



RE MINDER

ROLE OF EUROPEAN MOBILITY AND ITS IMPACTS
IN NARRATIVES, DEBATES AND EU REFORMS

Indicators of Normative Attitudes in Europe: Welfare, the European Union, Immigration and Free Movement

WORKING PAPER

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Indicators of normative attitudes in Europe: Welfare, the European Union, Immigration and Free Movement

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List of abbreviations

EB	Eurobarometer
EEA	European Economic Area (EU + Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway)
EFTA	European Free Trade Association (EU + Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland)
EU	European Union
EU 15	15 countries that were EU members before the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom)
EU/EEA	EU member states + 3 EEA member states
EU/EFTA	EU member states + 4 EFTA member states
ESS	European Social Survey

EU country codes

AT	Austria	IT	Italy
BE	Belgium	LV	Latvia
BG	Bulgaria	LT	Lithuania
HR	Croatia	LU	Luxembourg
CY	Cyprus	MT	Malta
CZ	Czech Republic	NL	Netherlands
DK	Denmark	PL	Poland
EE	Estonia	PT	Portugal
FI	Finland	RO	Romania
FR	France	SK	Slovakia
DE	Germany	SI	Slovenia
EL	Greece	ES	Spain
HU	Hungary	SE	Sweden
IE	Ireland	UK	United Kingdom

EFTA country codes

IS	Iceland	NO	Norway
LI	Liechtenstein	CH	Switzerland

Executive summary

- This report has three purposes. First, it provides an updated inventory of available data on European citizens' normative attitudes in four broad areas: the welfare state and work, European identity/citizenship and the EU, immigration and free movement. Second, it analyzes how normative attitudes in those four areas have varied over time, across the EU/EFTA countries for which data is available. Third, it identifies attitudes that appear to have the highest potential to generate political conflict among the EU/EFTA countries in matters relating to free movement.
- Subject to data availability, the inventory and analysis covers all member states of the EU28. It also covers the EEA/EFTA countries Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, which participate in the EU's free movement scheme on the basis of multilateral and bilateral agreements with the EU.
- Our analysis relies exclusively on survey items from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the Eurobarometer (EB).
- Attitudes towards the *welfare state* generally vary in line with the pattern found in prior research. There still are "two worlds" of welfare attitudes: In the Northern and Western parts of Europe, the welfare state is positively evaluated both with regard to the basic idea of redistribution and with regard to its implementation. In Southern and Eastern Europe, in contrast, citizens are positively disposed towards the idea of redistribution, but unhappy with its implementation. In this area, the survey questions where responses diverge the most between the EU/EFTA countries concern gender equality in the job market and the state of health services.
- Attitudes regarding *European identity/citizenship and the EU* vary widely depending on the dimension considered. As regards the citizens' identification with Europe and their attitudes towards EU citizenship, little Europeanization appears to have taken place in the member states, with the possible exception of Luxembourg. Respondents in Greece identify themselves as EU citizens to a lesser extent than respondents in other EU/EFTA states. Moreover respondents in all Southern European countries and several Eastern European countries feel that they do not really know their rights as citizens of the EU, or only know about them to some extent. In this area, the survey questions where responses diverge the most between the EU/EFTA countries concern the common European policy on migration, and the respondents' feelings of attachment to Europe.
- Attitudes towards *immigration* differ substantially between the EU/EFTA countries, and differences increased between the years of 2002 and 2014. Citizens in Hungary, the Czech Republic are outliers with markedly more restrictive attitudes than any other country in our sample, and a development towards more negative attitudes between 2002 and 2014 reinforced this pattern even further. At the other extreme, we find citizens in the Nordic countries which are outliers with markedly more positive attitudes towards immigration, and a development towards even more positive attitudes between 2002 and 2014. In

this area, the survey questions where responses diverge the most between the EU/EFTA countries concern whether proximity in terms of race should serve as a qualification for immigration, and whether the immigration of people from outside the EU evokes a positive or negative feeling.

- Attitudes towards *free movement* are analyzed based on EB data, and attitudes towards *immigration from European countries* (including non EU/EFTA countries) are analyzed based on ESS data. Attitudes towards *free movement* differ depending on whether inward or outward mobility is considered. Whereas attitudes towards the outward free movement of workers consistently fall into a pattern where the most positive respondents come from Eastern states, and the most skeptical respondents from Western states, the question of inward free movement of workers is another story: It encounters the strongest resistance among respondents in Western and Southern countries, and the strongest support in a mixed group of countries that contains Eastern and Western as well as Northern and Southern member states. Attitudes towards immigration from poorer European countries are predominantly negative in the Eastern states of Hungary, Estonia and Latvia, and predominantly positive in the Western states of Sweden, Germany, and Norway. Respondents in all examined countries are more in favor of the immigration of professionals than that of unskilled workers. The survey questions where responses diverge the most between the EU/EFTA countries concern the readiness to welcome the immigration of unskilled workers and people from the poorer countries in Europe.

1. Introduction

When citizens think of European integration, the free movement of persons is the result that first comes to their minds (Recchi 2015). Simultaneously, free movement has become one of the EU's most controversial policies, giving rise to hardening conflicts of interest concerning EU workers' access to national welfare states. This report is part of a larger research project that investigates the role of cross-country variations in national institutions (specifically, labor markets, welfare states and normative attitudes) in generating tensions between EU member states about the free movement of workers (for a theoretical discussion, see Ruhs and Palme 2018)

In this context, our report has three main objectives. The first is to provide an inventory of available data on citizens' normative attitudes towards issues closely connected to the European Union's policy of free movement. By normative attitudes we refer to attitudes that are rooted in ideas about how things ought to be, but remain changeable in the short term in response to new facts or perceptions (Ruhs and Palme 2018). Citizens in the four EFTA countries of Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland have been included in our analysis since they participate in the free movement scheme on the basis of multilateral and bilateral agreements with the EU.¹ We limit our inventory to four broad areas where normative attitudes and their longitudinal change patterns are likely to matter for the future of the EU's free movement policy: the welfare state, European identity/citizenship, immigration and the subject of free movement itself.

Our second objective is to analyze how normative attitudes in these four areas have developed during recent years across the EU's 28 member states and the four EFTA states. We believe that a simple and transparent presentation of this kind is of value, given recent debates about the need to “unpack” or refine indexes commonly used to measure attitudes towards the welfare state, immigration and European integration (see e.g. the discussions in Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Kentmen-Cin and Erisen 2017 and Roosma et al. 2013). Our inventory and figures may be used as a starting point for consideration and reassessment of previously used indices, as well as efforts to develop new, more precise, measures for future analyzes. In addition to this, we hope that our presentation may be of value for case study researchers who wish to select or describe their case from a comparative perspective, based on variables in the ESS or EB.

The report's third and final objective is to identify normative attitudes with a potential to generate political conflict among the EU/EFTA countries due to major differences of opinion between their populations. This part of the analysis should be useful for those looking for variables that may help explain differences between the EU/EFTA countries in terms of their political approach to free movement.

¹ In the following we will refer to the 28 member states of the European Union (EU) and the four member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) together, as the EU/EFTA countries. More information about the EFTA states and their relations with the EU is available at <http://www.efta.int>

2. Overview of indicators

Since our aim is an analysis both across countries and over time, our general strategy has been to select survey items with extensive coverage of the EU/EFTA countries, that also were repeated at least twice in time; preferably before the major enlargements of the EU (2002-2004), and recently (2014-2017). These selection criteria resulted in the decision to rely exclusively on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the Eurobarometer (EB). We explored several alternative sources of such data, the most important of which were the World Values Survey (WVS) and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The WVS has a number of items that reflect normative attitudes, but it only covers 8-10 EU/EFTA member states repeatedly during the years of interest. Similarly, the ISSP has items on normative attitudes, and covers 15-21 out of the 32 EU/EFTA member states depending on the item and year selected². In comparison, the ESS and EB provide better coverage of the countries of along with good opportunities for analysis over time. While some countries are missing in various ESS rounds, the EB and the ESS cover a large share of the EU/EFTA member states. Both surveys, moreover, contain relevant survey items that have been repeated at several points in time and thus permit longitudinal analysis.

The EB and the ESS are structured in different ways. The ESS is made up of two different types of thematic modules (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Core modules contain items that are repeated in each round of the survey (at times, items are added, removed or rephrased). Rotating modules contain items on specific themes and are implemented less frequently. The ESS is academically driven and runs every two years. It is based on face-to-face interviews with the respondents and the effective sample size in each country is 1500 (for smaller countries, 800).

The Eurobarometer contains three types of quantitative surveys: First, the Standard Eurobarometer runs twice yearly and draws on approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country. Second, Special Eurobarometer surveys are thematic studies carried out on behalf of European Commission DGs or other EU institutions. They are integrated in the Standard Eurobarometer's polling rounds. Finally, Flash Eurobarometers are telephone interviews carried out at the request of the European Commission to quickly obtain data on specific themes or target groups. Flash Eurobarometers (n=500/country) are of lower quality than Standard and Special EB surveys.

The following subsections provide an inventory of recurring ESS and EB modules and themes that tap citizens' normative attitudes towards the welfare state and work, European identity/citizenship and the EU, immigration and free movement in the period 2002-2017.

² ESS module overview: <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/module-index.html>.

Eurobarometer module overview: <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index>

For more information about Eurobarometer questionnaires and datasets:

<https://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/survey-series/>

For comparable items in other surveys, see the ISSP module overview:

<http://www.issp.org/page.php?pageId=4>, and the World Values Survey module overview:

<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>

2.1 Welfare, including work

Welfare attitudes are not part of the ESS core questionnaire, but were the focus of a rotating module first used in 2008 and repeated in 2016. Out of the 50 items included in the 2008 module on welfare attitudes, 21 items or parts thereof were repeated in 2016 (see the module proposal by van Oorschot et al. 2014).³

Since our objective is to analyze longitudinal change in normative attitudes across the EU/EFTA countries, we primarily selected the 21 repeated items for analysis. With three exceptions, items that only occurred in the original 2008 module have been excluded, and so have nine new items that only occurred in the 2016 module. The remaining items cover normative attitudes on the following themes:

- Egalitarianism in society and related beliefs, including gender equality
- Perceived consequences of redistribution, economic as well as social
- Perceptions of deservingness and misuse of social benefits relating to specific target groups and receivers
- Government performance in the areas of education and health
- Redistribution preferences in terms of desired degrees of progressivity
- Redistribution principles, preference for merit, equality or need as a basis for redistribution

Table A2 in the Appendix provides a full list of survey items on each of the above themes, including their exact wording and years in use.

2.2 European identity, including the EU and EU citizenship

Attitudes towards the EU, European citizenship and European identity are covered more extensively in the EB than in the ESS. While early ESS proposals by professors van Kersbergen and van Waarden (2001) argued for the inclusion of several items reflecting citizens' attitudes towards "shifts in governance" to the European level, the final core module only included one item on that theme. In the most recent ESS round (2016) the revised core module on "politics" contains a new item tapping the respondents' emotional attachment to Europe. This item cannot yet be analyzed over time and has not been included here, but will be a valuable addition to future analyses.

³ A new rotating module on justice and fairness will be included in ESS9, for which fieldwork will take place in 2018. We expect this data to be released in the autumn of 2019.

All but one of our selected items on the subject come from the Eurobarometer. Taken together, the recurring survey items cover the following themes:

- Attitudes towards European integration
- Attachment to the European Union
- Attitudes towards EU citizenship and rights, identification and awareness
- Perceptions of European identity
- Perceptions of the EU's image
- Support for key EU policies

Table A3 in the Appendix provides a full list of survey items on each of the above themes, including their exact wording and years in use.

2.3 Immigration

Several items measuring normative attitudes towards immigration form part of the ESS core questionnaire and have been repeated in all rounds since 2002. In addition to this, a larger number of items on immigration were included in a rotating module used for the first time in 2002 and repeated in 2014 (see Heath et al. 2014).

EB items on “Discrimination” and two differently constructed Flash/Special EB surveys on “Justice and Home Affairs” have been excluded here on the grounds that the items in these surveys never were repeated, thus ruling out analysis over time. This leaves us with one item from the EB. Together, the recurring survey items cover the following themes:

- Opposition to immigration, with regard to specific types of sending countries, groups, or skills
- Preferences regarding qualifications for immigration, e.g. language skills
- Perceptions of immigration as an economic threat, e.g. with reference to the job market
- Perceptions of immigration as a cultural threat
- Perceptions of immigration as a security threat
- Positive vs. negative feelings towards immigration

Table A4 in the Appendix provides a full list of survey items on each of the above themes, including their exact wording and years in use.

