# REMINDER

ROLE OF EUROPEAN MOBILITY AND ITS IMPACTS
IN NARRATIVES, DEBATES AND EU REFORMS

# Public Attitudes Toward EU Mobility and Non-EU Immigration: A Distinction with Little Difference

**WORKING PAPER**

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**Published:**  August 2018

UNIVERSITY OF
OXFORD

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## Deliverable 10.2: Public Attitudes Toward EU Mobility and Non-EU Immigration: A Distinction with Little Difference

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# Executive Summary

Why do some Europeans support immigration from within the EU, while rejecting immigration from elsewhere? This paper identifies and attempts to explain the attitudes of "EU-only inclusionists": EU nationals who support high levels of immigration, but only from within the EU. Our analysis takes advantage of an experimental module in the European Social Survey to explore the demographic and country profile of EU citizens who tend to distinguish in their preferred levels of immigration inflows, depending on the origin and skill-level of immigrants. We find that less than 10% of Europeans in our 18-country sample can be classified as Europe-only inclusionists. We also find that existing theories of immigration attitudes and EU support, based on identities, resources, and cognitive mobilization, have relatively little power to explain this pattern, although EU identity is marginally associated with support for intra-EU mobility.

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# Introduction

In immigration policy, the European Union requires sharp differentiation between EU and non-EU nationals. Intra-EU mobility is a foundational right for EU nationals, one of the basic, non-negotiable "four freedoms."[1] On the other hand, member states can and do develop policies to limit immigration from non-EU countries. Indeed, EU policy discourses even use a distinct nomenclature for each type of movement: "mobility" exercised by EU nationals within EU member states, is distinguished from "migration" of "Third Country Nationals (TCNs)" arriving from outside the EU (Ruhs 2017a).

However, as debates in Britain and Germany have shown (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou 2016), members of European publics often do not seem to make the same sharp distinction between the two. The disjuncture between elite rhetoric and policy on one hand and public understandings of immigration on the other hand may pose a significant challenge to the ongoing stability of the EU. Anti-immigration public opinion, directed toward intra-EU movement, was essential to the Brexit movement (Goodwin and Milazzo 2017), and has created pressure in other EU members states to create new restrictions on free movement (Ruhs 2017b). In the context of freedom of movement across national boundaries within the EU, anti-immigrant sentiment can "challenge mainstream views on the 'European project'" (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou 2016). It is therefore an urgent matter for policy-makers and scholars alike to understand whether EU citizens recognize the fundamental institutional distinction between intra-EU mobility and non-EU migration.

However, very little research examines EU citizens' attitudes toward immigration on either side of this fundamental policy dividing line. In what follows, we address this gap in the

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[1] The foundational four freedoms of the EU refer to the movement of goods, capital, services, and labor.

literature. We examine when and why EU citizens distinguish between support for internal EU migration and immigration from outside the EU. We focus, to the extent possible given available data, on understanding the group that we label "EU-only inclusionists": individuals who support intra-EU movement while opposing immigration from the rest of the world. Thus, we ask: why do some Europeans favor European or EU immigration, when the majority are either supportive or opposed to migration in general?

The paper begins with an overview of existing theories and evidence that we draw on to identify and explain EU inclusionism. We test hypotheses derived from leading theories of both public opinion toward immigration and EU integration (Mayda 2006; L. M. McLaren 2001; Sides and Citrin 2007). We continue with a description of the data, the modelling strategy, and finally the empirical results.

Our statistical analysis relies primarily on data collected during round 7 of the European Social Survey (ESS): a large survey data set consisting of over 30,000 respondents from 18 EU member states, plus Switzerland and Norway. Most available data—and a portion of our analysis—distinguishes European from non-European immigration, rather than specifying EU and non-EU origins. However, we leverage an experimental design embedded in the 2014 ESS that has been unexploited in the literature to date; this design enables us to identify EU-only inclusionism and investigate its determinants.

Our findings suggest a striking lack of specific support for the contours of migration policy that are embedded in EU institutions and treaties. Descriptively, the vast majority of Europeans show the same level of support for migration from within and outside Europe or the EU, either supporting strong limits on both types of migration or supporting substantial migration flows from both sources. Even for those who prefer European or EU migration, little of this support seems to come from identification with the EU. Substantively, these findings

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make plain the challenge facing supporters of free movement; theoretically, we call for further research on the links between Europeanness, other forms of identity, and attitudes toward immigration.

## Identifying and Explaining EU Inclusionism in Immigration

Why do Europeans support or oppose immigration? Prior research provides a well-developed catalogue of answers to this question (see Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014 for review). According to many scholars, Europeans' attitudes toward immigration hinge on levels of perceived threat (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). Threats can be either symbolic or resource-based (L. McLaren and Johnson 2007). On the symbolic side, people who see immigrants as threatening to the dominant culture are more likely to oppose immigration (Riek, Mania, and Gaertner 2006). This feeling of threat may be more widespread when immigrants are different from the existing dominant population group in terms of race or ethnicity, religion, language, or other prominent cultural markers (Ford 2008; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Hopkins 2010). Thus, identities—of both the citizens and the potential immigrants—are critical variables here; when these identities diverge, support for immigration becomes less likely.

On the resource-based side, immigration opponents may also perceive threats here, viewing immigrants as threatening to the national economy (Riek, Mania, and Gaertner 2006). However, resource-based opposition to immigration may also stem from relative positions in the labor market. Economic logic suggests that citizens will be more likely to oppose immigrants who are competitors in the labor market, but will be more supportive of immigrants whose skills are complementary to their own. So low-skilled native workers would

be expected to favour high levels of high-skilled immigration while restricting low-skilled immigration; high-skilled native workers should show the opposite pattern (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Malchow-Møller et al. 2008; Chandler and Tsai 2001). Another strand of resource-based theories focuses on the fiscal impacts of immigration rather than the labor market. The fiscal burden hypothesis argues that all citizens are expected to prefer high-skilled inflows due to their greater contributions in taxes and their lower likelihood of requiring public assistance, compared to low-skilled (Valentino et al. 2017).

In these theories, whether implicitly or explicitly, preferences for restricting immigration are not always applied across the board to all types of immigrants. Public opinion distinguishes between immigrants according to their level of education or job skills (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010), their reason for immigrating (Blinder 2015), and their racial, ethnic, national, or religious identities (Ford 2008; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016). In public opinion, then, it is often true that some immigrants are more acceptable than others.

But is EU citizenship one of the dimensions of difference that matters in public opinion? Do Europeans distinguish between EU nationals and other prospective immigrants? Despite the political importance of this distinction (Ruhs 2017b), the literature on public opinion toward EU vs. non-EU migration is sparse. In fact, the literature lacks up-to-date answers even for simple descriptive questions, such as whether or not EU citizens are more supportive of intra-EU mobility than of non-EU migration. The evidence base, while thin and out-of-date, suggests that this pattern of preferences will not be very common. McLaren (2001) found that most Europeans have the same attitudes toward immigrants from within and from outside the EU, and this was at a time when the EU was less heterogeneous economically, prior to EU

enlargement in 2004. Gorodzeisky (2011) finds that Europeans do differentiate between immigrants from poorer and richer European countries, showing that migrants from within Europe are not all alike in Europeans' preferences. So we expect that McLaren's basic descriptive findings will remain true; if anything, recent trends have made it less likely that Europeans who support immigration restrictions will make a positive exception for fellow EU nationals (Ruhs 2017b).

## Explaining European or EU Inclusionism

Nonetheless, as noted above, there are important political as well as theoretical reasons to attempt to understand the determinants of this pattern of preferences. Thus, our hypotheses focus on identifying potential determinants of the Europe-only or especially "EU-only inclusionist" pattern of migration preferences. For those EU nationals who do prefer European or EU migration, what might explain this pattern of preferences? Is it due to loyalty to the EU itself, or for other reasons? We identify several potential explanations, outlined below.

