but also notes the net outflows of Spanish-born Spaniards who mainly choose Germany and the UK as their destination countries (as well as the USA).

In terms of onward migration of the immigrant population, Larramona (2013) analyses a sample of emigrations from Spain made by foreign nationals between 2002 and 2009. Using the data on reported country of destination, Larramona finds evidence of onward as well as return migrations made by EU citizens leaving Spain for both EU and non-EU destinations, and also comments on the role of certain Spanish border regions and cities, particularly Ceuta and Melilla (located in Africa), as gateways to the rest of Europe, given the high rates of non-return out-migration reported there. According to Larramona’s analysis, the out-migrations of both EU and non-EU migrants are more likely to be return movements among

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**Figure 46. Main hosts of Spanish-born immigrant stocks in the EU (2016)**

![Main EU hosts of stocks of immigrants born in Spain, 2016](image)

*Source: Eurostat (2017c); note: based on mirrored immigrant stock data from respective countries*
migrants of retirement age (Larramona, 2013). Onward migration is, as expected, more likely to countries with a higher GDP per capita, and is also more likely among migrants whose countries of origin have higher unemployment rates (Larramona, 2013).

A more recent working paper for the Banco de España provides some insight into the effects of the economic crisis on emigration from Spain (Izquierdo et al., 2015). Analysing the characteristics of emigrants (both EU and non-EU nationals), Izquierdo et al. argue that Spain’s recent unemployment crisis has driven the outflows of both Spanish and foreign-born nationals. They identify Spanish-born emigrants as being younger and increasingly less highly educated compared to the non-mobile Spanish-born population, and foreign-born emigrants as being less highly educated than foreign-born stayers, suggesting that these are the groups likely to have been hardest-hit by the economic crisis.

As in the case of Italy, a significant outflow from Spain is comprised by Romanian emigrants. Marcu (2011) conducted a survey of Romanian immigrants in the Autonomous Community of Madrid and found that although 71% of respondents wish to return to Romania at some point in the future, substantially fewer were certain or near-certain that they would return in the next five years. Return motivations noted in the study include family-related considerations, emotional attachments to the country of origin, as well as a lack of integration or sense of belonging to the host country. Marcu (2011) emphasises that circular, “back-and-forth” patterns of migration may arise when migrants face difficulties in terms of job security and a stable quality of life, forcing them to adopt flexible, short term migration strategies.

5. Concluding remarks

The aim of this paper was to provide an overview of the existing empirical literature that helps understand the factors and considerations driving mobility within the European Union. Throughout a review process of over 200 studies – conducted almost exclusively within the 20, ideally 10 years – we note some general patterns and trends regarding the state of the literature.
First of all, we find that the scholarly literature on intra-EU migration is almost solely concerned with the movements of EU nationals. The movements of third-country nationals across Member States are a severely overlooked phenomenon. While an upward trend in these movements is recognised, even the exact volume and locality of these movements is difficult to assess due to data gaps. Producing an evidence base tracking the scope and direction of TCNs’ movements within the EU (e.g. by collecting information on movers’ previous and next places of residence together with their citizenship) is an essential first step before analysts can even attempt to understand the factors influencing these movements. In lieu of such a comprehensive evidence base at the European level, our current understanding of the phenomenon relies on a few case studies observing specific populations and destination countries. While some literature is available on the phenomenon of naturalised EU citizens born in third countries moving from the country where they acquired citizenship to another Member State (typically, the UK), the literature on internal movers who are still TCNs remains lacking.

A second pattern we notice in the literature is a very strong geographical focus on migration from the new member states directed towards EU15 countries, while much less is available on intra-EU15 movements or other interregional corridors. While East-to-West movements indeed constitute a large share of intra-EU migration flows, recent statistics indicate that the largest interregional flows are in fact originating from Western Member States (looking at residence-based data), making the degree of imbalance in the focus of the literature unwarranted (Fajth & Siegel, forthcoming). Some recognition of these flows is reflected in recent studies exploring some North-South corridors (mostly UK to Spain), as well as return migration of EU12 citizens from EU15 countries to their countries of origin (especially Poles and Romanians).

Next to nationality and geography, we observe an outstanding degree of attention focused on one type of migration in particular: work-related movements. Labour-motivated mobility has overall been studied more frequently and in more depth than any other type of intra-EU migration, despite the fact that its primacy among drivers is often challenged (more on this below). Yet, we note a growing branch of literature moving beyond the analysis of “classic” drivers of migration (such as work, family, education, asylum) to explore factors related to
personal enrichment, or lifestyle, weather, and cultural preferences, to name a few. Importantly, recent studies allowing to indicate multiple reasons for migration (within a wide range) recognise the multi-faceted decision process of intra-EU movers. A further important emerging finding regards the linearity of migration: in particular for contemporary EU10 migration, scholars are recognising that migration, emigration and return may not be singular events, but rather flexible and circular patterns.

Moving on from the state of the literature to the findings of these studies, the overall impression is that the motives of mobile Europeans are highly diverse, but work and personal relationships are clearly the two main driving factors. Work-related factors include employment, higher wages, career prospects and working conditions. Motivations tied to personal relationships involve familial as well as romantic relationships. While work and personal relationships are typically the two most often indicated motives for both males and females, their relative popularity within gender groups reveals the persistence of a traditional gender divide, with work being predominant for males, and family (or personal relationships) being predominant for women. Regarding geographical differences, income differentials elicit nationals from the new member states more often than EU15 nationals, who are likely to put more weight on career development, family motivations, or new experiences when deciding to move.