2.4 Free movement

Attitudes towards free movement are a neglected topic in the ESS, and only examined purposefully and in depth in the EB. The available ESS items on the theme of European immigration were designed to solicit respondents' attitudes towards immigration from "countries in Europe" in general and not from the EU/EFTA member states specifically. Some of the ESS items mention *the* specific "poor European country that provides the largest number of migrants" to the respondents' home country. This reference country was allowed to vary across the examined member states. In most cases, the reference country specified to the respondents is an EU/EFTA member state, but in some cases it is a non-EU/EFTA state such as Belarus or Ukraine (see Table A.6 in the Appendix for a list of selected reference countries).

In contrast to this, the EB items are designed with the intention to capture attitudes towards free movement as such, and the questions posed refer explicitly to "people from other EU member states," "EU citizens" or to "free movement".⁴ Unlike the ESS items, that only measure attitudes towards inward migration, the EB items are also phrased so that analysts may distinguish between attitudes to inward and outward free movement. Our empirical analysis of the data in section 4.4. will highlight these differences.

Two Special EB surveys have examined EU citizens' incentives to move to other countries/EU countries ("Geographical and labour market mobility", fieldwork 2009 and "Geographical Mobility of Citizens", fieldwork 2007). These do not concern free movement per se, but focus on neighboring concepts, and have consequently been excluded from our analysis.

The remaining ESS and EB items cover normative attitudes on the following four themes:

- Opposition to immigration from poor European countries, with regard to specific sending countries or worker skills
- Perceptions of free movement as a positive result of the EU
- Attitudes to free movement generally, inward as well as outward
- Attitudes to the free movement of workers specifically, inward as well as outward

Table A5 in the Appendix provides a full list of survey items on the above themes, including their exact wording and years in use.

⁴ To address this gap in the ESS, an original survey of attitudes to free movement was carried out in WP9 of the REMINDER project, see Meltzer et. al 2018.

3. Patterns of difference and change: How normative attitudes vary across the EU/EFTA countries

The aim of this section is to analyze how normative attitudes differ between countries and over time in the EU/EFTA area of free movement. Our selection of indicators covers four broad themes where normative attitudes and their longitudinal change patterns are likely to matter for the future of the free movement scheme: the welfare state, European identity/citizenship, immigration and the subject of free movement itself. For each of these areas, the following subsections provide a brief summary of key patterns of difference and change in normative attitudes, based on the relevant recurring survey items in the ESS and/or EB. This is followed by figures that allow the reader to make more detailed observations. The figures include all EU/EFTA countries for which data from the latest time of measurement (in most cases 2014-2016) are available.

Following the same order as in the previous section, we first discuss normative attitudes towards the welfare state, and then continue with normative attitudes towards the EU (including European identity/citizenship), immigration and free movement.

3.1 Welfare, including work

A large number of new topics were made researchable by the pioneering ESS welfare module launched in 2008. One crucial finding based on the module was that welfare attitudes in Europe follow a different pattern than the three worlds of welfare capitalism observed by Esping-Andersen (1990) in his landmark work. The world of welfare attitudes, the 2008 data revealed, was not divided in three, but rather in two. In the Northern and Western parts of Europe, the welfare state was positively evaluated by the citizens both with regard to the basic idea of redistribution and with regard to its implementation in their own country. In Southern and Eastern Europe, in contrast, citizens were positively disposed towards the idea of redistribution but unhappy with its implementation in their own countries (Roosma et al., 2013; Roosma et al., 2014).

The newly released welfare attitudes data from the 2016 ESS repeat module allows us to revisit these and other prior findings and evaluate whether the patterns still hold. It is worth noting that fieldwork based on the 2008 module started just before the global economic crisis broke out in September 2008, and was completed in the last set of countries during 2009. Together, the 2008 and 2016 modules thus make it possible to evaluate how the economic crisis impacted welfare attitudes in the European countries (van Oorschot et al. 2014).

As regards attitudes towards *redistribution*, Figure 3.1 shows that the overall pattern of widespread support observed in 2008 persists in 2016. Differences between the EU/EFTA countries remain small. Apart from this general pattern, a few details deserve comment. First, the average attitude towards redistribution in the EU/EFTA countries is somewhat less positive in 2016 than in 2008. The group of most positive countries is mixed and contains Eastern as well as Western/Northern states. Secondly, all countries that are less than averagely positive towards redistribution in 2016 are located in

Europe's Northern and Western regions, except the Czech Republic (CZ). The Czech Republic stands out in two ways; as the only Eastern country in the less positive group, and also as the most marked outlier in our sample, with that population which is the least positively disposed towards redistribution. Two further items - only asked in the 2008 module - tap attitudes towards different redistribution principles (merit, equality and need) in the context of pensions and unemployment benefits (Figure 3.2-3.3; see also Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012).

Citizen perceptions of *government performance* differ between the two key areas of health and education (Figures 3.4-3.5). Health services are generally more positively evaluated by citizens in the Northern/Western part of Europe than by those in the Eastern part, both in 2008 and in 2016 (Figure 3.4). However, in two Northern/Western countries, Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom (GB), respondents are less positive than the average among the EU/EFTA countries and in these countries the development between 2008 and 2016 is negative. In the area of education, in contrast, no clear geographical pattern is evident in the 2016 data (Figure 3.5). For example, citizens in the Nordic countries of Finland (FI) and Norway (NO) are the most satisfied of all, while their neighbors in Sweden (SE) and Denmark (DE) are the most dissatisfied. Eastern, Western and Northern countries are spread across the scale. Thus, the "two worlds" of welfare attitudes found in prior research cannot be observed on the basis of this particular indicator.

A number of ESS items in 2008 and 2016 focused on citizen perceptions of the *consequences of redistribution* (Figure 3.6-3.11). Two of these ask whether social benefits and services have the intended consequence of preventing widespread poverty and leading to a more equal society (Figure 3.6-3.7). With some exceptions, including Denmark (DE), the United Kingdom (GB) and Iceland (IS), citizens in the Western and Northern countries made more positive assessments in 2008 than their counterparts in the East. This remains the case in 2016, just as in 2008. The four remaining items in this category focus on unintended and negative consequences of redistribution; the possibility that social benefits and services make people less willing to care for one another, that they make people lazy or lead to tax levels that put too great a strain on businesses in the country (Figure 3.8-3.11). With regard to the first two indicators, little has changed since 2008 with the exception of Estonia (EE) and Poland (PL), where negative assessments have become more common. Finally, the perception that redistribution is too costly for businesses is less common in 2016 than in 2008 in the vast majority of EU/EFTA countries.

Three ESS items capture attitudes towards *egalitarianism* in 2008 and 2016 (Figure 3.12-3.14). Two of these are mirror images, where the first item asks to what extent respondents agree or disagree that standards of living should be small in a fair society, and the second item, conversely, asks whether they agree that large differences in income are acceptable to reward talents and efforts. Figure 3.12 suggests that there is extensive support in the EU/EFTA countries for the idea that a fair society requires a leveling of income disparities. At the same time, there appears to be a downward trend with somewhat weaker support in 2016 than in 2008. Based on this indicator, egalitarian attitudes seem to enjoy the strongest support in Finland (FI), Slovenia (SI) and Belgium (BE).


Figure 3.13 illustrates the empirical patterns captured by the second item on egalitarianism. It suggests that citizens in the EU/EFTA countries were less willing in 2016 than in 2008 to view income differences as an acceptable means to reward differences in talent and effort. Together with Ireland (IE), the three Eastern countries of Estonia (EE), the Czech Republic (CZ) and Poland (PL) show the greatest acceptance for the idea of income differences as a reward for talent and effort in 2016.

A third egalitarianism item focuses on the question of *gender equality* in the job market, asking respondents whether they agree that a woman should be prepared to cut down on paid work for the sake of her family (Figure 3.14). This, it appears, is a more divisive topic among the EU/EFTA countries than any of those commented above. The idea that women should prioritize family over work is most strongly opposed by citizens in the Nordic countries, and most strongly supported in the East. The overall empirical pattern in 2016 is in line with the overarching finding from 2008 that welfare attitudes differ markedly between a Northern/Western and an Eastern/Southern group of countries. Citizens in the Southern European countries of Greece (GR), Portugal (PT) and Spain (ES) are less disposed towards gender equality in the job market than the average, and so are all of the EU's Eastern member states with the single exception of Slovenia (SI).

A last group of items ask respondents about their *perceptions of target groups and receivers* of social benefits, including aspects having to do with deservingness and misuse (Figure 3.15-3.18). Perceptions that there is a *misuse of social benefits* have been identified as one of the greatest threats to the welfare state's legitimacy (Roosma et al., 2013). A comparison of the attitudes in 2008 and 2016 shows that over the years, a slightly larger share of citizens in the EU/EFTA states have become convinced that unemployed people do not really try to find a job (Figure 3.15) and that many receivers manage to obtain benefits to which they are not entitled (Figure 3.16). As regards the share of the citizens that hold the contrasting view – i.e. that underuse of social benefits is a problem – little appears to have changed between 2008 and 2016 (Figure 3.17).


Finally, a salient topic in research on welfare attitudes is *welfare chauvinism*, i.e. the perception that immigrants are less deserving of social rights than natives (Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012). Between the years 2008 and 2016, the EU/EFTA countries' populations have moved towards an averagely more generous position on the question of when immigrants should gain equal access to the welfare state as the people already living in a country (Figure 3.18, Table 3.1 and Table 3.2). The only exceptions to this general trend towards more generosity are the Czech Republic (CZ), the Netherlands (NL) and Switzerland (CH). Whereas the group of countries that shows a more generous disposition than the EU/EFTA average are Northern/Western states, the group of countries that are more restrictive than the average is mixed and contains all of the Eastern member states in our sample, along with four Northern/Western states, Austria (AT), Finland (FI), the Netherlands (NL) and the United Kingdom (GB).

Figure 3.1 Attitudes towards redistribution: Government should reduce differences in income levels?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean preference in 2016. Question posed (gincdif): “Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.” Responses were given on the scale 1 “Agree strongly”; 2 “Agree”; 3 “Neither agree nor disagree”; 4 “Disagree”; 5 “Disagree strongly.” Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.
Source: European Social Survey 2008 and 2016

Figure 3.2 Preferences regarding redistribution: Should higher or lower earners get larger old age pensions?




Note: Question posed (earnpen): "Some people say that higher earners should get larger old age pensions because they have paid in more. Others say that lower earners should get larger old age pensions because their needs are greater. Which of the three statements on this card comes closest to your view?"

Responses were given on the scale 1 "Higher earners should get more in benefit"; 2 "High and low earners same amount benefit"; 3 "Lower earners should get more in benefit." Four types of responses were coded as missing: 4 "None of these"; 5 "Refusal"; 6 "Don't know"; 7 "No answer." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2008

Figure 3.3 Preferences regarding redistribution: Should higher or lower earners get larger unemployment benefits?




Note: Question posed (earnueb): "Some people say that higher earners should get larger old age pensions because they have paid in more. Others say that lower earners should get larger old age pensions because their needs are greater. Which of the three statements on this card comes closest to your view?"