We begin with symbolic or identity-based explanations. First and most straightforwardly, we hypothesize that identification with the EU will be an important predictor of a preference for European migrants. Scholars have shown that the EU is a locus of a supranational political identity for at least some citizens (Kentmen-Cin and Erisen 2017; Risse 2010). As Fligstein, Polyakova, and Sandholtz (2012) put it, "for a significant share of EU citizens, a European identity exists alongside a national identity" (see also Bruter 2009). However, many EU citizens do not develop a strong personal identification with the EU; Kuhn (2017) finds that real transnational interactions spur individuals to identify with the EU, but

that these experiences (such as the opportunity to live or study abroad) are confined to a relatively small subset of society. Nonetheless, for those who do identify with the EU, this identity is politically consequential, predicting citizens' support for further EU integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Brinegar and Jolly 2005). Therefore, we hypothesize that identification with the EU will be associated with Europe-only or EU-only inclusionism: greater support for immigration from European/EU countries than from outside.

Identity, of course, plays a broader role in the politics of immigration as well. Other aspects of citizens' political and social identities may also affect their tendencies to distinguish between EU and non-EU migrants. As noted above, opposition to immigration is associated with negative attitudes toward out-groups of various types—racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural. These "symbolic threats" to identity are often used to predict individual-level opposition to immigration (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). We suggest that these cultural identity preferences might also be predictors of the "EU-only inclusionist" pattern of preferences. This would be the case if EU citizens perceive potential within-EU migrants as more similar to themselves than potential non-EU migrants on one or more of these dimensions of identity.

Following this logic, we hypothesize that Europeans who think it is important that immigrants share the racial, religious, or linguistic characteristics with the majority of the native-born population will be more likely to show a pro-European bias in their preferences for immigration admissions. These reasons for EU inclusionist preferences are quite distinct from the directly pro-EU reasoning outlined above. In this case, the European-ness of potential migrants is simply a proxy for characteristics such as whiteness, Christianity, or in some cases linguistic similarity. So EU citizens may hold EU inclusionist preferences not out

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of any attachment to the EU or Europe itself, but rather as an indirect expression of in-group favoritism on racial, religious, or linguistic lines.

In addition to perceived symbolic threats, citizens may oppose immigration from a sense of realistic or resource-based threat. In this economic logic—which is focused on workers in the paid labor market—citizens should welcome migrants who complement their own role in the labor market while opposing immigration of potential labor market substitutes (Facchini and Mayda 2009). Low-skilled "native" workers are expected to oppose the immigration of more low-skilled workers but welcome the immigration of high-skilled workers, while high-skilled native workers should hold the opposite set of views. In this theory, EU citizenship (as well as other identity considerations) is not expected to be a directly relevant predictor of immigration policy preferences.

However, EU citizenship may be relevant as a proxy for labor market position. In the present climate, European migrants—from within the EU, in particular—may be viewed as more likely to fill low-skilled jobs in the labor market, relative to other immigrants who are subject to movement restrictions. This is a by-product of free movement itself. EU member states limit immigration from outside the EU, including restrictions based on skill and income (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2011). Thus, immigration flows to EU countries from outside of Europe may be disproportionately composed of highly educated and skilled workers, or may be perceived as such. These real or perceived flows may also feature large numbers of students who are poised to join that highly-skilled group once they complete their degrees. On the other hand, because of free movement, EU members states cannot (directly) restrict the arrivals of low-skilled workers from elsewhere within the EU. Fears of large flows of unskilled workers have long been a part of anti-migration, anti-EU discourse, crystallized in the widely circulated trope of the "Polish plumber," expected by some to flood the European

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labor markets and drive down wages and employment among native workers (Donaghey and Teague 2006). Thus, whether through direct experience or media reports, Europeans may view EU migration as a particular source of low-skilled workers.

Viewing the resource-based theory of immigration attitudes in light of this characteristic of EU migration, we can generate additional hypotheses. Whereas the imagined Polish plumber will be in competition with low-skilled native-born workers in France or Germany, this figure will be a complement rather than a substitute for high-skilled native-born workers (and perhaps an affordable provider of services, to boot). By this logic, then, the resource-based theory would predict that low-skilled EU workers will be more likely to oppose intra-EU migration; support for intra-EU migration, on the other hand, should be more likely among high-skilled workers.

Finally, we consider the "cognitive mobilization" hypothesis, from the existing literature on support for the EU and its political projects (see Hobolt and de Vries 2016 for review). In this view, support for the EU—which we would extend to include intra-EU mobility as a component of free movement and the four freedoms—is in part a result of citizens taking political cues from political elites. The EU has long been seen as an elite political undertaking; individuals who are more engaged in politics have traditionally shown more support for the EU and for EU integration (Gabel 1998). This pattern may be a function of exposure to, and acceptance of, political elites' pro-EU messages (McLaren 2001).

Although elites have become more divided with the rise of Euroskeptic parties and shifts in ideology (Hooghe and Marks 2009), elites remain substantially more supportive of the EU than the general public, while Euroskepticism springs disproportionately from the ideological extremes with less attachment to mainstream parties (Elsas, Hakhverdian, and Brug 2016). Thus, we would expect that elites on balance continue to provide cues

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encouraging EU support, for those members of the public who are attentive enough to politics to receive these cues.

In the case of migration, as noted above, EU orthodoxy draws a sharp distinction between intra-EU "mobility"—a foundational freedom for EU citizens—and non-EU migration, which member states have the right to limit and control. We would expect that elites will send signals supporting intra-EU mobility, and that EU citizens who are more attentive to politics are more likely to have absorbed this nuanced view on how to prioritize potential migration inflows. Those who are less attentive to politics are more likely to react to immigration in broader brush strokes. So, in short, the implication of the cognitive mobilization hypothesis is that individuals who are more interested in and engaged with politics, or more attached to mainstream political parties, will be more likely to prefer EU to non-EU immigration.

We summarize the key hypotheses of the various relevant theories in Table 1. For each theoretical perspective, we list the factors associated with increased preference for immigration either from the EU specifically, or from Europe but not specifically from the EU. Note that these predictions refer to a *relative preference* for EU or European migrants. They are therefore not equivalent to the factors that predict general support for immigration. Rather, these are hypotheses about EU-only or Europe-only inclusionists: people who are more supportive of immigration from within Europe than from outside Europe.

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**Table 1**

| Category of hypotheses | Expected preference | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | **Pro EU** | **Pro European** |
| **Identity** | EU identity (+) | Preference for ethnically and culturally similar immigrants (+) |
| **Resources** | EU origin as proxy for low-skilled inflows:<br>High skilled (+)<br>Low skilled (-) | |
| **Cognitive & elite "cues" mobilization** | High education (+) | |
| | Engaged with elite politics (+) | |

# Data

The empirical analysis relies on survey microdata from the European Social Survey (ESS) and considers nationals/citizens who are resident across EU and EFTA member countries available (EU countries plus Switzerland and Norway). The ESS is a biennial cross-sectional face-to-face interview survey of individuals over the age of 14 conducted in more than 33 countries in Europe since 2002. It represents an established source of harmonised nationally representative survey data on people's characteristics, behaviours, and attitudes.