In connection to the latter, some recently emerging factors beyond the “classic” drivers of work and family include lifestyle considerations (including, for example, the environment, culture, and climate), motives related to personal development, and self-fulfilment. Education and asylum-related migration represent only a very small part of long-term intra-EU movements. However, study can play a role in triggering later movements: an important finding from recent literature is that past experiences seem to greatly influence the likelihood of future movements. Not only first work experiences, but also Erasmus study periods as well as holidays in a specific European country often stimulate future movements, be it in the form of further employment, education or retirement in the respective country. Finally, while welfare-driven migration is a common concern in the EU, generally speaking this is not confirmed by the existing empirical literature.
Regarding obstacles to intra-EU mobility, it appears that Europeans largely hold back from long-time moves because of social ties, perceived language barriers, and concerns regarding the recognition of qualifications. In fact, while it is the relatively younger and more educated Europeans who are more likely to move to another Member State, there is strong evidence of down-skilling and over-qualifications for mobile Europeans, especially among EU12 movers.

Our literature review included an in-depth analysis of five focus countries – Germany, the UK, Sweden, Italy, and Spain – chosen for their status and important destination and/or origin countries, as well as for their diverse labour market and geographical characteristics. The literature for all five countries largely focuses on the work-related movements that were facilitated by the 2004 (and later) accession round(s), despite the fact that cross-national surveys such as the LFS AHM 2014 underline the primary role of family motivations in EU immigration both overall and to these countries specifically. Country studies commonly focus on one or a few specific immigrant groups, for example Polish individuals in the UK and Romanians in Italy, but also Finnish migrants in Sweden and Britons in Spain – the latter two are some of the rare intra-EU15 corridors that receive scholarly attention. Another particular topic of study is the case of former TCNs who have moved to the UK after acquiring EU citizenship via another country. This is one of the rare strand of literatures that addresses the onward movements within the EU of non-EU origin groups. While this phenomenon has received attention in the UK, data limitations make it difficult to assess the volume of this type of migration to other countries (whether naturalised or still-TCN movers).

The existing body of literature on the five focus countries allows to identify some characteristic pull factors for each. For instance, Germany seems to attract Europeans largely due to employment opportunity and higher wages. While these factors are also a common draw in the case of the UK, the country also stands out – in the eyes of naturalised TCNs in particular – for its perceived high levels of tolerance and diversity, and perceived lower discrimination than other EU countries. Sweden also appears to attract Europeans for work reasons, although compared to the other focus countries, the Nordic country is an outstanding destination of EU citizens for asylum-related reasons (presumably, this is also a case of naturalised TCNs). Italy’s labour migrants appear to be specifically drawn by its large
underground economy. Finally – next to work opportunities for Eastern Europeans – Spain attracts a considerable flow of immigrants (e.g. the aforementioned Britons) drawn to the Mediterranean country’s climate and lifestyle.

While this paper provides valuable insights regarding the drivers of European mobility, the range and depth of its takeaways were limited by the shortcomings of the available literature. As mentioned earlier, specific nationalities, geographical areas and types of migration receive most of the attention while others continue to be overlooked. In addition, many partly-relevant studies were excluded due to methodological decisions. For instance, we decided to keep a focus on studies conducted within the past decade since the mobility opportunities (e.g. the enlargement rounds in 2004 and 2007) and economic conditions which are likely to have influenced Europeans’ mobility intentions have changed substantially from earlier periods. Other empirical studies were excluded from this literature review due to a lack of focus on movements within the EU, their sole focus on short-term mobility, or their sole focus a single European country (outside of our focus countries). In fact, the lack of recent EU-wide analyses of mobility drivers is a serious shortcoming. Part of this is due to lack of data, with recent EB surveys focusing solely on work-related mobility; however, even the relevant data that is available from the 2014 LFS AHM has not been analysed in depth with an intra-EU focus. Until EU-wide data informing on intra-European mobility motivations for both EU nationals and TCNs is collected, a thorough analysis of the aforementioned LFS data would constitute a considerable step forward. A further drawback in the synthesis of existing results is the difference in the phrasing of survey questions.

Lastly, while the opportunity to indicate multiple reasons in surveys (e.g. EB) allows for a more nuanced understanding of the decision-making process than a single answer-option would, a ranked list of answers would be even more insightful to grasp the relative importance of different drivers.

Despite these challenges, this literature review offers an unprecedented synthesis of the existing evidence on the reasons behind European mobility, providing a comprehensive overview of patterns at the EU level as well as an in-depth look into the particularities of five focus countries. Such a wide-ranging review of the existing evidence is a fundamental contribution not only for its summary of empirical findings, but also for its observations
regarding the state of the literature. These observations note on biases in the topical, geographical and other types of focus of existing studies and call attention to the remaining gaps that need further study. Expanding our current knowledge on overlooked phenomena such as the onward mobility of TCNs within the EU, movements originating from EU15 countries, and the role of non-economic motivating factors is key: the more nuanced our understanding of intra-EU mobility, the more accurately our policies will target the needs of migrant and host populations in the EU, and the more effectively we can reap the benefits offered by European mobility.
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REMINDER
ROLE OF EUROPEAN MOBILITY AND ITS IMPACTS IN NARRATIVES, DEBATES AND EU REFORMS

The REMINDER project is exploring the economic, social, institutional and policy factors that have shaped the impacts of free movement in the EU and public debates about it.

The project is coordinated from COMPAS and includes participation from 14 consortium partners in 9 countries across Europe.