Responses were given on the scale 1 "Higher earners should get more in benefit"; 2 "High and low earners same amount benefit"; 3 "Lower earners should get more in benefit." Four types of responses were coded as missing: 4 "None of these"; 5 "Refusal"; 6 "Don't know"; 7 "No answer." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2008


Figure 3.4 Perceptions of government performance: State of health services in country nowadays?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2016. Question posed (stfhlth): “Still using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of health services in [country] nowadays?” Responses were given on a scale from 0 “Extremely bad” to 10 “Extremely good.” Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2008 and 2016


Figure 3.5 Perceptions of government performance: State of education in country nowadays?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2016. Question posed (stfedu): “Now, using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of education in [country] nowadays?” Responses were given on a scale from 0 “Extremely bad” to 10 “Extremely good.” Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2008 and 2016


Figure 3.6 Perceived consequences of redistribution: Social benefits and services prevent widespread poverty?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2016. Question posed (sbprvpv): "Using this card please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in [country] prevent widespread poverty?" Responses were given on the scale 1 "Agree strongly"; 2 "Agree"; 3 "Neither agree nor disagree"; 4 "Disagree"; 5 "Disagree strongly." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2008 and 2016


Figure 3.7 Perceived consequences of redistribution: Social benefits and services lead to a more equal society?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2016. Question posed (sbeqsoc): "Using this card please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in [country] lead to a more equal society?" Responses were given on the scale 1 "Agree strongly"; 2 "Agree"; 3 "Neither agree nor disagree"; 4 "Disagree"; 5 "Disagree strongly." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2008 and 2016


Figure 3.8 Perceived consequences of redistribution: Social benefits and services make people less willing care for one another?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2016. Question posed (sblwcoa): “And to what extent do you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in [country] make people less willing to care for one another?” Responses were given on the scale 1 “Agree strongly”; 2 “Agree”; 3 “Neither agree nor disagree”; 4 “Disagree”; 5 “Disagree strongly.” Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2008 and 2016


Figure 3.9 Perceived consequences of redistribution: Social benefits and services make people lazy?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2016. Question posed (sblazy): "And to what extent do you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in [country] make people lazy?" Responses were given on the scale 1 "Agree strongly"; 2 "Agree"; 3 "Neither agree nor disagree"; 4 "Disagree"; 5 "Disagree strongly." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2008 and 2016


Figure 3.10 Perceived consequences of redistribution: Social benefits and services cost businesses too much in taxes and charges?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2016. Question posed (sbbsntx): "Using this card please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in [country] cost businesses too much in taxes and charges?" Responses were given on the scale 1 "Agree strongly"; 2 "Agree"; 3 "Neither agree nor disagree"; 4 "Disagree"; 5 "Disagree strongly." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2008 and 2016


Figure 3.11 Perceived consequences of redistribution: Social benefits and services place too great a strain on the economy?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2016. Question posed (sbstrec): "Using this card please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in [country] place too great a strain on the economy?" Responses were given on the scale 1 "Agree strongly"; 2 "Agree"; 3 "Neither agree nor disagree"; 4 "Disagree"; 5 "Disagree strongly." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2008 and 2016


Figure 3.12 Attitudes towards egalitarianism / income inequality: Large differences in income acceptable to reward talents and efforts?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean attitude in 2016. Question posed (dfincac): "Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. Large differences in people's incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in talents and efforts." Responses were given on the scale 1 "Agree strongly"; 2 "Agree"; 3 "Neither agree nor disagree"; 4 "Disagree"; 5 "Disagree strongly." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2008 and 2016


Figure 3.13 Attitudes towards egalitarianism / social inequality: For a fair society, differences in standard of living should be small?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean attitude in 2016. Question posed (smdfslv): "Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. For a society to be fair, differences in people's standard of living should be small." Responses were given on the scale 1 "Agree strongly"; 2 "Agree"; 3 "Neither agree nor disagree"; 4 "Disagree"; 5 "Disagree strongly." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2008 and 2016


Figure 3.14 Attitudes towards egalitarianism / cultural liberalism / gender equality:
A woman should be prepared to cut down on paid work for the sake of her family?



Note: Question posed (wmcprwk): "Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family." Responses were given on the scale 1 "Agree strongly"; 2 "Agree"; 3 "Neither agree nor disagree"; 4 "Disagree"; 5 "Disagree strongly." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.


Source: European Social Survey 2008

Figure 3.15 Perceptions of target groups, receivers and welfare misuse: Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2016. Question posed (uentrjb): "Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about people in [country]. Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job?" Responses were given on the scale 1 "Agree strongly"; 2 "Agree"; 3 "Neither agree nor disagree"; 4 "Disagree"; 5 "Disagree strongly." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.
Source: European Social Survey 2008 and 2016


Figure 3.16 Perceptions of target groups, receivers and welfare misuse: Many manage to obtain benefits and services to which they are not entitled?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2016. Question posed (bennent): “Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about people in [country]. Many people manage to obtain benefits and services to which they are not entitled.” Responses were given on the scale 1 “Agree strongly”; 2 “Agree”; 3 “Neither agree nor disagree”; 4 “Disagree”; 5 “Disagree strongly.” Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2008 and 2016


Figure 3.17 Perceptions of target groups, receivers and deservingness: Many with very low incomes get less benefit than they are legally entitled to?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2016. Question posed (Ibenent): “Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about people in [country]. Many people with very low incomes get less benefit than they are legally entitled to.” Responses were given on the scale 1 “Agree strongly”; 2 “Agree”; 3 “Neither agree nor disagree”; 4 “Disagree”; 5 “Disagree strongly.” Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2008 and 2016

Figure 3.18 Preferences regarding target groups, receivers and deservingness: When should immigrants obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean preference in 2016. Question posed (imsclbn): “Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?” Responses were coded on the scale 1 “Immediately on arrival”; 2 “After a year, whether or not have worked”; 3 “After worked and paid taxes at least a year”; 4 “Once they have become a citizen”; 5 “They should never get the same rights.” Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean. Source: European Social Survey 2008 and 2016

Table 3.1 Preferences regarding target groups, receivers and deservingness in 2008:
When should immigrants obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as
citizens already living here?

Country	Responses (%)								
	Immediately on arrival	After a year, whether or not have worked	After worked and paid taxes at least a year	Once they have become a citizen	They should never get the same rights	Refusal	Don't know	No answer	Total
BE	6.2	10.2	47.4	28.8	6.1	0.2	1.1	0.0	100.0
BG	4.5	3.5	30.8	31.8	12.4	0.0	17.0	0.1	100.0
CH	11.7	12.8	53.7	15.5	2.7	0.0	3.5	0.0	100.0
CY	2.3	2.2	12.6	56.4	22.8	0.0	3.8	0.0	100.0
CZ	2.5	5.6	33.7	38.9	14.3	0.0	4.9	0.1	100.0
DE	9.1	11.5	41.4	29.6	5.6	0.5	2.4	0.0	100.0
DK	13.6	15.1	30.9	35.2	2.1	0.0	2.6	0.5	100.0
EE	4.6	5.1	38.3	43.2	3.6	0.0	5.1	0.3	100.0
ES	10.2	8.8	51.8	19.4	6.2	0.7	2.8	0.0	100.0
FI	5.1	12.2	36.5	41.8	2.8	0.1	1.5	0.0	100.0
FR	12.2	11.0	44.9	25.9	4.6	0.2	1.2	0.0	100.0
GB	5.8	5.3	47.4	31.4	8.4	0.0	1.5	0.1	100.0
GR	8.5	4.3	31.7	33.0	18.5	0.0	4.0	0.0	100.0
HR	5.3	4.7	26.6	42.9	0.0	0.0	20.4	0.2	100.0
HU	1.5	3.0	27.9	48.1	12.9	0.3	6.4	0.0	100.0
IE	4.4	9.6	56.3	23.5	5.8	0.0	0.4	0.0	100.0
LV	4.0	2.8	34.6	35.9	16.2	0.0	6.5	0.0	100.0
NL	7.5	9.0	35.3	43.6	3.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	100.0
NO	13.2	12.7	33.8	36.6	1.9	0.4	1.4	0.0	100.0
PL	5.2	6.7	35.9	42.1	2.2	0.0	7.8	0.2	100.0
PT	8.0	10.3	51.7	12.7	2.6	1.2	13.6	0.0	100.0
RO	4.6	6.0	22.9	39.1	6.5	0.0	19.8	1.2	100.0
SE	18.5	15.3	30.1	30.0	0.7	0.4	4.1	1.0	100.0
SI	4.0	4.7	31.3	49.3	6.5	0.0	3.8	0.3	100.0
SK	3.2	7.1	45.4	26.5	10.4	0.0	7.4	0.0	100.0
Total*	7.0	8.0	37.3	34.4	7.2	0.2	5.8	0.2	100.0

Note: Question posed (imsclbn): "Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?" Responses were coded on the scale 1 "Immediately on arrival"; 2 "After a year, whether or not have worked"; 3 "After worked and paid taxes at least a year"; 4 "Once they have become a citizen"; 5 "They should never get the same rights." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculations.

*Total refers to the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2008 and own calculations

Table 3.2 Preferences regarding target groups, receivers and deservingness in 2016:
When should immigrants obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as
citizens already living here?

Country	Responses (%)								Total
	Immediately on arrival	After a year, whether or not have worked	After worked and paid taxes at least a year	Once they have become a citizen	They should never get the same rights	Refusal	Don't know	No answer	
AT	7.8	9.6	38.2	24.6	15.0	1.3	3.6	0.0	100.0
BE	12.1	10.4	50.3	21.1	5.8	0.0	0.4	0.0	100.0
CH	9.3	12.9	51.9	18.8	3.3	0.8	3.1	0.0	100.0
CZ	4.9	3.7	31.5	33.5	22.8	0.3	3.4	0.0	100.0
DE	11.6	13.6	48.6	22.6	2.0	0.4	1.1	0.0	100.0
EE	5.8	5.3	47.1	33.9	6.5	0.1	1.3	0.0	100.0
FI	5.9	15.0	33.6	41.2	2.5	0.1	1.7	0.0	100.0
FR	11.2	10.7	49.1	19.7	6.8	0.4	2.2	0.0	100.0
GB	4.9	7.7	56.6	21.2	6.4	0.5	2.7	0.0	100.0
IE	8.6	15.0	48.3	19.4	5.8	0.6	2.4	0.0	100.0
IS	16.4	19.0	40.7	19.8	0.9	1.1	1.9	0.1	100.0
NL	7.4	8.3	32.7	46.7	2.4	0.1	2.4	0.0	100.0
NO	12.1	14.4	36.3	33.1	1.7	0.1	2.4	0.0	100.0
PL	3.7	4.8	37.4	38.2	7.3	0.3	8.1	0.2	100.0
SE	17.2	17.7	31.4	27.1	0.9	0.3	5.4	0.0	100.0
SI	4.1	7.7	33.1	44.5	7.4	0.2	3.0	0.1	100.0
Total*	8.9	11.0	41.7	29.1	6.1	0.4	2.8	0.0	100.0

Note: Question posed (imsclbn): "Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?" Responses were coded on the scale 1 "Immediately on arrival"; 2 "After a year, whether or not have worked"; 3 "After worked and paid taxes at least a year"; 4 "Once they have become a citizen"; 5 "They should never get the same rights." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculations.

*Total refers to the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2016 and own calculations

3.2 European identity, the EU and EU citizenship

In a recent review of the research on public support for European integration, authors Sara Hobolt and Catherine de Vries (2016) note that public opinion on European integration was considered to be of minor importance by scholars and decision-makers until the 1990s. In more recent years the issue has become of great interest in both spheres, following the increasing politicization of European affairs (see e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2009). The recent debate around Brexit also demonstrates the relevance of questions about European identity and citizenship.

Survey items on the issues of European unification (Figure 3.19) and European citizenship (Figure 3.24-3.26) have been used as indicators of public support for European integration in previous studies, while items that tap citizens' support for key EU policies (Figure 3.27-3.28) have been added to such analyzes more recently (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). Prior empirical findings based on items measuring public support for EU membership suggest that it is strongest in the Western/Northern Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), and somewhat weaker but increasing in the Northern non-Eurozone countries (Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). In the Southern member states (Cyprus, France, Italy, Greece, Malta, Portugal, and Spain) as well the Eastern member states (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia), support is lower following a decrease related to the economic crisis that began to take hold in 2008 (Hobolt and de Vries 2016:417).

We find somewhat different patterns based on a much-used ESS item that asks respondents whether they think that the EU's process of *European unification* should go further, or if it already has gone too far (Figure 3.19). In 2014, respondents in Spain (ES), Lithuania (LT), and Poland (PL) show the strongest support for further unification, although the average support among Polish respondents has fallen quite sharply since 2014. Austria (AT) and the United Kingdom (GB) stand out as countries where the average respondent tends towards the view that European unification has gone too far.

In 2015, low levels of *attachment to the European Union* (Figure 3.20) were shown by respondents in the Czech Republic (CZ), Cyprus (CY) and Greece (GR), whereas comparatively high levels of attachment were shown in Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV) and Malta (MT). A twin survey question that taps *attachment to Europe* generated a somewhat different response pattern (Figure 3.21), but the two Southern European countries of Cyprus (CY) and Greece (GR) still show the lowest levels of attachment. In the case of Greece, low levels of attachment to the EU and Europe are likely to be a result of the economic crisis and the tough austerity measures implemented in the country. Cyprus, too, received financial assistance from the EU and IMF, and implemented austerity measures from 2012 and onwards.


Turning to an EB item designed to capture the *image of the EU* in 2002 and 2016, we note a relatively sharp downward turn (Figure 3.22). Whereas no single EU/EFTA population had an averagely negative view of the EU's image in 2002, five member states – Greece (GR) in particular, but also Cyprus (CY), Austria (AT), Czech Republic (CZ) and France (FR) – did so in 2016.