**Table 2**
Sample sizes by country and ESS round

| Country | ESS1 2002 | ESS7 2014 | Largest imm. sending country in Europe | Largest imm. sending country outside Europe |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 2,162 | 1,671 | Serbia | Turkey |
| Belgium | 1,803 | 1,618 | Poland | Turkey |
| Switzerland | 1,822 | 1,237 | Portugal | Turkey |
| Czech R | 1,352 | 2,128 | Ukraine | Vietnam |
| Germany | 2,799 | 2,894 | Poland | Turkey |
| Denmark | 1,464 | 1,438 | Poland | Turkey |
| Estonia | - | 1,630 | Belarus | Vietnam |
| Spain | 1,682 | 1,818 | Romania | Morocco |
| Finland | 1,969 | 2,039 | Estonia | Somalia |
| France | 1,447 | 1,820 | Portugal | Algeria |
| UK | 1,992 | 2,135 | Poland | India |
| Hungary | 1,682 | 1,698 | Romania | China |
| Ireland | 1,978 | 2,193 | Poland | Nigeria |
| Lithuania | - | 2,242 | Belarus | Turkey |
| Netherlands | 2,318 | 1,856 | Poland | Turkey |
| Norway | 1,975 | 1,339 | Poland | Somalia |
| Poland | 2,110 | 1,614 | Belarus | Vietnam |
| Portugal | 1,479 | 1,234 | Ukraine | Brazil |
| Sweden | 1,941 | 1,720 | Poland | Somalia |
| Slovenia | 1,514 | 1,209 | Bosnia-Herz | China |
| Total | 33,489 | 35,533 | | |

Notes: non-weighted sample, non-nationals excluded; sending countries providing largest number of immigrants follow classifications used in the four experimental questions in ESS7, hence missing for countries excluded in that round.

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**Dependent variables**

We construct two dependent variables by taking advantage of six question items that ask respondents how many immigrants should be allowed to immigrate (many, some, a few, or none) with reference to immigrants' origins from within and outside Europe and skill-level. The first dependent variable cross-references respondents' answers to two questions. The items are otherwise identically worded, but one asks about immigrants from poorer countries *in* Europe, whereas the other mentions immigrants from poorer countries *outside* Europe. We construct a variable that isolates respondents who prefer different levels of restriction depending on the origin of immigrants, much like Gorodzeisky's (2011) use of similar questions to isolate respondents whose migration preferences differ depending on migrants' origins from richer versus poorer countries.

Respondents who opted for the same level of restriction in both questions are classified as either general inclusionists or general restrictionists. Respondents who differed in their inflow preference are categorised as either Europe inclusionists or non-Europe inclusionists (for details on coding see Appendix A, Tables 1 & 2). In the 2002 round of the survey, there is another pair of these questions that references richer countries within and outside Europe. We repeat our analysis for 2002 using both pairs of these questions (poorer/richer) as part of robustness tests (see Appendix A for results).

Europe-only inclusionists comprise less than 10% of ESS respondents (see Figure 1). Moreover, this proportion is fairly consistent over time. In 2014, 9% of respondents were in favour of restricting immigration from poorer non-European countries while allowing immigrants from poorer European countries. In 2002, the comparable figure was 6.7% for immigrants from poorer countries and 8% for immigrants from richer countries. Likewise, in both 2002 and 2014, about half of respondents supported allowing many or at least some

immigrants, irrespective of origin from within or outside Europe. An even smaller portion of respondents were in favour of allowing many or some from non-European countries, while restricting immigration from European countries to few or none (between *2%* and *3.4%*).

**Figure 1**



Notes: Weighted summary statistics, ESS data (see Appendix A for details)

Summary statistics suggest that only a small proportion of EU residents (at least in the broad but not complete set of EU countries sampled in the ESS) would prefer relatively large numbers of immigrants from European countries while at the same time preferring little or no non-European immigration. However, consistency pressures internal to the ESS survey instrument might influence the results above. The questions about immigration from poorer countries within and outside Europe are asked, consecutively, to each respondent. This might induce pressure on respondents to be consistently pro-immigration or anti-immigration in their answers to this pair of questions, for a variety of possible motivations. For this reason, we turn next to dependent variable B, constructed from a controlled experiment embedded in ESS 7.

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The ESS immigration module in 2014 included a survey experiment that captures differences in attitudes toward European and non-European immigration, while avoiding the consistency pressures that arise from the consecutive question format. Within each country, the sample of respondents is equally and randomly split to four groups that correspond to four treatments/specifications. Respondents were asked about their preferred level of just one of four possible types of immigration. While otherwise identical in wording and response design, the four types vary on two dimensions related to the characteristics of immigrants: job-related skills and origin; a) unskilled laborers from poorer European country, b) professionals from poorer European country, c) unskilled laborers from poorer *non*-European country, and d) professionals from poorer *non*-European country. This design ("between-subjects" rather than "within-subjects"), again, eliminates concerns about pressure to provide consistent responses across questions.

In addition, the experimental question enables us to distinguish between attitudes toward immigration from EU countries and immigration from European countries that are not part of the EU. The relevant survey question changes depending on the country of the respondent to reflect the individual country from either within or outside Europe providing the largest number of immigrants. The individual country of origin in Europe or outside remains the same across all respondents within each country sample (see Table 2 for countries mentioned in each sample). Since a complex host of historical and geopolitical factors are likely to determine the most popular sending country among immigrants for each destination in Europe, the actual country mentioned as sending the largest number of migrants varies in a non-random manner for respondents living in different countries. In places such as the UK, Sweden, and Germany, *Poland* is mentioned as the poorer country in Europe providing the largest number of migrants. But for outside Europe, the UK respondents

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are asked about *India*, those in Sweden are asked about *Somalia*, and those in Germany are asked about *Turkey*. Depending on the country, some European countries mentioned are members of the EU, while others are not. In Spain, the question references *Morocco* and *Romania*, while in Portugal it mentions *Ukraine* and *Brazil*.

Direct cross-referencing of each respondent's answers to the different experimental items is not possible in this case. However, the experimental design allows us to assign respondents with a value based on their support or opposition to inflows and then include the origin and skill specification of those inflows (i.e. iteration they received) as a factor within the estimated model. If we assume that people partly form their views based on the immigrants they interact with the most, then a question that references the most salient or recognisable country of origin of immigrants within and outside Europe is likely to improve reliability in responses, rather than reduce it.

It does however raise some questions around the interpretation of the role of country of origin when grouped into Europe/non-Europe, if respondents in each country sample are asked about a different country of birth. But since associations ought to be more consistent within each country, this should not introduce bias into within-country, individual-level variation. For this reason, our analysis opts for a multilevel modelling approach, controlling for country-level effects, and taking this limitation into account in the interpretation of the results.

In spite of these limitations, an advantage of this experimentally-varied question is that it allows us to test whether attitudes are more or less negative in countries where the largest immigrant group are mobile EU citizens, compared to countries where most European immigrants are not a result of EU mobility.  By doing this, and controlling for other potential factors, we can pinpoint to the role of EU/European inclusion on immigration preferences,

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above and beyond other reasons such as racial and cultural similarity that might increase support for migration from only within Europe. Another design implication to note is the lack of direct reference to the EU or to EU mobility. It is possible that a respondent is generally supportive to the idea of free movement or to EU inflows but opposes inflows from the specific origin country mentioned. We are effectively inferring on all EU origins on the basis of specific countries. The analysis addresses this as far as possible by statistically controlling for the effect of specific country mentioned both at individual and country level.

**Table 3**
Dependent Variable B (Origin & Skill)

| Allow many/some immigrants from poorer cntry | N | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment: unskilled from European country | 8,741 | 0.46 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Treatment: skilled from European country | 8,638 | 0.74 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 |
| Treatment: unskilled from non-European country | 8,451 | 0.37 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Treatment: skilled from non-European country | 8,623 | 0.70 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 |
| Experimental combined (dependent B) | 34,453 | 0.57 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |

Notes: Weighted summary statistics; values represent the % of respondents who chose many/some as opposed to few/none in the respective experimental question (each respondent gets one of the four iterations); EU countries were mentioned in BE DK DE IE NL SE UK ES HU FI FR, while non-EU European countries were mentioned in EE PL LT CZ PT SI AT.

The means shown in Table 3 suggest that the differentiating factor in support for immigration restrictions is skill-level primarily, and secondarily origin from within or outside Europe. Around *37%* of respondents were in support of allowing many or some unskilled workers from the respective poorer non-European country with the largest number of immigrants. This stood at *45%* among those who were asked about unskilled workers from the poorer European country with the largest number. For skilled workers, pro-inclusion stood at *70%* when asked about outside Europe and *73%* when asked about within Europe. In other words, European origins provide a boost in support of only 3 percentage points for

skilled migrants and 8 percentage points for unskilled migrants. By contrast, the increment for skills is much larger: 28 and 33 percentage points, respectively, for migration from within and from outside Europe.

**Explanatory variables**

Our first set of explanatory variables relate to the hypothesis that identification with the EU will predict EU-only inclusionist migration preferences. EU identification is represented by two ESS questions, asking whether the respondent thinks EU unification has gone too far, and trusts the European Parliament. These are proxies rather than direct measures, but more precise identification questions are not available on any survey that also includes the suite of immigration questions required for our analysis.

In addition, we expect that other forms of identity may predict opposition to EU migration, or more broadly predict opposition to migration as suggested by group threat theory. We represent the racial, religious, and cultural identity factors with items on how important or unimportant respondents think it is for immigrants to have certain characteristics: fluency in the country's official language, a Christian background, white racial identity, and a commitment to the country's way of life. We also include another item that taps into cultural chauvinism at a general level, asking to what extent respondents think 'some cultures are better than others' as opposed to opting for 'all cultures are equal'. Finally, we take account of national identity with a question item asking respondents how close they feel to their country.

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**Table 4**
Individual Independent Variables

| Explanatory factors | N | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *EU and national identity* | | | | | |
| EU unification gone too far | 33,220 | 0.39 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Distrustful of EU parliament | 33,313 | 0.54 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Feel close to country | 35,332 | 0.89 | 0.31 | 0 | 1 |
| | | | | | |
| *Shared cultural and ethnic identity* | | | | | |
| Religious | 35,302 | 0.38 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Some cultures better than others | 35,533 | 0.39 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Important to speak country's official language | 35,243 | 0.74 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 |
| Important to have Christian background | 34,884 | 0.20 | 0.40 | 0 | 1 |
| Important to be white | 35,019 | 0.11 | 0.31 | 0 | 1 |
| Important to be committed to way of life | 35,142 | 0.79 | 0.41 | 0 | 1 |
| | | | | | |
| *Resource competition* | | | | | |
| Activity: Paid work | 35,417 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Activity: Education | 35,417 | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0 | 1 |
| Activity: Unemployed, looking for job | 35,417 | 0.04 | 0.20 | 0 | 1 |
| Activity: Economically inactive | 35,417 | 0.36 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Occupation: Highly skilled ISCO 1/3 | 35,533 | 0.36 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Occupation: Medium skilled ISCO 4/6 | 35,533 | 0.28 | 0.45 | 0 | 1 |
| Occupation: Low skilled ISCO 7/9 | 35,533 | 0.27 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 |
| Occupation: Armed forces ISCO 0 | 35,533 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0 | 1 |
| Difficult to cope on present hh income | 35,216 | 0.18 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 |
| Subjective health poor | 35,500 | 0.08 | 0.27 | 0 | 1 |
| Important to have good educational qualifications | 35,073 | 0.66 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 |
| Important to have work skills needed | 35,144 | 0.69 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 |
| | | | | | |
| *Cognitive mobilization* | | | | | |
| Education: Up to lower secondary education ISCED 0-II | 35,431 | 0.33 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 |
| Education: Upper second, post-secondary, short tertiary ISCED III-IV | 35,431 | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Education: Bachelors or higher ISCED V-VI | 35,431 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 |
| How interested in politics | 35,438 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Last national election: did not vote | 35,241 | 0.22 | 0.42 | 0 | 1 |
| Last national election: not eligible to vote | 35,241 | 0.08 | 0.27 | 0 | 1 |
| Last national election: voted | 35,241 | 0.70 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 |
| Feel closer to a particular party than all other parties | 34,816 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Political action participation scale (7-item cumulative scale) | 35,533 | 1.11 | 1.42 | 0 | 7 |

Notes: Weighted summary statistics; Original eleven-point scales are recoded into binary variables (0 /5=0 and 6/10=1)

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Moving from symbolic to realistic threats, we begin with the respondents' occupation, whether current, previous (for the retired), or most recent (for the unemployed), which should predict attitudes toward immigration inflows of different skill levels. This measure uses categories based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08). We group workers as low-skilled (ISCO 7-9: elementary occupation, plant and machine operator, or craft and trades worker), medium-skilled (ISCO 4-6: skilled agricultural/fish/forestry worker, service and sales worker, or clerical support worker), high-skilled (ISCO 1-3: technician, associate professional/professional, or manager), or in armed forces occupations (ISCO 0). We also include a measure of economic activity, identified with four categories using self-reported main activity in last seven days; a) in paid work, b) in education or training, c) unemployed and actively looking for work, and d) economically inactive.

In addition to objective economic indicators, we also control for subjective income perceptions using a question on feelings about household income nowadays (living comfortably/coping vs difficult/very difficult). The analysis also accounts for self-reported subjective health status (very good/good/fair vs bad/very bad), a variable that may indicate concerns over the economic threat or public assistance burden perceived to arise from immigration. Finally, we also include items asking whether it is important that immigrants a) have good educational qualifications and b) have needed skills.

To test the cognitive mobilization hypothesis, we include a series of indicators of interest and engagement in politics. We include interest in politics (very/quite vs hardly/not at all), whether they voted in the last national election (yes/no/not eligible), and whether there is a particular political party they "feel closer to than all the other parties" (yes/no). The *political action participation scale* is a cumulative scale comprised of seven items asking the

respondent (yes=1/no=0) whether they took part in the respective action in the last 12 months: contacted politician or government official, worked in political party or action group, worked in another organisation or association, worn/displayed campaign badge or sticker, signed petition, taken part in lawful demonstration, or boycotted certain products. If a respondent reported "no" in all seven questions, they are assigned a zero, while a respondent who took part in all actions will be assigned a seven. This scale aims to approximate instances as well as extent of recent engagement and mobilization with various types of political action and social activism, which we expect will be associated with political information acquisition, but without prioritizing any one action specifically.

Education is strongly correlated with political interest and attention to elite messages, so we incorporate it here as a categorical variable based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED); a) low education if up to lower secondary (ISCED 0-II), b) medium education if up to upper second, post-secondary non-tertiary, or short tertiary (ISCED III-IV), and c) high education if Bachelors Degree equivalent or higher (ISCED V-VI).

**Demographic and other control variables**

Our analysis takes into account a series of individual level demographic differences between respondents, which have been identified by both theory and previous evidence as playing a role in attitudes towards immigration (see Table 5). We control for gender, three age groups, birth in country of interview (as opposed to naturalised foreign-born), and self-reported ethnic minority status. Rural or urban residence is measured with a supplied variable that identifies whether the respondent lives in a) a big city, b) outskirts of big city/suburbs, c) a small city or town, or d) in a country village or farm.

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**Table 5**

Individual Control Variables

| Demographics | N | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Female | 35,511 | 0.51 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Born in country | 35,527 | 0.94 | 0.24 | 0 | 1 |
| Member of ethnic minority | 35,129 | 0.04 | 0.19 | 0 | 1 |
| Age: up to 35 | 35,533 | 0.30 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 |
| Age: between 36 and 60 | 35,533 | 0.42 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Age: over 60 | 35,533 | 0.28 | 0.45 | 0 | 1 |
| Residence: A big city | 35,449 | 0.17 | 0.37 | 0 | 1 |
| Residence: Suburbs or outskirts of big city | 35,449 | 0.12 | 0.32 | 0 | 1 |
| Residence: Town or small city | 35,449 | 0.34 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Residence: Country village or farm | 35,449 | 0.37 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |

Notes: Weighted summary statistics

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# Modelling Strategy

Our estimation approach differs depending on the outcome being analysed. Both dependent measures are operationalised as binary variables that take the value of 1 if the person expressed the respective inflow preference and 0 otherwise.