As regards the citizens' *identification with Europe* and their attitudes towards *EU citizenship* (Figures 3.23-3.25), the member-states do not come across as particularly Europeanized, with the possible exception of Luxembourg (LU). While people in Sweden (SE) and Finland (FI) identify more with the Europe in 2016 than in 2002, Italy (IT) above all has moved in the opposite direction (Figure 3.23 and Tables 3.3-3.4). As shown in Figure 3.24, respondents in Greece identify themselves as EU citizens to a lesser extent than respondents in other EU/EFTA states. Moreover, Figure 3.25 suggests that respondents in all Southern European countries and several Eastern European countries feel that they do not really *know their rights as citizens of the EU*, or only know about them to some extent. Many of these countries can be found among those where the respondents *would like to know more about their rights as EU citizens* (Figure 3.26).

Finally, two of our EB items tap *support for key EU policies*, in the areas of social protection and migration respectively. While the issue of *social protection* (Figure 3.27) has become salient in the context of the recent economic crisis, most respondents in the EU/EFTA states do not mention it as a thing they, personally, associate with the EU in 2016. This is especially the case in Slovakia (SK), France (FR), Germany (DE), and Italy (IT), whereas it is slightly more common to associate the EU with social protection in Austria (AT), Romania (RO) and Luxemburg (LU).


Attitudes towards *a common European policy on migration* (Figure 3.28) differ radically between the member states. Citizens in the Czech Republic (CZ) and Estonia (EE) are clearly against such a policy, whereas respondents in Luxembourg (LU), Germany (DE) and Spain (ES) are in favor. In all countries except Denmark (DK), Greece (GR), and Sweden (SE), opposition to the idea of a common migration policy has increased. Attitudes have become substantially more negative in the Eastern European countries of the Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Slovakia (SK), Latvia (LV) and Poland (PL). The only Northern European country showing strong opposition to the common migration policy in 2016 is Austria (AT). Finland (FI) and the United Kingdom (GB) are also more negatively disposed than the EU-average, but still far less negative than the Eastern European countries. Hence, with the exception of Austria (AT), the question of a common migration policy clearly demonstrates the presence of a division between the Eastern and Western member states of the EU.

Figure 3.19 Attitudes towards European integration: Should European unification go further or has it gone too far?




Note: Countries are sorted by mean attitude in 2014. Question posed (eutf): “Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?” Responses were given on a scale from 0 “Unification already gone too far” to 10 “Unification go further.” Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.
Source: European Social Survey 2004 and 2014

Figure 3.20 Attachment to the European Union




Note: Countries are sorted by mean attachment in 2015. Question posed (qd1a_3): "People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to European Union." Responses were given on a scale from 1 "Very attached" to 4 "Not at all attached." Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.
Source: Eurobarometer 2002 and 2015

Figure 3.21 Attachment to Europe




Note: Countries are sorted by mean attachment in 2016. Question posed (qd1a_4): "People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to Europe" Responses were given on a scale from 1 "Very attached" to 4 "Not at all attached." Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.
Source: Eurobarometer 2014 and 2016

Figure 3.22 Attitudes towards the EU: Positive or negative image?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean attitude in 2016. Question posed (qa9): "In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?" Responses were given on a scale from 1 "Very positive" to 5 "Very negative." Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.
Source: Eurobarometer 2002 and 2016

Figure 3.23 Identification with Europe vs. nationality in the near future



Note: Countries are sorted by mean attitude in 2016. Question posed (qd3): “In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) Nationality only (2) Nationality and European (3) European and nationality (4) European only.” Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: Eurobarometer 2002 and 2016

Table 3.3 Identification with Europe vs. nationality in the near future (2002)

Country	Responses (100%)				
	Nationality only	Nationality and European	European and nationality	European only	Total
AT	41.0	47.0	9.2	2.8	100.0
BE	37.3	45.1	11.3	6.4	100.0
DE	40.7	46.9	9.7	2.7	100.0
DK	37.0	57.0	4.5	1.5	100.0
ES	30.4	59.4	5.6	4.6	100.0
FI	56.4	39.9	2.9	0.9	100.0
FR	31.8	55.2	9.4	3.5	100.0
GB	63.5	30.7	3.2	2.7	100.0
GR	52.5	42.1	3.7	1.8	100.0
IE	42.4	50.2	5.9	1.5	100.0
IT	22.1	66.4	8.2	3.3	100.0
LU	18.3	52.1	15.2	14.4	100.0
NL	40.9	50.0	6.6	2.5	100.0
PT	47.3	48.3	3.4	1.0	100.0
SE	50.2	45.2	3.2	1.4	100.0
Total*	40.8	49.0	6.8	3.4	100.0

Note: Question posed (qd3): "In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) Nationality only (2) Nationality and European (3) European and nationality (4) European only." Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculations. Missing observations were excluded. *Total refers to the between-country mean.

Source: Eurobarometer 2002 and own calculations


Table 3.4 Identification with Europe vs. nationality in the near future (2016)

Country	Responses (100%)				
	Nationality only	Nationality and European	European and nationality	European only	Total
AT	47.2	43.6	8.4	0.9	100.0
BE	27.4	61.7	9.6	1.4	100.0
BG	49.8	43.3	6.2	0.6	100.0
CY	49.9	44.4	3.7	2.1	100.0
CZ	46.1	48.1	4.3	1.5	100.0
DE	32.0	55.8	10.2	2.0	100.0
DK	35.7	60.6	3.2	0.5	100.0
EE	39.8	54.7	4.5	1.1	100.0
ES	24.6	64.4	6.1	4.9	100.0
FI	38.3	57.0	3.6	1.0	100.0
FR	36.1	55.0	6.8	2.2	100.0
GB	52.1	39.9	6.2	1.9	100.0
GR	50.5	47.8	1.5	0.3	100.0
HR	35.7	57.9	5.7	0.7	100.0
HU	30.7	61.2	7.8	0.3	100.0
IE	39.8	57.1	2.0	1.2	100.0
IT	45.8	49.9	3.6	0.8	100.0
LT	42.9	49.9	6.5	0.8	100.0
LU	11.3	66.8	15.6	6.4	100.0
LV	46.8	43.3	8.1	1.8	100.0
MT	27.7	68.5	3.2	0.7	100.0
NL	26.4	66.7	6.0	0.9	100.0
PL	35.4	60.0	4.0	0.6	100.0
PT	31.2	66.1	2.4	0.3	100.0
RO	45.1	48.8	4.6	1.5	100.0
SE	38.8	55.5	4.9	0.8	100.0
SI	43.7	51.6	3.2	1.6	100.0
SK	37.6	54.8	6.6	1.0	100.0
Total*	38.2	54.8	5.6	1.4	100.0

Note: Question posed (qd3): "In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) Nationality only (2) Nationality and European (3) European and nationality (4) European only." Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculations. Missing observations were excluded. *Total refers to the between-country mean.

Source: Eurobarometer 2016 and own calculations


Figure 3.24 European citizenship: Do you feel like a citizen of the European Union?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean attitude in 2016. Question posed (qd2_1): "For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion. You feel you are a citizen of the EU?" Responses were given on a scale from 1 "Yes, definitely" to 4 "No, definitely not." Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: Eurobarometer 2014 and 2016


Figure 3.25 European citizenship: Do you know your rights as a citizen of the EU?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean attitude in 2016. Question posed (qd2_2): "For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion. Do you know your rights as a citizen of the EU?" Responses were given on a scale from 1 "Yes, definitely" to 4 "No, definitely not." Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: Eurobarometer 2014 and 2016


Figure 3.26 European citizenship: Would you like to know more about your rights as a citizen of the EU?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean attitude in 2016. Question posed (qd2_3): "For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion. You would like to know more about your rights as a citizen of the EU?" Responses were given on a scale from 1 "Yes, definitely" to 4 "No, definitely not." Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.


Source: Eurobarometer 2014 and 2016

Figure 3.27 Meaning of the EU: Social protection?



Note: Countries are sorted by the proportion of respondents mentioning “social protection” in 2016. Question posed (qa11_4): “What does the EU mean to you personally?” Multiple answers possible. Responses are coded as 0 “Not mentioned” or 1 “Mentioned.” Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.
Source: Eurobarometer 2014 and 2016

Figure 3.28 Opposition to a common European policy on migration



Note: Countries are sorted by mean attitude in 2016. Question posed (qa17_6): "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: A common European policy on migration." Responses were given on the scale 0 "For" or 1 "Against." Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: Eurobarometer 2014 and 2016

3.3 Immigration

All but one of our indicators of attitudes to immigration are from the 2002 and 2014 ESS modules on this theme. When first fielded in 2002, it was one of the most extensive studies available in the area, with a sample of 22 countries. This paved the way for a large number of studies of the individual- and country level factors shaping attitudes to immigration (Heath 2014). Although our purpose here is purely descriptive and focused on attitudes to immigration as such, it should be noted that a number of studies have explored the link between attitudes to immigration and support for European integration. The resulting findings show that individuals with a negative attitude towards immigration are more likely to be skeptical of European integration. One suggested mechanism behind this pattern is hostility towards “outgroups” whether or not these come from within the EU as a consequence of integration or from third countries as a consequence of immigration (de Vreese and Boomgarden 2005; MacLaren 2002; see also the overview and criticism in Kentmen-Cin and Erisen 2017).

Opposition to immigration is measured in the ESS using five items that distinguish between types of sending countries and between immigrants with different group belongings, or skills (Figure 3.29-3.33). Prior findings suggest that Eastern Europeans hold more restrictive attitudes towards immigration than do Western Europeans, despite the fact that immigration flows into Eastern Europe are much smaller in comparative terms (Ceobano and Escandell 2010, 311). Our five ESS indicators of opposition to immigration largely confirm this pattern. So does the single item included from the EB, which asks the respondents whether the immigration of people from outside the EU evokes a *positive or negative feeling* (Figure 3.34). Eastern Europe tops the list of countries where immigration evokes more negative feelings. It should be noted, however, that Lithuania and Romania break off from this pattern.

Looking at the five ESS items in more detail, Figure 3.29 illustrates the degree to which citizens in the EU/EFTA countries oppose immigration of people of *different ethnicity or race* than the majority population. It shows that the average EU/EFTA country was more positively disposed towards this type of immigration in 2014 than in 2002. Differences between the EU/EFTA countries are substantial, however, and also increased between the years of 2002 and 2014. Citizens in Hungary (HU), the Czech Republic (CZ) are outliers with markedly more restrictive attitudes than any other country in our sample, and a development towards more negative attitudes between 2002 and 2014 reinforced this pattern even further. At the other extreme, we find citizens in the Nordic countries of Sweden (SE), Denmark (DE) and Norway (NO), which are outliers with markedly more positive attitudes towards immigration of people of different ethnicity or race, and a development towards even more positive attitudes between 2002 and 2014. A much similar geographical pattern of attitudes can be observed based on a twin item asking respondents about their views on immigration of people of the *same ethnicity or race* as the majority (Figure 3.30). Attitudes towards the immigration of people of the same ethnicity or race are generally more positive than those towards the immigration of people of a different ethnicity or race. However, attitudes towards both types of immigration developed in a positive direction between 2002 and 2014 in an overwhelming majority of the EU/EFTA countries. Curiously, attitudes towards


immigration from *poor countries outside Europe* (Figure 3.31) developed in a negative direction in the same time period in all but a few countries.

Finally, according to two items that were used in 2014 but absent in the 2002 round, citizens in the included EU/EFTA countries are more positively disposed towards the immigration of *professionals* than they are towards the immigration of unskilled workers, and attitudes towards *unskilled* immigration are more polarized among the countries (Figure 3.32-3.33).

The ESS also contains items designed to capture factors that may function as *qualifications for immigration* in the eyes of the host country's citizens (Figures 3.35-3.40). Two main categories of qualifying factors are investigated, where the first consists of *language-related, work-related and educational skills*, and the second reflects proximity in terms of culture, religion or race. Language and work skills, and to a somewhat lesser extent educational skills, are seen as quite important qualifications in most of the EU/EFTA countries (Figure 3.35 and 3.36), but more so in some countries, such as the United Kingdom (GB) and Austria (AT), where the development between 2002 and 2014 was towards a greater emphasis of these factors. The idea that proximity in terms of religion or race could serve as a qualification for immigration is far more controversial, and splits the EU/EFTA countries along Eastern/Western lines, where citizens in the Western countries generally view such factors as far more unimportant than those in the Eastern countries (Figure 3.37 and 3.38). The proposition that commitment to the host country's way of life could serve as a qualification for immigration (Figure 3.40) receives quite consistent support in the EU/EFTA countries, but more so in Hungary (HU), the Czech Republic (CZ) and Belgium than in other countries.