*Dependent A (Origin)*: The first dependent variable includes four discrete but not ranked categories (general inclusionists, general restrictionists, Europe inclusionists, non-Europe inclusionists). Therefore we opt for a maximum likelihood multinomial logit regression model that allows us to simultaneously calculate varying predictor slopes for each restrictionist category within one model estimation.

Following equation (1), we estimate the probability $y$ that an individual will express support for the respective origin category denoted by $\tau$, as a function of individual level characteristics and country fixed effects denoted by a vector of covariates $X$.

$$\Pr(y = \tau) = \left. e^{\beta_\tau X} \middle/ 1 + \sum_{k=1}^{T-1} e^{\beta_k X} \right. \qquad (1)$$

While the choice of reference category does not affect the estimated probabilities or relative risk ratios, in our case the chosen category is general inclusionists (Kwak and Clayton-Matthews 2002). We cluster standard errors by country to reflect the nesting of respondents within each country sample and include country dummies in the model. This approach takes account of the non-independence of respondents within countries but assumes and estimates a fixed country effect. The list of controls and predictor variables are entered in the estimations as discussed in the *Data* section.

*Dependent B (Origin & Skill)*: To reflect the wording and administration design of the second dependent variable, which splits the sample into equal treatment groups, we borrow

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our methodological approach from applied epidemiological studies and employ multilevel modelling. The outcome variable takes the value of 0 if the person opted for restriction in their respective question, and 1 if they opted for inclusion. The randomly assigned wording iterations that vary by origin and skills of immigrants are entered as predictors in a mixed-effects logistic regression model that includes all respondents (level 1) nested within countries (level 2).

Following equation (2), we estimate the probability that individual *i* in country *C* will support inclusion of immigrants ($y = 1$), as a function of the wording $Treatment_{iC}$ they received, and their individual characteristics $X_{iC}$.

(2)

$$Logit\ (\pi_{iC}) = \Pr(y = 1) = (\beta_0 + \beta_1\ X_{iC} + \beta_2 Treatment_{iC} + u_C Treatment_{iC} + u_C)$$

The above model structure includes both a fixed and a random component and takes account of treatment effects associated with each country as well as for each individual. It estimates fixed coefficients for each individual level variable, including the treatment received ($\beta_2 Treatment_{iC}$) as part of the fixed portion of the model specification. In addition, it estimates a random coefficient for each treatment at country level ($u_C Treatment_{iC}$), and a random intercept for countries $u_C$. We specify the covariance as *independent*, since respondents cannot be part of more than one treatment or more than one country sample, simultaneously. This allows us to isolate the change in the likelihood of preferring restriction or inclusion of immigrants depending on the treatment received, while controlling for other country and individual level differences. The specifications are otherwise identical across all the estimations as discussed in the *Data* section.

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Regression results for both dependent variables are presented following marginal standardization, which calculates predicted probabilities and/or marginal changes associated with the values of a predictor for each outcome (inflow preference), while other factors in the model are considered in their observed values. In simple terms, this approach averages the estimated effects across actual respondents in the data, rather than presenting the estimated effect for a person with average characteristics. This is chosen as the most appropriate method to interpret the average effect of dichotomous factors in the overall population for binary dependent measures (Muller and MacLehose 2014). For complete estimation and postestimation results concerning dependent variable A, see Appendix A. For dependent B, see Appendix B.

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### Results for dependent A (origin)

An overview of the empirical findings suggests that there are certain demographic, situational, and attitudinal differences between Europe-only inclusionists and people with other inflow preferences. On the whole, results appear to support identity-based drivers of Europe inclusionism more than other explanatory approaches. Support for the EU and trust towards its institutions is associated with a higher likelihood of having views classified as Europe inclusionist (bottom left chart, Figure 2). Our results also corroborate the argument that people who prefer immigrants who share their cultural and ethnic identity are more likely to be Europe inclusionists (Figure 3).

**Figure 2**



Notes: Estimation sample = 27,352 observations; estimated marginal effect of factor variable on the probability of expressing each category of dependent variable A; mean effect with 95% CI; standard errors were clustered by country and country fixed effects were included alongside the complete set of individual level controls and predictors.

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Thinking that EU unification should go further is associated with, either preferring European inflows or general inclusion. Those who think that EU unification has gone too far are more likely to prefer general restrictions or opt for non-European inflows. Expressing distrust towards the EU parliament shows a similar relationship. Those who are distrustful of the EU parliament are about 4 percentage points more likely to choose general restrictions, and slightly less likely to support European inflows only. While the effect is not statistically very consistent, we find that those who report feeling close to their country are generally more likely than those who don't to opt for European inflows or general restrictions, and less likely to favour general inclusion and non-European inflows. We also find that people who report feeling religious are more likely than the non-religious people to make an exception for the inclusion of either European or non-European inflows, and less likely to opt for general restrictions.

**Figure 3**



Predicted marginal effects on probability of preferring inclusion of respective inflows

Notes: Estimation sample = 27,352 observations; estimated marginal effect of factor variable on the probability of expressing each category of dependent variable A; mean effect with 95% CI; standard errors were clustered by country and country fixed effects were included alongside the complete set of individual level controls and predictors.

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Beyond EU identification, other forms of identity are strongly associated with immigration attitudes, including a specific preference for European immigration. People who think that some cultures are better than others are about 1.3 percentage points more likely to prefer European inflows to non-European and 4.8 percentage points more likely to support general restrictions. Controlling for demographic and other differences, people who do not value identity and culture related qualifications as important conditions for the inclusion of immigrants, are more likely to be general inclusionists. Among those who do consider certain conditions as important for immigrants to have, Europe only inclusionists are more likely to view being Christian as important. Preferring ethnically white immigrants is associated with a small but statistically less consistent increase in the likelihood of opting for European only inflows (by 1.3 percentage points). We should note, however, that all of these factors, as well as a preference for linguistically-similar immigrants, are even more strongly associated with general restrictionist immigration attitudes. This is in contrast with EU identification, which is associated positively with Europe-only inclusionism but negatively with general restrictionist attitudes.

The resource-based view, meanwhile, finds more limited, mixed support at best. As shown in Figure 4, people in low skilled occupations are more likely to prefer general restrictions on immigration, and high skilled workers are less likely to do so (relative to medium skill workers). In contrast, skill level is not strongly associated with European inclusionism. This contrasts with the predictions of the resource-based account; since European immigrants are more likely to be low skilled workers, they should be particularly welcomed by high skilled native workers and opposed by low skilled native workers. Attitudes toward non-European migrants, more likely to be highly skilled because of existing immigration restrictions, should show the opposite pattern.

On the other hand, the resource theory gains limited support if we allow for subjective measures of economic well-being. Individuals who say they are having difficulty at their current income level are more likely to oppose immigration generally; those who are comfortable with their current income are more likely to support European immigration.

**Figure 4**



Predicted marginal effects on probability of preferring inclusion of respective inflows

Notes: Estimation sample = 27,352 observations; estimated marginal effect of factor variable on the probability of expressing each category of dependent variable A; mean effect with 95% CI; standard errors were clustered by country and country fixed effects were included alongside the complete set of individual level controls and predictors.

The cognitive mobilization perspective gains even less support, as shown in Figure 5. None of the measures of engagement or mobilization were significant predictors of this pattern of preferences.

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**Figure 5**



Notes: Estimation sample = 27,352 observations; estimated marginal effect of factor variable on the probability of expressing each category of dependent variable A; mean effect with 95% CI; standard errors were clustered by country and country fixed effects were included alongside the complete set of individual level controls and predictors.

Factors related to cognitive and elite cue mobilization and political engagement contribute mostly to differences between general inclusionists and general restrictionists, but appear less relevant in identifying people who distinguish between inflows by origin. People who are more interested and/or engaged with political affairs tend to be more positive towards immigration inflows, compared to those who are less interested or less engaged. High education is associated with a small decrease in the likelihood of preferring non-European inflows.

Beyond theoretically predicted determinants of immigration attitudes, we may also want to understand the demographic profile of European inclusionists. In particular, it is politically relevant to compare this group to general restrictionists. Both of these groups

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prefer to severely restrict non-European immigration, but Europe inclusionists make an exception for European immigrants while general restrictionists do not.

We find a few demographic differences. European inclusionists are more likely to be in education or jobseekers. They are more religious, and more likely to live outside of a big city. General restrictionists on the other hand tend to be economically inactive and less religious. Both groups tend to be older than average (higher likelihood of being over 60 years old). We do not find any statistically significant gender disparities in the probability of expressing either preference.

To ensure our findings remain robust to the way we have constructed this dependent variable, we also estimate equation 1 using an alternative version of our dependent variable that is more sensitive to smaller differences in attitudes toward European vs. non-European immigration. For more information on coding, see Appendix A Tables 1 & 2. Complete results of this estimation are available in Appendix A Table 5. As discussed earlier in the paper, we also conduct a series of sensitivity tests using the first round of ESS data, which was collected in 2002. We begin by replicating the primary regression (Appendix A, Table 6). Secondly, we estimate equation 1 with the ESS1 data and the alternative version of dependent variable A (Appendix A, Table 7). Lastly, we replicate the primary estimation using a copy of dependent variable A but based on the question wording that mentions richer countries rather than poorer (Appendix A, Table 8). Despite some differences in effect sizes and in some cases resulting statistical significance, our broader inferences remain robust to these changes. The question on support or opposition to further EU unification was not asked in the first round of the survey. Trust in the EU parliament shows similar effects in both rounds.

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### *Results for dependent B (origin & skill)*

Next, we discuss the empirical results for the experimental dependent variable, which identifies differentiating inflow preferences by immigrants' origin (Europe, EU, non-Europe) and skill level (unskilled, skilled). In this case we employ a mixed effects multilevel logistic regression where respondents are nested within countries. In the fixed portion of the equation, the predicted effect of the wording treatment shows to what extent the skill and origin of immigrants mentioned contributes to a person's likelihood of supporting inclusion of inflows, after controlling for other differences between individuals and countries; including the country level differences in the specific country mentioned as sending the largest number of immigrants. The random treatment effect at the country level represents how much the country mentioned contributes to the probability of preferring inclusion, in isolation from any other differences across countries, or individual characteristics and differences in wording treatment effects.

Figure 6 shows how the estimated probability of opting for inclusion of inflows varies depending on the origins and skills of immigrants mentioned. For the two groups asked about inflows from Europe, the probability is shown separately between those in countries where the largest sender mentioned is part of the EU, from those in countries where the largest sender of immigrants mentioned is not a member. The values are estimated based on the fixed portion of the model, allowing us to isolate the individual fixed effect of origin mentioned on the probability of opting for inclusion, while controlling for other individual and country factors. The line at 0.5 separates the probability distribution between those who are generally predicted to opt for restriction and those who are more likely to support inclusion. The estimated probability tends to tilt towards inclusion for those assigned the wording

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treatment that references skilled, and towards restriction for those asked about unskilled immigrants.

**Figure 6**



Notes: Estimation sample = 28,985 observations; estimated probability (margin) of expressing support for allowing many or some immigrants; mean effect with 95% CI; fixed portion of mixed effects logistic regression as in equation (2).

*Do EU origins matter?* Holding skill levels constant, we find a small but statistically significant advantage associated with EU sending countries, compared with both non-EU European and non-European inflows. However, the primary differentiator in how likely a person is to support inflows remains predominantly attributed to the skill of immigrants mentioned. Favour for allowing many or at least some immigrants is predicted at 73% for respondents asked about skilled workers from EU sending countries in Europe. This stands at about 46% among those asked about unskilled workers from the same sending country. The probability of being receptive to skilled immigration inflows is estimated at 65% for those asked about inflows from outside Europe and 66% for those asked about inflows from non-EU European countries. Support for inflows of unskilled workers is estimated at about 37%

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for people asked about non-EU European inflows, and 34% for people asked about inflows from outside Europe.

Table 6
Contrasts in predicted probability of preferring inclusion
between EU and other wording treatments

| Treatment compared to **Skilled from EU** | Contrast | Std. Err. | Chi2 | P>chi2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Skilled from Europe (non-EU) | -0.07 | 0.004 | 346.47 | 0.00 |
| Unskilled from EU | -0.28 | 0.019 | 217.38 | 0.00 |
| Unskilled from Europe (non-EU) | -0.36 | 0.018 | 382.95 | 0.00 |
| Skilled from outside Europe | -0.08 | 0.014 | 33.59 | 0.00 |
| Unskilled from outside Europe | -0.40 | 0.020 | 396.85 | 0.00 |
| | | | | |
| Treatment compared to **Unskilled from EU** | | | | |
| | | | | |
| Unskilled from Europe (non-EU) | -0.08 | 0.003 | 767.85 | 0.00 |
| Skilled from Europe (non-EU) | 0.21 | 0.019 | 123.01 | 0.00 |
| Unskilled from outside Europe | -0.12 | 0.026 | 21.43 | 0.00 |
| Skilled from outside Europe | 0.20 | 0.022 | 81.08 | 0.00 |
| | | | | |
| Joint test | | | 1583.92 | 0.00 |

Notes: Estimation sample = 28,985 observations; contrasts in predicted margins on expressing support for allowing many or some immigrants; fixed portion of mixed effects logistic regression as in equation (2).

Table 6 shows the estimated contrasts in the predicted probability of preferring inclusion of inflows between different wording treatments. Being asked about skilled immigrants from EU countries is associated with a 7% increase in inclusion compared to European but non-EU countries and 8% compared to skilled immigrants from outside Europe. Among those who were assigned the 'unskilled' inflows specification, EU origins is associated with an 8% increase in support for inclusion compared to non-EU European countries and 12% compared to unskilled from outside Europe. The positive advantage associated with EU origins is modest but statistically significant for both skilled and unskilled. There appears to be a combined penalty in support for inclusion for inflows that are specified as both unskilled and from outside Europe, while skilled EU inflows are met with the most positive inflow

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attitudes. Our estimates suggest that the penalty in inclusion support attributed to unskilled versus skilled inflows within the EU is about 28%.

By exploring the random effects portion of the estimation for the groups assigned Europe as origin, we can assess to what extent there is any residual variation in preferences attributed specifically to the individual sending country in Europe mentioned as providing the largest number of immigrants, in isolation from any individual treatment effects. While the fixed portion of the treatment effect reveals certain broad dynamics that have to do with the skill level or European and EU origins of immigrants, the random (country-level) portion of the treatment effects shows substantial variation, both in direction and magnitude. Furthermore, this variation does not appear consistently tied to whether the sending country is a member of the EU or not.

Compared to other countries, attitudes to inflows are generally more negative in countries where Romania (i.e. Hungary and Spain) and Estonia (i.e. Finland) are the sending countries specified and hold for both skill levels. Other things considered, attitudes to inflows are more positive in countries where Portugal is mentioned as the largest poorer sender of immigrants within Europe, but the effect is mostly observed with respect to skilled inflows (i.e. France and Switzerland). The large variation in the random portion of the treatment effects, coupled with low intra-class correlation within countries (7%), supports the expectation that there are additional disparities related to the specific sending country referenced in the question which are driven by more idiosyncratic, historical, and geopolitical factors.