Recent research suggests that citizens' concerns about their country shape attitudes to immigration in a far more tangible way than their economic self-interest (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). In the ESS, *perceptions of immigration as a threat* of this kind are measured along three distinct dimensions. A first set of ESS items is intended to capture the extent to which respondents perceive of immigration as an *economic* (or welfare) threat based on the idea that immigration has a negative impact on the country's economy (Figure 3.41), that immigrants will take jobs away (Figure 3.42), or pay less in taxes and services than they put in (Figure 3.43). Secondly, a number of items are designed to tap the extent to which respondents perceive of immigration as a *cultural* threat, i.e. a thing that undermines the country's cultural life (Figure 3.44) or its customs and traditions (Figure 3.45). Finally, one item is devised to measure perceptions of immigration as a *security* threat, by asking respondents whether they believe that it makes the country's crime problems worse or better (Figure 3.46).


Figure 3.29 Opposition to immigration: Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group than majority?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean preference in 2014. Question posed (imdfetn): “How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?” Responses were given on the scale 1 “Allow many to come and live here”; 2 “Allow some”; 3 “Allow a few”; 4 “Allow none.” Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014


Figure 3.30 Opposition to immigration: Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean preference in 2014. Question posed (imsmetn): “Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here?” Responses were given on the scale 1 “Allow many to come and live here”; 2 “Allow some”; 3 “Allow a few”; 4 “Allow none.” Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014


Figure 3.31 Opposition to immigration: Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean preference in 2014. Question posed (impctr): "How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?" Responses were given on the scale 1 "Allow many to come and live here"; 2 "Allow some"; 3 "Allow a few"; 4 "Allow none." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014


Figure 3.32 Opposition to immigration: Allow unskilled labourers from [poor non-European country providing largest number of migrants]?



Note: Question posed (allbpne): "Using the same card, please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow unskilled labourers from [poor country outside Europe providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country Responses were given on the scale 1 "Allow many to come and live here"; 2 "Allow some"; 3 "Allow a few"; 4 "Allow none." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2014


Figure 3.33 Opposition to immigration: Allow professionals from [poor non-European country providing largest number of migrants]?



Note: Question posed (alpfpne): "Using the same card, please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow professionals from [poor country outside Europe providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]?" Responses were given on the scale 1 "Allow many to come and live here"; 2 "Allow some"; 3 "Allow a few"; 4 "Allow none." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2014


Figure 3.34 Immigration of people from outside the EU: Positive or negative feeling



Note: Countries are sorted by mean attitude in 2016. Question posed (qa17_6): "Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you: Immigration of people from outside the EU." Responses were given on a scale from 1 "Very positive" to 4 "Very negative." Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: Eurobarometer 2014 and 2016


Figure 3.35 Qualification for immigration, criteria for entry/exclusion: Importance of having good educational qualifications?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean attitude in 2014. Question posed (qfimedu): “Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be for them to have good educational qualifications?” Responses were given on a scale from 0 “Extremely unimportant” to 10 “Extremely important.” Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014


Figure 3.36 Qualification for immigration, criteria for entry/exclusion: Importance of speaking country's official language?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2014. Question posed (qfimlng): "Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be for them to be able to speak [country's official language(s)]." Responses were given on a scale from 0 "Extremely unimportant" to 10 "Extremely important." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.


Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014

Figure 3.37 Qualification for immigration, criteria for entry/exclusion: Importance of coming from a Christian background?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2014. Question posed (qfimchr): “Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be for them to ... come from a Christian background?” Responses were given on a scale from 0 “Extremely unimportant” to 10 “Extremely important.” Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.
Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014


Figure 3.38 Qualification for immigration, criteria for entry/exclusion: Importance of being white?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2014. Question posed (qfimwht): "Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be for them to be white?" Responses were given on a scale from 0 "Extremely unimportant" to 10 "Extremely important." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014


Figure 3.39 Qualification for immigration, criteria for entry/exclusion: Importance of having work skills needed in country?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2014. Question posed (qfimwsk): "Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be for them to have work skills that [country] needs?" Responses were given on a scale from 0 "Extremely unimportant" to 10 "Extremely important." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014


Figure 3.40 Qualification for immigration, criteria for entry/exclusion: Importance of being committed to way of life in country?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2014. Question posed (qfimcmt): "Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be for them to be committed to the way of life in [country]?" Responses were given on a scale from 0 "Extremely unimportant" to 10 "Extremely important." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.


Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014

Figure 3.41 Perceptions of immigration as an economic threat: Is immigration bad or good for country's economy?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2014. Question posed (imbgeco): "Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?" Responses were given on a scale from 0 "Bad for the economy" to 10 "Good for the economy." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean. Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014


Figure 3.42 Perceptions of immigration as a realistic threat: Do immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2014. Question posed (imtcjob): "Using this card, would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs?" Responses were given on a scale from 0 "Take jobs away" to 10 "Create new jobs." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014


Figure 3.43 Perceptions of immigration as an economic threat: Taxes and services – do immigrants take out more than they put in or less?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2014. Question posed (imbleco): “Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?” Responses were given on a scale from 0 “Generally take out more” to 10 “Generally put in more.” Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014


Figure 3.44 Perceptions of immigration as a cultural threat: Is country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2014. Question posed (imueclt): "And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?" Responses were given on a scale from 0 "Cultural life undermined" to 10 "Cultural life enriched." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.


Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014

Figure 3.45 Perceptions of immigration: Is it better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2014. Question posed (pplstrd): "Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree that: "It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions." Responses were given on the scale 1 "Agree strongly"; 2 "Agree"; 3 "Neither agree nor disagree"; 4 "Disagree"; 5 "Disagree strongly." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.
Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014

Figure 3.46 Perceptions of immigration as a security threat: Do immigrants make country's crime problems worse or better?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean perception in 2014. Question posed (imwbcrm): "Are [country]'s crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries?" Responses were given on a scale from 0 "Crime problems made worse" to 10 "Crime problems made better." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.
Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014

3.4 Free movement

The freedom to work, travel and study anywhere in the EU is one of the core features of European integration and prior research suggests that individuals who practice any of these rights tend to have more positive attitudes towards the EU and a stronger European identity (Recchi 2015). At the same time, the EU's free movement scheme has been contested over the years. Before the Eastern enlargement of 2004 and 2007, for example, there was extensive public and scholarly debate about the perceived risk of so-called "benefit tourism" or "social tourism" from poorer to richer EU member states, as a consequence of free movement (Heindlmaier and Blauburger 2017). Despite the diverging pictures and opinions surrounding the issue, there is quite little research on normative attitudes towards free-movement. The issue has been overshadowed, it appears, by the more general question of support for the European Union.

We reiterate that the ESS items analyzed in this section were not designed to gauge attitudes to free movement specifically. They are phrased so as to measure attitudes towards European immigration, and more specifically: immigration from poor European countries in general, or from specific top sending countries in Europe (see Table A.6 in the Appendix for a list showing the reference country mentioned to respondents in each member state). This section thus analyzes attitudes towards European immigration more broadly (based on the ESS), as well as free movement specifically (based on the EB).

Starting with the ESS items on European immigration, Figure 3.47 shows attitudes towards immigration from *poorer European countries* in 2002 and 2014, respectively. Several Eastern European countries stood out above, as negatively disposed towards third-country immigration. Citizens in these countries, the figure suggests, also tend to be skeptical of European immigration. Respondents in Hungary (HU) and the Baltic states of Estonia (EE) and Lithuania (LT) appear to hold the most restrictive views on immigration from poor European countries. This occurs despite the fact that these three member states contribute significantly to European mobility flows. The Hungarian and Baltic respondents are accompanied by those from the United Kingdom (GB) – the fourth most restrictive country. In contrast to this, respondents in the receiving countries of Sweden (SE) and Germany (DE) were more positively disposed, along with those in Norway (NO).

Similar country patterns are generated by the two following ESS items, that tap attitudes towards the immigration of *professionals vs. unskilled workers from top European sending countries* (Figure 3.48-3.49), but there are also interesting differences. Respondents in all examined countries are more ready to welcome professionals than unskilled workers. Respondents in Finland (FI) make a particularly sharp distinction between professionals (to which it is the 7th least restrictive country) and unskilled workers (to which it is the 4th most restrictive country). In the case of Finland, the sending country mentioned in the survey was Estonia (see Appendix A.6). The Finnish opposition to unskilled European migrants is most likely related to the large influx of Estonian labor migrants that was facilitated by the geographical and linguistic closeness between the two countries.

Our first EB item (Figure 3.50), shows that public opinion on the value of the free movement policy as such varies across the member states. Large numbers of respondents mention *free movement as the most positive result of the EU* in Latvia (LT), Sweden (SE), Croatia (HR) and Estonia (EE), whereas respondents in Malta (MT), France (FR), Italy (IT), and Austria (AT) rarely do so. Two Eastern European countries – Slovakia (SK) and Bulgaria (BL) appreciated the free movement policy less in 2016 than in 2014. The remaining new member states appreciated the policy more in 2016 than in 2014 (except Latvia (LV) where no change occurred). The largest decline in support for the free movement policy took place in Austria (AT).


With a broad focus on *inward free movement*, our second EB item asks respondents whether the immigration of people from other EU countries evokes a positive or negative feeling with them (Figure 3.51). The resulting pattern of attitudes appears quite unrelated to actual intra-EU migration flows. Resistance to inward free movement primarily comes from a mixed group of Southern and Eastern member states. The Italian respondents were the most negative to immigration from other EU countries in 2014 as well as in 2016, closely followed by those in the Czech Republic (CZ) – two countries with relatively low inflows of EU citizens in relation to their populations (Fries-Tersch et al. 2018). In Ireland (IE) and Luxembourg (LU) that experience high inflows in relation to their populations (ibid.), the respondents were the most positive towards immigration from other EU countries. A mixed group of Northern, Southern and Eastern States follows, with positive attitudes. The overall picture is positive for proponents of the free movement scheme, as public opinion towards immigration of people from other EU countries has become more favorable in all EU/EFTA member states except Denmark.

The following item may arguably be interpreted as capturing attitudes towards *outward free movement*, by asking whether the respondents are for or against “the free movement of EU citizens who can live, work, study and do business anywhere in the EU.” Figure 3.52 suggests that Austrian (AT) and British (GB), followed by Italian (IT) and Danish (DK) respondents hold the least positive attitudes towards outward free movement among the EU/EFTA member states. Italian respondents thus appear to be rather negatively disposed towards both inward and outward free movement. The difference between Austria and the UK on the one hand and the most supportive countries on the other – Estonia (EE), Luxembourg (LU) and Lithuania (LT) – is significant. On the question of outward free movement, Eastern member states thus dominate the group of most positive countries, and Western member states dominate the least positive group.

Finally, with reference to the *inward and outward free movement of workers* specifically, the respondents are asked to state whether they think it is a good thing, a bad thing or neither a good or a bad thing that EU citizens have the right to work in “our country” (Figure 3.53) or in “in every EU member state” (Figure 3.54). The first question is quite clearly intended to capture attitudes towards inward free movement, whereas the second question arguably may be interpreted as measuring attitudes towards outward free movement, by underlining EU citizens’ right to work everywhere in the EU. Although these two items focus on workers, and thereby provide a more restrictive definition of what free movement entails, they generate a response pattern much similar to that described above based on more broadly formulated items. As regards workers’


right to move outward, Eastern member states dominate the most positive group and Western member states dominate the most negative group. The corresponding question on workers' right to move inward to "our country" provokes positive responses among a mixed group of Western, Eastern, Northern and Southern member states: Luxemburg (LU), Latvia (LT), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE). The most negative responses to the inward mobility of workers can be found in the Western and Southern member states of Austria (AT), Italy (IT) and Belgium (BE).

Figure 3.47 Opposition to European immigration: Allow many/few people from poorer countries in Europe to come and live here?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean preference in 2014. Question posed (eimpcnt): "Now, still using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries in Europe to come and live here?" Responses were given on the scale 1 "Allow many to come and live here"; 2 "Allow some"; 3 "Allow a few"; 4 "Allow none." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.
Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2014


Figure 3.48 Opposition to European immigration: Allow many/few professionals from top poor European sending country?