*Who is most and least likely to support EU inflows?* The probability of supporting inclusion of unskilled workers from EU countries is found lowest among respondents who work in low-skilled occupations (33%), with low education completed (34%), who report poor

health (34%), and those who find it difficult to cope on their present income (35%). The chances are also lowest among those who think that EU unification has gone too far (35%) and those saying that being Christian (31%) and white (23%) are important conditions for immigration. On the opposite direction, the likelihood of opting for inclusion of inflows of unskilled EU laborers is found highest among respondents who have high education (63%), and those who think that speaking the country's official language (61%), having skills needed (61%), and being committed to the way of life of the country (64%) are unimportant conditions for immigration. People who scored the highest in the participation index (i.e. had taken part in all seven actions) are also estimated as generally likely to opt for inclusion (57%).

Support for inflows is overwhelmingly high among all groups of respondents who were asked about skilled from within the EU. Relatively speaking, however, support tends to vary in similar directions as for unskilled EU inflows. Support for allowing skilled EU inflows is found lowest among respondents who value being white (52%) and Christian (60%) as an important condition for immigrants to have.

The above findings show that support for intra-EU immigration is associated with many factors that are also associated with support for immigration in general. Additional analysis focuses on factors that differentiate support for intra-EU migration specifically. Figures 7 to 10 show how the predicted probability of supporting inflows varies depending on people's demographic characteristics and the wording treatment they received, while other things are held constant (for values see Appendix B, Table 3). Among respondents who were randomly assigned Europe as the broader region of origin (half of sample), the probability is shown separately for sending countries that are members of the EU. This breakdown allows us to pinpoint any potential differences associated with EU versus non-EU European origins,

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while other factors have been taken into account either by experimental controls (skills) or statistical controls (other factors).

**Figure 7**



Notes: Estimation sample = 28,985 observations; estimated probability (margin) of expressing support for allowing many or some immigrants; mean effect with 95% CI; fixed portion of mixed effects logistic regression as in equation (2).

EU support matters, but its estimated impact is almost as much great on support for non-EU European immigration as for EU inflows. The EU support variable has a slightly larger marginal effect on support for EU flows, but the differences are substantively small and statistically significant only for skilled migrants and not for unskilled. This suggests that EU identity may be a proxy for a more open viewpoint that is associated with openness to immigration generally; it does not seem that there is a powerful relationship between support for the EU and specific support for the pattern of immigration policy embedded in EU institutions (free movement within the EU, restrictions on non-EU immigration including from within Europe). Expressing concern about EU unification (14%-19%) or distrust of the EU parliament (5%-12%) is associated with a reduction in the probability of opting for inclusion of inflows; with the largest gap estimated for the unskilled from EU treatment group. The

disparity is not necessarily major, but it lends limited support to the argument that opposition to mobility of low skilled workers within Europe is especially pronounced among people who have concerns over the degree of EU unification and are distrustful of EU institutions.

Consistent with our expectation, those who prefer immigrants who share their ethnic and cultural background do not differ substantially in their support for inflows, regardless of immigrants' origins from EU or European countries. Those who value being white as an important condition exhibit particularly low probability of opting for inclusion, which unlike other factors, holds in the case of skilled inflows as well. Respondents who said that being white is important are the only group predicted in our estimations as likely to prefer restriction of skilled inflows (from outside Europe, 44%).

**Figure 8**



Notes: Estimation sample = 28,985 observations; estimated probability (margin) of expressing support for allowing many or some immigrants; mean effect with 95% CI; fixed portion of mixed effects logistic regression as in equation (2).

Resource based explanatory approaches expect the respondents' labor market position to determine support for inflows of those immigrants who would act as

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complements, but opposition to those who would act as substitutes. Despite the advantage associated with this dependent measure, i.e. the ability to explicitly differentiate between unskilled and skilled inflows, findings do not confirm these hypotheses. While we do find that support for inclusion of unskilled immigrant workers is particularly low among respondents who themselves work in manual and low skill occupations, the "penalty" appears more or less the same for both European and EU inflows. Moreover, the opposite is not the case for skilled respondents' preferences towards highly skilled inflows. Respondents who work in highly skilled occupations exhibit the most positive attitudes towards other skilled inflows, and especially from EU countries. In other words, there is no indication that highly skilled respondents exhibit feelings of competition towards skilled inflows stemming from labor market displacement or lowered wages.

**Figure 9**



Notes: Estimation sample = 28,985 observations; estimated probability (margin) of expressing support for allowing many or some immigrants; mean effect with 95% CI; fixed portion of mixed effects logistic regression as in equation (2).

Cognitive and elite cue mobilization contributes to higher support for inflows across all wording treatment groups. But that impact does not appear to independently contribute to higher support for inflows from the EU. When asked about unskilled EU workers, the prediction leans towards opting for inclusion if the person reports being interested in politics (52% probability) and being politically engaged (57% probability if index=7). The prediction leans towards restriction, however, among people who are not interested in politics (37% probability), and those who are less politically active (43% probability for those who did not take part in any of the actions measured in the index). Similar to the previous analysis (of dependent variable A), reporting having voted in the last national election does not exert any influence in the probability of preferring inclusion of inflows and this remains the same across groups of skills-origins mentioned.

**Figure 10**



Notes: Estimation sample = 28,985 observations; estimated probability (margin) of expressing support for allowing many or some immigrants; mean effect with 95% CI; fixed portion of mixed effects logistic regression as in equation (2).

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*Model Diagnostics:* Intra-class correlation in the level 2 of the model, i.e. countries, is particularly low at .07, confirming that latent responses to the outcome variable are not highly correlated within countries (Appendix B, Table 1). If intraclass correlation were especially high, it would indicate that latent responses of people within the same country sample correlated too highly (i.e. too similar) and the chance of someone preferring restriction or inclusion of inflows is primarily attributable to country of residence. The predicted versus observed classification table suggests reasonable predictive power for our model estimations. Around 68% of respondents who opted for a few or no inflows in their respective question were correctly predicted by the model as preferring restriction (Appendix B, Table 2). Around 75% of respondents who chose many or some inflows in their question were correctly predicted by the model as preferring inclusion.

In addition to these diagnostic tests, we also try two alternative estimation methods to ensure our results and conclusions are not particularly sensitive to small changes. We estimate a logistic regression model with country fixed effects and standard errors clustered by country, in which the treatment is taken into account as an individual fixed effect (Appendix B, Table 6). We also replicate equation 2 by estimating a mixed effects logistic regression where treatment effects are only included in the fixed portion of the equation (Appendix B, Table 7). There are minor differences but our inferences appear robust.

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## Conclusions

This paper relies on social survey data across twenty European countries to explore the incidence and determinants of *Europe* and of *EU* inclusionism in patterns of preferences for immigration flows. We identify occasions where respondents (citizens resident across EU and EFTA countries) express preference for more immigrants to be allowed from within Europe and/or the EU, than from outside. Further, we examined the determinants of patterns of immigration preferences, testing explanations derived from several prominent theories of immigration attitudes and EU support.

Theoretically, the gap between popular preferences and EU requirements suggests a need to understand the sources of these preferences. Here, our results may raise more questions than they answer. Even identification with the EU seems to have limited impact on specific support for intra-EU mobility; support for the EU seems almost as strongly linked to support for non-EU immigration. The weakness of the cognitive mobilization explanation contrasts with earlier findings, but may not be surprising given increased political contention around EU issues. Further work might aim to distinguish whether this result reflects a lack of elite influence on disaffected citizens, or, instead, ongoing influence by elites who are increasingly polarized rather than united on issues of immigration and Europe. Our results also point to the weakness of objective labor market positioning as an explanation for attitudes toward immigration, as low skilled workers are not particularly opposed to intra-EU mobility, the largest source of low skilled migrant inflows. On the other hand, subjective indicators of economic security do have some explanatory power, and our results are consistent with the fiscal burden hypothesis as well. Future work will incorporate new

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REMINDER project data on the actual fiscal impact of intra-EU and non-EU inflows, allowing for an actual empirical examination of this theory.