Note: Question posed (alpfe): “Using the same card, please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow professionals from [poor European country providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]?” Responses were given on the scale 1 “Allow many to come and live here”; 2 “Allow some”; 3 “Allow a few”; 4 “Allow none.” Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2014


Figure 3.49 Opposition to European immigration: Allow many/few unskilled workers from top poor European sending country?



Note: Question posed (allbpe): "Using the same card, please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow unskilled labourers from [poor European country providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]?" Responses were given on the scale 1 "Allow many to come and live here"; 2 "Allow some"; 3 "Allow a few"; 4 "Allow none." Design weights (dweight) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: European Social Survey 2014


Figure 3.50 Free movement of people, goods and services: The most positive result of the EU?



Note: Countries are sorted by the proportion of respondents mentioning “the free movement of people, goods and services” in 2016. Question posed (qa4t_2): “Which of the following are the most positive results of the EU?” Multiple answers possible. Responses are coded as 0 “Not mentioned” or 1 “Mentioned.” Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: Eurobarometer 2014 and 2016


Figure 3.51 Free movement, inward: Positive or negative feeling towards immigration of people from other EU Member States?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean attitude in 2016. Question posed (qa17_6): "Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you: Immigration of people from other EU Member States." Responses were given on a scale from 1 "Very positive" to 4 "Very negative". Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculation of country means and the between-country mean.


Source: Eurobarometer 2014 and 2016

Figure 3.52 Free movement, outward: For or against the free movement of EU citizens to live, work, study and do business anywhere in the EU?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean attitude in 2016. Question posed (qa17_9): "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: The free movement of EU citizens who can live, work, study and do business anywhere in the EU." Responses were either 0 "Against" or 1 "For." Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculations of country means and the between-country mean.
Source: Eurobarometer 2016


Figure 3.53 Free movement of workers, inward: The right of EU citizens to work in [our country], a good thing?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean attitude in 2016. Question posed (qb6_4): "For each of the following statements, please tell me if you think that it is a good thing, a bad thing or neither a good or a bad thing: The right for EU citizens to work in (our country)". Responses were either 0 "Bad thing" or 1 "Good thing." Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculations of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: Eurobarometer 2016

Figure 3.54 Free movement of workers, outward: The right of EU citizens to work in every EU member state, a good thing?



Note: Countries are sorted by mean attitude in 2016. Question posed (qb6_2): "For each of the following statements, please tell me if you think that it is a good thing, a bad thing or neither a good or a bad thing: The right for EU citizens to work in every EU member state". Responses were either 0 "Bad thing" or 1 "Good thing." Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied in the calculations of country means and the between-country mean.

Source: Eurobarometer 2016

4. Conflict potential: Divisive attitudes among and within countries

This section identifies normative attitudes with a potential to generate political conflict over free movement among the EU/EFTA countries. The purpose of doing a descriptive analysis of this kind is to pave the way for the project's future work. We ultimately aim to assess to what extent and how domestic institutions interact with normative attitudes to shape the different stances that EU/EFTA countries take on the question of free movement (see Ruhs and Palme 2018). Investigating cross-country differences in normative attitudes (their European conflict potential) is one of several preparatory steps for such an empirical analysis.

We measure the *European conflict potential* of a given survey item as the between-country standard deviation of the responses it generates. More precisely, our measure reflects the average distance between the mean (country) attitude in the EU/EFTA and the different country means. To obtain a standardized measure, we rescaled all indicators so that the response scale runs from 0 to 10.

- If mean attitudes in the different EU/EFTA countries tend to be close to the overall mean (i.e. the between-country mean), this indicates a *low* European conflict potential.
- If attitudes in the different EU/EFTA countries are spread out over a wider range of values on the 0-10 response scale, this indicates a *high* European conflict potential.

One key advantage of using a simple measure of dispersion such as the between-country standard deviation is that it allows us to identify relevant normative attitudes without making prior theoretical assumptions about their importance or interrelationships. An alternative way to analyze the potential for conflict in our four selected areas would be to use multi-group factor analysis to examine and compare the distributions of latent variables such as “immigration” or “egalitarianism” in the EU/EFTA countries. However reducing the data to summary variables at this point would limit our options as we move forward towards the multivariate analysis. Given recent debates about the need to “unpack” or refine indexes commonly used to measure attitudes towards the welfare state, immigration and European integration (see e.g. the discussions in Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Kentmen-Cin and Erisen 2017 and Roosma et al. 2013) we prefer to leave the door open for reassessment and development of new, more precise, measures.

In addition to the between-country standard deviation, we report an alternative measure of normative attitudes' European conflict potential. This alternative measure is the adjusted R² resulting from an analysis where each variable from the surveys was regressed on country dummy variables to obtain the share of variation in individual responses explained by between-country differences (Adj. R²). In our view, the between-country standard deviation is a more suitable measure of an attitude's European conflict potential than the adjusted R². The main reason is that the adjusted

R2 is greatly influenced by the degree of domestic polarization in a given variable.⁵ This is not the case with the standard deviation, which is a simple and transparent measure of the dispersion of country mean attitudes. One potential drawback of using the between-country standard deviation is its sensitivity to outliers. However, in Europe's process of political integration, outlier countries often have great potential to affect policy outcomes or cause policy gridlock. Thus, in the present case, the standard deviation's sensitivity to outliers could be considered a valuable feature.

Each subsection below contains a table that ranks the available indicators in a given area based on their European conflict potential. For each available survey item, the table also provides the following additional information: the exact wording of the *survey question*; information about how the *end points of the response scale* were labeled; as well as the *between-country mean* attitude in the EU/EFTA countries for which data are available. Moreover, the table presents our alternative measure of European conflict potential, namely the *total variation explained by between-country differences* (Adj. R2).

We also consider the *domestic polarization* of those normative attitudes that have the highest European conflict potential. For two top-ranked attitudes in each area, we provide bar charts showing how responses were distributed across the available response options, in each country. More specifically, the bars show the percentage share of respondents that chose each response option. We interpret the bar charts as follows:

- If normative attitudes in a country tend to be close to the country mean this indicates a *low* level of domestic polarization. The most extreme scenario would be one where all respondents chose the same response option.
- If normative attitudes in a country are spread out over a wider range of values on the response scale, this indicates a *high* level of domestic polarization. The most extreme scenario would be one where half of the respondents chose the outermost option at one end of the response scale, and the other half chose the outermost option at the other end of the response scale.

Our analysis starts with an assessment of the European conflict potential and domestic polarization of normative attitudes towards the welfare state. We then move on to consider normative attitudes towards the EU (including European identity/citizenship), immigration and free movement from this perspective.

⁵ The variation explained by between-country differences equals the total variation in a variable minus the variation explained by within-country differences. High domestic polarization thus lowers the share of the total variation that may be explained by between-country differences. Conversely, low domestic polarization boosts the share of the variation that may be explained by within-country differences. This property of R2 is not optimal given our aim to analyze a variable's European conflict potential and its domestic polarization separately. We prefer a measure of dispersion that is independent of the degree of domestic polarization (such as the between-country standard deviation).

4.1 Welfare, including work

Table 4.1 ranks the report's eighteen indicators of attitudes towards the welfare state and work, based on their European conflict potential. As explained above, our operational measure of an attitude's European conflict potential is the between-country standard deviation. This measure may be interpreted as the average distance between the mean (country) attitude in the EU/EFTA and the different country means.

Among our indicators in the area of welfare, two stand out as most divisive in a comparative perspective. The indicator that tops our rank order in Table 4.1 is intended to tap the respondents' *satisfaction with government performance in the area of health services*. Based on Figure 3.17 above we found that health services generally are more positively evaluated by citizens in the Northern/Western part of Europe than by those in the Eastern part. However, both Swedish (SE) and British (GB) respondents were less positive than the average among the EU/EFTA countries in 2016. These two countries also experienced decreasing satisfaction with government performance in the area of health between 2008 and 2016, in contrast with the overall development in the EU/EFTA area, which was going towards increasing satisfaction.

The second-most divisive indicator in Table 4.1 taps normative attitudes towards *gender equality in the job market*. On the basis of Figure 3.6 above, we noted that the idea that a woman should be prepared to cut down on paid work for the sake of her family is most strongly opposed by citizens in the Nordic countries. Citizens in the Southern European countries of Greece (GR), Portugal (PT) and Spain (ES) are less disposed towards gender equality in the job market than the average EU/EFTA country, and so are all of the EU's Eastern member states with the single exception of Slovenia (SI).

Turning to the domestic arena (Figure 4.1), assessments of government performance in the area of health services in 2016 are most polarized in Estonia (EE), Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SI) and to a somewhat lesser extent the United Kingdom (GB). Fairly high levels of polarization can also be observed in Germany (DE) and Sweden (SE). In the remaining countries, including Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), the Czech Republic (CZ), Finland (FI), France (FR) and Switzerland (CH), positive assessments of health services dominate. Belgium stands out as a country with a particularly low level of domestic polarization, and a large share of positive assessments of government performance in the area of health services.

Domestically, moreover, normative attitudes towards gender equality were quite highly polarized in several countries in 2016; particularly so in the Western/Southern countries of Belgium (BE), the United Kingdom (GB) and Ireland (IE) followed by the Eastern country of Slovakia (SI). Somewhat lower, but still evident levels of polarization can be noted in France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR) and Hungary (HU). Low levels of polarization occurs in two groups of countries; the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, where large shares of the respondents take a stand for gender equality in the job market, and Eastern as well as Southern countries such as Cyprus (CY), Estonia (EE), Latvia (LV) Poland (PL), Portugal (PT) and Spain (ES) where large shares of the respondents take a stand against it. Switzerland (CH) breaks this pattern; a Western

country where a large share of the respondents take a stand against gender equality in 2016.

Table 4.1 The European conflict potential of normative attitudes towards the welfare state and work – a rank order

Conflict potential (rank order*)	Survey Question	Responses (standardized scale, 0–10)			Total variation explained by between-country differences ** (%)
		Response scale (min–max)	Between-country mean	Between-country standard deviation	
1	Perceptions of government performance: State of health services in country nowadays? (stfhlth)	Extremely bad – Extremely good	5.92	1.18	22.31
2	Attitudes towards egalitarianism/cultural liberalism/gender equality: A woman should be prepared to cut down on paid work for the sake of her family? (wmcprwk)	Agree strongly – Disagree strongly	4.88	1.16	13.81
3	Preferences regarding redistribution: Should higher or lower earners get larger old age pensions? (earnpen)	High and low earners same amount benefit - Lower earners should get more in benefit	3.30	1.11	10.84
4	Preferences regarding redistribution: Should higher or lower earners get larger unemployment benefits? (earnueb)	High and low earners same amount benefit - Lower earners should get more in benefit	3.97	0.92	8.85
5	Perceptions of target groups, receivers and	Agree strongly –	5.09	0.80	6.96


	welfare misuse: Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job? (uentrjb)	Disagree strongly			
5	Perceptions of government performance: State of education in country nowadays? (stfedu)	Extremely bad – Extremely good	6.17	0.80	13.20
6	Attitudes towards egalitarianism/income inequality: Large differences in income acceptable to reward talents and efforts? (dfincac)	Agree strongly – Disagree strongly	4.67	0.73	6.14
7	Preferences regarding target groups, receivers and deservingness: When should immigrants obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here? (imsclbn)	Immediately on arrival – Never	5.32	0.68	6.31
8	Perceived consequences of redistribution: Social benefits and services make people lazy? (sblazy)	Agree strongly – Disagree strongly	4.65	0.65	4.64
9	Perceived consequences of redistribution: Social benefits and services place too great a strain on the economy? (sbstrec)	Agree strongly – Disagree strongly	5.05	0.62	4.55
10	Perceived consequences of redistribution: Social benefits and services cost businesses too much in taxes and charges? (sbbsntx)	Agree strongly – Disagree strongly	5.10	0.59	4.49
10	Attitudes towards redistribution: Government should reduce differences in income levels? (gincdif)	Agree strongly – Disagree strongly	3.09	0.59	4.61
11	Perceived consequences of redistribution:	Agree strongly –	4.13	0.58	5.58

	Social benefits and services lead to a more equal society? (sbeqsoc)	Disagree strongly			
12	Perceptions of target groups, receivers and welfare misuse: Many manage to obtain benefits and services to which they are not entitled? (bennent)	Agree strongly – Disagree strongly	3.81	0.56	4.72
13	Perceived consequences of redistribution: Social benefits and services make people less willing care for one another? (sblwcoa)	Agree strongly – Disagree strongly	4.94	0.52	2.95
14	Perceptions of target groups, receivers and deservingness: Many with very low incomes get less benefit than they are legally entitled to? (lbenent)	Agree strongly – Disagree strongly	4.47	0.51	3.93
15	Perceived consequences of redistribution: Social benefits and services prevent widespread poverty? (sbprvpv)	Agree strongly – Disagree strongly	3.68	0.46	3.48
16	Attitudes towards egalitarianism/social inequality: For a fair society, differences in standard of living should be small? (smdfslv)	Agree strongly – Disagree strongly	3.65	0.44	3.19

Source: European Social Survey and Eurobarometer, latest year available.


Note: Design weights have been applied in calculations based on European Social Survey data. Post-stratification weights have been applied in calculations based on Eurobarometer data (no design weights available). * The rank order is based on the between-country standard deviation, after standardizing the response scale (0-10). **Each variable was regressed on country dummy variables to obtain the share of variation in individual responses explained by between-country differences (Adj. R2).

Figure 4.1 The domestic polarization of perceptions of government performance: State of health services in country nowadays? Distribution of respondents across the available response options 0-10, by country (%)



Note: Question posed (stfhlth): “Still using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of health services in [country] nowadays?” Responses were given on a scale from 0 “Extremely bad” to 10 “Extremely good.” Design weights (dweight) were applied.
Source: European Social Survey 2016

Figure 4.2 The domestic polarization of attitudes towards gender equality in the job market: A woman should be prepared to cut down on paid work for the sake of her family? Distribution of respondents across the available response options 1-5, by country (%)



Note: Question posed (wmcprwk): "Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family." Responses were given on the scale 1 "Agree strongly"; 2 "Agree"; 3 "Neither agree nor disagree"; 4 "Disagree"; 5 "Disagree strongly." Design weights (dweight) were applied.
Source: European Social Survey 2008

4.2 European identity, the EU and EU citizenship

Table 4.2 ranks our indicators of normative attitudes towards European identity, the EU and EU citizenship based on their European conflict potential in recent years (2014-2016). It suggests that the two most divisive items in this area concern the EU's common migration policy and *EU citizenship*. In 2015, *the common migration policy* climbed to the top of the EU agenda as a result of the escalating refugee crisis. The following intergovernmental disagreements about the measures to be taken were heavily medialized and may have enhanced differences of opinion between citizens in the different EU countries (see e.g. Harteveld et al. 2017).

At the same time, attitudes towards the EU's common migration policy were domestically polarized. Particularly so in Estonia (EE), where equal shares of respondents were for and against the common migration policy, but also in countries such as Austria (AT), the Czech Republic (CZ), and to a lesser but still substantial degree in Hungary (HU, Latvia (LT), Poland (PL) and Slovakia (SK).

As regards the question of EU citizenship, attitudes also vary widely within countries (Figure 4.4). While a large majority of the respondents in Luxemburg (LU) identify as citizens of the EU, only one tenth of the respondents in Greece (GR) do so. Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY) and Great Britain (GB) show the highest levels of domestic polarization on the question of EU citizenship, whereas views in Lithuania (LU), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovenia (SI) and Slovakia (SK) are homogenous and large shares of the respondents in these countries either state that they “definitely” feel that they are citizens of the EU, or that they feel so “to some extent.”

Table 4.2 The European conflict potential of normative attitudes towards European identity, including the EU and EU citizenship – a rank order


Conflict potential (rank order*)	Survey Question	Responses (standardized scale, 0–10)			Total variation explained by between-country differences ** (%)
		Response scale (min–max)	Between-country mean	Between-country standard deviation	
1	Opposition to a common European policy on migration (qa17_6)	For – Against	2.90	1.15	6.17
2	European citizenship: Do you feel like a citizen of the European Union? (qd2_1)	Yes, definitely – No, definitely not	3.73	0.88	6.72
3	Attachment to Europe (qd1a_4)	Very attached – Not at all attached	4.58	0.85	6.94
4	Attitude towards the EU: Positive or negative image? (qa9)	Very positive – Very negative	4.51	0.73	8.99
5	European citizenship: Do you know your rights as a citizen of the EU (qd2_2)	Yes, definitely – No, definitely not	4.86	0.66	5.05
6	European citizenship: Would you like to know more about your rights as a citizen of the EU? (qd2_3)	Yes, definitely – No, definitely not	3.60	0.66	3.49

7	Attachment to the European Union (qd1b_3)	Very attached – Not at all attached	4.04	0.60	5.42
8	Attitude towards European integration: Should European unification go further or has it gone too far? (euftf)	Unification already gone too far –Unification go further	4.88	0.58	4.91
9	Identification with Europe vs. nationality in the near future (qd3)	Nationality only – European only	2.34	0.43	3.02
10	Meaning of the EU: Social protection? (qa11_4)	Not mentioned – Mentioned	1.15	0.36	1.14

Source: European Social Survey and Eurobarometer, latest year available.

Note: Design weights have been applied in calculations based on European Social Survey data. Post-stratification weights have been applied in calculations based on Eurobarometer data (no design weights available). * The rank order is based on the between-country standard deviation, after standardizing the response scale (0-10). **Each variable was regressed on country dummy variables to obtain the share of variation in individual responses explained by between-country differences (Adj. R2).

Figure 4.3 The domestic polarization of attitudes towards a common European policy on migration. Distribution of respondents across the available response options “For” and “Against”, by country (%)




Note: Question posed (qa17_6): “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: A common European policy on migration.”

Responses were given on the scale 0 “For” or 1 “Against.” Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied.

Source: Eurobarometer 2016

Figure 4.4 The domestic polarization of attitudes towards European citizenship: Do you feel like a citizen of the European Union? Distribution of respondents across the available response options 1-4, by country (%)



Note: Question posed (qd2_1): "For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion. You feel you are a citizen of the EU?" Responses were given on a scale from 1 "Yes, definitely" to 4 "No, definitely not." Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied.
Source: Eurobarometer 2016

4.3 Immigration

Table 4.3 ranks the report's eighteen indicators of attitudes towards immigration, based on their European conflict potential. Among our indicators in the area of immigration, two stand out as particularly divisive. The first of these is the ESS survey question that asks respondents whether *proximity in terms of race* should serve as a qualification for immigration. As noted in our previous analysis of this item, it is based on a provocative racist proposition that splits the EU/EFTA countries along Eastern/Western lines. Citizens in the Western countries generally view proximity in terms of race, religion or culture as far less important than do citizens in the Eastern countries (Figure 3.36, 3.37, 3.39).

A second survey question which reveals comparatively large attitudinal differences between the EU/EFTA countries is the EB item asking respondents whether the *immigration of people from outside the EU* evokes a positive or negative feeling with them (Figure 3.46). It is not obvious why this item generates more varying responses in the EU/EFTA countries than other items on the theme of immigration. One possibility could be that its unspecific nature and its reference to emotions generated much of the variation.

Within-country differences of opinion on the two top-ranked issues from Table 4.3 differ markedly. As illustrated in Figure 4.4, the question of racial proximity as a qualification for immigration gives rise to little domestic polarization in most EU/EFTA countries. A majority of the respondents in most countries opt for an outright rejection of this racist proposition. However, citizens in the Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LT), (and to a somewhat lesser extent Poland (PL) and Ireland) are clearly divided on this topic and responses from these countries are quite evenly distributed across the response scale.

In contrast to this, Figure 4.5 shows that there are important within-country differences of opinion on the question of whether immigration of people from outside the EU evokes a positive or negative feeling. Austria (AT), Denmark (DK), France (FR), Germany (DE), Romania (RO) and the United Kingdom (GB) are among the countries where attitudes based on this question are most domestically polarized.

Table 4.3 The European conflict potential of normative attitudes towards immigration – a rank order

Conflict potential (rank order*)	Survey Question	Responses (standardized scale, 0–10)			Total variation explained by between-country differences ** (%)
		Response scale (min–max)	Between-country mean	Between-country standard deviation	
1	Qualification for immigration: Being white? (qfimwht)	Extremely unimportant – Extremely important	2.34	1.33	21.16
2	Immigration of people from outside the EU: Positive or negative feeling (qb4_2)	Very positive – Very negative	7.09	1.16	6.17
3	Qualification for immigration: Coming from a Christian background? (qfimchr)	Extremely unimportant – Extremely important	3.24	1.14	13.35
4	Qualification for immigration: Being able to speak [country]’s official language(s) (qfimlng)	Extremely unimportant – Extremely important	6.63	1.08	13.24
4	Opposition to immigration: Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe? (impcntr)	Allow many – Allow none	5.26	1.08	11.92


5	Opposition to immigration: Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group than majority? (imdfetn)	Allow many – Allow none	4.66	1.03	12.08
6	Opposition to immigration: Allow unskilled labourers from [poor non-European country providing largest number of migrants]? (allbpne)	Allow many – Allow none	6.29	1.01	9.52
7	Opposition to immigration: Allow professionals from [poor non-European country providing largest number of migrants]? (alpfne)	Allow many – Allow none	4.25	0.92	10.16
8	Qualification for immigration: Having work skills that [country] needs? (qfimwsk)	Extremely unimportant – Extremely important	6.53	0.90	10.13
9	Opposition to immigration: Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority? (imsmetn)	Allow many – Allow none	3.76	0.82	9.31
10	Perceptions of immigration as a cultural threat: Is it better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions? (pplstrd)	Agree strongly – Disagree strongly	4.38	0.75	7.51
11	Perceptions of immigration as an economic threat: Do immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs? (imtcjob)	Take jobs away – Create new jobs	4.80	0.74	9.58

12	Perceptions of immigration as a cultural threat: Is country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants? (imueclt)	Cultural life undermined – Cultural life enriched	5.64	0.73	8.66
12	Qualification for immigration: Having good educational qualifications? (qfimedu)	Extremely unimportant – Extremely important	6.19	0.73	7.16
13	Qualification for immigration: Being committed to the way of life in [country]? (qfimcmt)	Extremely unimportant – Extremely important	7.31	0.72	7.21
14	Perceptions of immigration as an economic threat: Is immigration bad or good for country's economy? (imbgeco)	Bad for the economy – Good for the economy	4.93	0.66	6.92
15	Perceptions of immigration as an economic threat: Taxes and services – do immigrants take out more than they put in or less? (imbleco)	Generally take out more – Generally put in more	4.49	0.46	4.33
16	Perceptions of immigration as a security threat: Do immigrants make country's crime problems worse or better? (imwbcrm)	Crime problems made worse – Crime problems made better	3.72	0.42	3.91

Source: European Social Survey and Eurobarometer, latest year available.

Note: Design weights have been applied in calculations based on European Social Survey data. Post-stratification weights have been applied in calculations based on Eurobarometer data (no design weights available). * The rank order is based on the between-country standard deviation, after standardizing the response scale (0-10). **Each variable was regressed on country dummy variables to obtain the share of variation in individual responses explained by between-country differences (Adj. R2).


Figure 4.5 The domestic polarization of attitudes concerning qualifications for immigration: Importance of being white? Distribution of respondents across the available response options 0-10, by country (%)



Note: Question posed (qfimwht): "Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be for them to be white?" Responses were given on a scale from 0 "Extremely unimportant" to 10 "Extremely important." Design weights (dweight) were applied.

Source: European Social Survey 2014

Figure 4.6 The domestic polarization of attitudes towards immigration of people from outside the EU: Positive or negative feeling? Distribution of respondents across the available response options 1-4, by country (%)



Note: Question posed (qa17_6): "Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you: Immigration of people from outside the EU." Responses were given on a scale from 1 "Very positive" to 4 "Very negative." Post-stratification weights (w1) were applied.
Source: Eurobarometer 2014 and 2016

4.4 Free movement

On the theme of free movement (explored by the EB) and European immigration (explored by the ESS), the two most divisive issues among the populations of the EU/EFTA countries in 2016 concern their readiness to welcome *unskilled workers* from top European sending countries and *people from the poorer countries in Europe* who want to “come and live here” (Table 4.6). Both topics were salient in the campaign leading up to the June 2016 Brexit referendum. They have also been salient in earlier periods, for example at the time of the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007, when public debates and political leaders in the EU15 referred to a perceived risk of “social tourism” from the new member states. More generally, as observed by Schimmelfenig and Winzen (2017), the EU’s enlargement processes – including the Mediterranean expansion in the 1980s as well as the Eastern expansion in 2004 and 2007 – have been important drivers of debates about differentiated integration, i.e. different rights and obligations for some member states than for others.

However, as shown in Figure 4.7, there are also important within-country differences of opinion on the top-ranked topic from Table 4.6. The level of domestic polarization on the question of *immigration of unskilled workers* from top sending countries in Europe is highest in Lithuania (LT) and the UK (GB). It is also markedly higher in Austria (AT), Ireland (IE), Netherlands (NL) and Portugal (PT) than in, for example, Spain (ES), France (FR) or Hungary (HU) (see Table A.6 in the Appendix for a list of the sending country mentioned to respondents in each member state).

Attitudes towards *immigration of people from the poorer countries in Europe* in general (Figure 4.8) appear to be less polarized than attitudes towards the immigration of unskilled workers from specific, salient, sending countries. As Figure 4.8 illustrates, three countries are characterized by particularly homogenous attitudes and thus low polarization: A large share of the respondents in Norway (NO) and Sweden (SE) take a liberal stance on immigration from the poorer countries in Europe, whereas a large share of the respondents in Hungary (HU) take a restrictive stance. Considering the recent political developments in Hungary, predominantly restrictive attitudes towards European immigration were perhaps to be expected, but it is interesting to note that the Hungarian pattern of opinion differs from that in Poland (PL) where the political leadership in recent years has been similarly critical of the European Union and restrictive on issues having to do with immigration.

Taken together, these results clearly show that further analysis of the domestic context is needed to increase our understanding of normative attitudes towards European immigration and free movement in the EU/EFTA states.

Table 4.4 The European conflict potential of normative attitudes towards free movement – a rank order


Conflict potential (rank order*)	Survey Question	Responses (standardized scale, 0–10)			Total variation explained by between-country differences ** (%)
		Response scale (min–max)	Between-country mean	Between-country standard deviation	
1	Opposition to European immigration: Allow many/few unskilled workers from top poor European sending country? (allbpe)	Allow many – Allow none	5.65	1.08	11.18
2	Opposition to European immigration: Allow many/few people from poorer countries in Europe to come and live here? (eimpent)	Allow many – Allow none	4.69	0.94	9.59
3	Opposition to European immigration: Allow many/few professionals from top poor European sending country? (alpffe)	Allow many – Allow none	3.82	0.89	9.73
4	Free movement of workers, inward: The right of EU citizens to work in [our country], a good thing? (qb6_4)	Bad thing – Good thing	8.06	0.79	5.08
5	Free movement, outward: For or against the free movement of EU citizens to live, work, study and do business anywhere in the EU?(qa17_9)	Against – For	8.77	0.72	4.52
5	Free movement of people, goods and services: The most positive result of the EU? (qa4t_2)	Not mentioned – Mentioned	4.89	0.72	7.98

6	Free movement of workers, outward: The right of EU citizens to work in every EU member state, a good thing? (qb6_2)	Bad thing – Good thing	8.54	0.68	4.82
7	Free movement, inward: Positive or negative feeling towards immigration of people from other EU Member States? (qa17_6)	Very positive – Very negative	3.22	0.53	5.94

Source: European Social Survey and Eurobarometer, latest year available.

Note: Design weights have been applied in calculations based on European Social Survey data. Post-stratification weights have been applied in calculations based on Eurobarometer data (no design weights available). * The rank order is based on the between-country standard deviation, after standardizing the response scale (0-10). **Each variable was regressed on country dummy variables to obtain the share of variation in individual responses explained by between-country differences (Adj. R2).


Figure 4.7 The domestic polarization of opposition to European immigration: Allow many/few unskilled workers from top poor European sending country? Distribution of respondents across the available response options 1-4, by country (%)



Note: Question posed (allbpe): "Using the same card, please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow unskilled labourers from [poor European country providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]?" Responses were given on the scale 1 "Allow many to come and live here"; 2 "Allow some"; 3 "Allow a few"; 4 "Allow none." Design weights (dweight) were applied.

Source: European Social Survey 2014

Figure 4.8 The domestic polarization of opposition to European immigration: Allow many/few people from poorer countries in Europe to come and live here? Distribution of respondents across the available response options 1-4, by country (%)



Note: Question posed (eimpcnt): "Now, still using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries in Europe to come and live here?" Responses were given on the scale 1 "Allow many to come and live here"; 2 "Allow some"; 3 "Allow a few"; 4 "Allow none." Design weights (dweight) were applied.

Source: European Social 2014

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Appendix

Table A.1 Available ESS modules (core and rotating)

	R1 2002	R2 2004	R3 2006	R4 2008	R5 2010	R6 2012	R7 2014	R8 2016
Media and social trust	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Politics	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Subjective well-being...	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Gender, Household	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Socio demographics	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Human values	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Immigration	•						•	
Citizen involvement	•							
Health and care		•						
Economic morality		•						
Family work and well-being		•			•			
Timing of life			•					
Personal ... well-being			•			•		
Welfare attitudes				•				•
Ageism				•				
Justice					•			
Democracy						•		
Social inequalities in health							•	
Public attitudes to climate change								•

Source: European Social Survey 2017, <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/module-index.html>

Table A.2 ESS items on welfare attitudes, including work, that were repeated at least twice in the period 2002-2017

Topic/concept	Survey Item	Survey	Module
Egalitarianism, (Belief systems)	D1: Large differences in people's incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in talents and efforts. D4: For a society to be fair, differences in people's standard of living should be small. D3: A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family.	ESS	2008 2016 2008
Perceived consequences of redistribution	Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in [country].... D21: ...place too great a strain on the economy? D22: ...prevent widespread poverty? D23: ...lead to a more equal society? D25: ...cost businesses too much in taxes and charges? D27: ...make people lazy? D28: ...make people less willing to care for one another?	ESS	2008 2016
Deservingness and misuse (Specific target groups and receivers)	D38: When social rights for newcomers in country D40: Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job. D41: Many people with very low incomes get less benefit than they are legally entitled to. D42: Many people manage to obtain benefits and services to which they are not entitled.	ESS	2008 2016
Government performance (Education and health system in country)	B24 Now, using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of education in [country] nowadays? B25 Still using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of health services in [country] nowadays?	ESS	All rounds (Core module)
Redistribution preferences (Progressivity)	Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. B26 The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.	ESS	All rounds (Core module)

Redistribution principles (Merit, equality or need)	<p>D36. Some people say that higher earners should get larger old age pensions because they have paid in more. Others say that lower earners should get larger old age pensions because their needs are greater. Which of the three statements on this card comes closest to your view?</p> <p>D37. Some people say that higher earners should get more benefit when they are temporarily unemployed because they paid more in tax, whilst others think that lower earners should get more because they are in greater need. Using this card, please tell me which of the three statements you agree with most?</p> <p>[Note: Question asked regarding pensions and unemployment benefits respectively.]</p>	ESS	2008
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Table A.3 EB and ESS items on the EU, European identity and EU citizenship that were repeated at least twice in the period 2002-2017

Topic/concept	Survey Item	Survey	Module
European integration	Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?	ESS	2004-2016 (core module)
Attachment to the EU	<p>People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to... [Europe]</p> <p>[Note: The attachment question was also asked about the European Union, our country, your village/town/city, your region – but not all items were included all/same years.]</p>	EB	1999 2000 2003 2004 2006 2012 2014 2015 2016
EU citizenship and rights	<p>For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> You would like to know more about your rights as a citizen of the EU You feel you are a citizen of the EU You know what your rights are as a citizen of the EU 	EB	2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Image of the EU	In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?	EB	2003 2006 2008 2011 2014 2016

Image of the EU	What does the EU mean to you personally? [Multiple answers possible] • Answer: Social protection	EB	2005-2016
Support for key European policies	What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it • A common European policy on migration	EB	2014 2015 (twice) 2015 (twice)
European identity	In the near future Do you see yourself as...? Answers: • [Nationality] only • [Nationality] and European • European and [Nationality] • European only • None [Spontaneous] • Refusal [Spontaneous] • DK	EB	1992-2016 (twice yearly since 2002)

Table A.4 ESS and EB items on attitudes to immigration that were repeated at least twice in the period 2002-2017

Topic/concept	Survey Item	Survey	Module
Opposition to immigration (Professionals)	D31. Using the same card, please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow professionals from [poor country outside Europe providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]? [Note: Corresponding items on free movement and immigration]	ESS	2014
Opposition to immigration (Unskilled workers)	D33. Using the same card, please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow unskilled labourers from [poor country outside Europe providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]? [Note: Corresponding items on free movement and immigration]	ESS	2014
Opposition to immigration (Poor countries)	D9 How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe? [Note: Corresponding items on free movement and immigration]	ESS	All rounds (core module)

Opposition to immigration (Race/Ethnic group)	D4. Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here D5 How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?	ESS	All rounds (core module)
Qualification for immigration, (criteria for entry/exclusion)	Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Please use this card. Firstly, how important should it be for them to... D10 have good educational qualifications? D12 be able to speak [country]'s official language(s) D13 come from a Christian background? D14 be white? D16 have work skills that [country] needs? D17 be committed to the way of life in [country]?	ESS	2002 2014
Immigration (Economic threat)	Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. Firstly... D25 Using this card, would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs? D26 Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?	ESS	2002 2014
Immigration (Economic threat)	D27 Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?	ESS	All rounds (core module)
Immigration (Cultural threat)	D28 And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?	ESS	All rounds (core module)
Immigration (Security threat)	D30 Are [country]'s crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries?	ESS	2002 2014
Immigration (Positive or negative feeling)	Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Immigration of people from outside the EU [Note: Corresponding items on free movement and immigration]	EB	2014 2015 (twice) 2016 (twice)

Table A.5 ESS and EB items on free movement 2002-2017

Topic/concept	Survey Item	Survey	Module
Opposition to European immigration (Professionals)	D30. Using the same card, please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow professionals from [poor European country providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]? [Note: Corresponding items on European and non-European immigration. See Table A.6 for information about which reference countries were mentioned.]	ESS	2014
Opposition to European immigration (Unskilled workers)	D32. Using the same card, please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow unskilled labourers from [poor European country providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]? [Note: Corresponding items on European and non-European immigration. See Table A.6 for information about which reference countries were mentioned.]	ESS	2014
Opposition to European immigration (Poor countries)	B30a. To what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries in Europe to come and live here? [Note: Corresponding items on European and non-European immigration]	ESS	2002 2014
Free Movement (Positive result of the EU)	Which of the following are the most positive results of the EU? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The free movement of people, goods and services [Note: Free movement is rated as the most positive result or second most positive result next to peace, all years. Item much used by the EC in communication.]	EB	2012-2017 (twice yearly)
Free Movement (Inward)	Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Immigration of people from other EU Member States [Note: Corresponding items on free movement and third country immigration]	EB	2014 2015 (twice) 2016 (twice)
Free movement (Outward)	What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: The free movement of EU citizens who can live, work, study and do business anywhere in the EU.	EB	2015 2016 (twice) 2017

Free movement of workers (Inward)	For each of the following statements, please tell me if you think that it is a good thing, a bad thing or neither a good or a bad thing: The right for EU citizens to work in (our country)	EB	2016
Free movement of workers (Outward)	For each of the following statements, please tell me if you think that it is a good thing, a bad thing or neither a good or a bad thing: The right for EU citizens to work in every EU member state	EB	2016

Table A.6 Countries used in ESS round 7 as "poor European country providing the largest number of migrants"

EU/EFTA country	Poor European country providing the largest number of migrants
Austria	Serbia
Belgium	Poland
Czech Republic	Ukraine
Denmark	Poland
Estonia	Belarus
Finland	Estonia
France	Portugal
Germany	Poland
Hungary	Romania
Ireland	Poland
Latvia	Belarus
Lithuania	Belarus
Netherlands	Poland
Norway	Poland
Poland	Belarus
Portugal	Ukraine
Slovenia	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Spain	Romania
Sweden	Poland
Switzerland	Portugal
UK	Poland

Source: European Social Survey, round7, Appendix A10, available at https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round7/survey/ESS7_appendix_a10_e03_0.pdf



REMINDER

ROLE OF EUROPEAN MOBILITY AND ITS IMPACTS
IN NARRATIVES, DEBATES AND EU REFORMS

The REMINDER project is exploring the economic, social, institutional and policy factors that have shaped the impacts of free movement in the EU and public debates about it.

The project is coordinated from COMPAS and includes participation from 14 consortium partners in 9 countries across Europe



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