Politically, our descriptive findings are perhaps the most relevant. As noted earlier, the EU project depends on broad acceptance of intra-EU mobility. Given the widespread nature of anti-immigration sentiment across virtually all immigrant-receiving societies, the EU project in effect requires some portion of the public who prefer restrictionist immigration policies to make an exception for fellow EU nationals, or at least to tolerate such an exception. As of now, however, there is relatively little support for such an exception. The vast majority of support for EU mobility comes from people who support immigration in general; relatively little comes from individuals who want to restrict immigration but make an exception for the EU (or for Europe more broadly). Less than 10% of this broad, representative sample of EU residents prefers inflows of some or many immigrants from Europe while preferring to restrict immigration from outside Europe to few or none. Similarly, when skills and origins are manipulated experimentally, we found only a modest preference for EU sending countries over non-EU European countries. This pattern of preferences contrasts sharply with the normative position entrenched in EU treaties that dramatically favor EU mobility over non-EU immigration.

Our exploration of the skills-origins nexus leads to an even more politically pointed way of putting this dilemma. Opposition to migration of low-skilled workers is widespread and consistent cross-nationally. Most Europeans hold to this set of preferences, even when the low-skilled workers in question come from Europe or the EU, and even when the high-skilled workers come from more distant origins. So, on the one hand, few Europeans register a preference for EU migrants; on the other hand, majorities reject unskilled immigration and are not willing to reverse their opinion just because the immigrants involved are part of the

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EU. This pattern poses an obstacle to support for free movement, which will inevitably include mobility of low skilled workers in search of better opportunities and wages than they can find in their countries of origin.

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# APPENDIX A[1]

# Dependent Variable A (Origin)

**Table 1**
Breakdown of case classification in dependent variable A

| Primary classification | How many from Europe | How many from outside | How many from Europe | How many from outside | Difference (non-Europe - Europe) | Alternative classification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| General Inclusionists | Many | Many | 0 | 0 | 0 | General inclusion |
| | Some | Some | 1 | 1 | 0 | General inclusion |
| | Many | Some | 0 | 1 | 1 | *pro Europe* |
| | Some | Many | 1 | 0 | -1 | *pro outside* |
| General restrictionists | A few | A few | 2 | 2 | 0 | General restriction |
| | None | None | 3 | 3 | 0 | General restriction |
| | A few | None | 2 | 3 | 1 | *pro Europe* |
| | None | A few | 3 | 2 | -1 | *pro outside* |
| Europe inclusionists | Many | A few | 0 | 2 | 2 | Pro Europe |
| | Many | None | 0 | 3 | 3 | Pro Europe |
| | Some | A few | 1 | 2 | 1 | Pro Europe |
| | Some | None | 1 | 3 | 2 | Pro Europe |
| Non-Europe inclusionists | A few | Many | 2 | 0 | -2 | Pro outside |
| | A few | Some | 2 | 1 | -1 | Pro outside |
| | None | Many | 3 | 0 | -3 | Pro outside |
| | None | Some | 3 | 1 | -2 | Pro outside |

Notes: in the second version of dependent variable A, cases identified as misclassified based on the difference in the preferred level of inflows by origin have been instead assigned to their respective pro-Europe/pro-outside categories.

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**Table 2**
Dependent Variable A (Origin)

| How many immigrants from? | | Outside Europe | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Many | Some | A few | None | Total |
| Europe | Many | 4,013 | 755 | 159 | 44 | 4,971 |
| | Some | 218 | 10,994 | 2,681 | 415 | 14,308 |
| | | **General Inclusionists** | | **Europe inclusionists** | | |
| | | **Non-Europe inclusionists** | | **General restrictionists** | | |
| | A few | 35 | 587 | 8,451 | 1,639 | 10,712 |
| | None | 12 | 80 | 295 | 3,864 | 4,251 |
| | Total | 4,278 | 12,416 | 11,586 | 5,962 | 34,242 |

Notes: unweighted sample breakdown of cases as classified in the construction of the dependent variable

**Table 3**

**Estimation results from Multinomial Logistic Regression (Equation 1)**

| | General restrictionists | | Europe inclusionists | | Non-Europe inclusionists | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | RRR | P | RRR | P | RRR | P |
| Female | 1.02 | 0.60 | 1.00 | 0.97 | 1.17 | 0.09 |
| Born in country | 1.01 | 0.91 | 0.89 | 0.24 | 1.04 | 0.84 |
| Member of ethnic minority | 0.89 | 0.26 | 0.99 | 0.92 | 1.23 | 0.49 |
| Aged between 36 and 60 yo | 0.98 | 0.74 | 1.02 | 0.75 | 1.18 | 0.26 |
| Aged over 60 yo | 1.16 | 0.15 | **1.36** | **0.00** | 1.36 | 0.08 |
| Suburbs or outskirts of big city | 1.00 | 0.99 | 1.11 | 0.21 | 1.15 | 0.37 |
| Town or small city | 1.01 | 0.88 | 1.19 | 0.09 | 1.19 | 0.18 |
| Country village | 1.02 | 0.78 | **1.22** | **0.04** | 1.07 | 0.60 |
| EU unification gone too far | **2.18** | **0.00** | **1.37** | **0.00** | **1.58** | **0.00** |
| Distrustful of EU parliament | **1.30** | **0.00** | 1.09 | 0.13 | **1.21** | **0.00** |
| Feel close to country | 1.09 | 0.43 | 1.17 | 0.13 | 0.72 | 0.14 |
| Religious | **0.91** | **0.02** | 1.02 | 0.59 | 1.11 | 0.19 |
| Some cultures better than others | **1.42** | **0.00** | **1.45** | **0.00** | **1.25** | **0.01** |
| Important for imm: speak language | **1.25** | **0.00** | **1.14** | **0.01** | 1.13 | 0.40 |
| Important for imm: Christian | **1.44** | **0.00** | **1.46** | **0.00** | **1.31** | **0.05** |
| Important for imm: be white | **2.25** | **0.00** | **1.75** | **0.00** | **1.83** | **0.00** |
| Important for imm: committed to way of life | **1.73** | **0.00** | **1.47** | **0.00** | 1.21 | 0.11 |
| Paid work | 0.98 | 0.65 | 0.99 | 0.93 | 0.99 | 0.93 |
| Education | **0.68** | **0.00** | 1.08 | 0.49 | 1.00 | 1.00 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unemployed, looking for job | **0.81** | **0.00** | 1.09 | 0.42 | 0.82 | 0.50 |
| Low skilled ISCO 7/9 | **1.18** | **0.00** | 1.13 | 0.09 | 1.21 | 0.12 |
| Highly skilled ISCO 1/3 | **0.85** | **0.00** | 0.95 | 0.39 | **0.71** | **0.00** |
| Armed forces occupations ISCO 0 | 1.18 | 0.42 | 1.46 | 0.17 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Difficult on present hh income | **1.34** | **0.00** | 0.98 | 0.72 | 0.98 | 0.92 |
| Subjective health bad | **1.17** | **0.00** | 0.99 | 0.94 | 1.17 | 0.35 |
| Important for imm: good educational qualifications | **1.24** | **0.00** | **1.15** | **0.03** | **1.39** | **0.03** |
| Important for imm: work skills needed in country | **1.78** | **0.00** | **1.72** | **0.00** | **1.24** | **0.01** |
| Up to lower secondary ed ISCED 0-II | **1.12** | **0.01** | **1.20** | **0.02** | **1.34** | **0.00** |
| Bachelors or higher ISCED V-VI | **0.67** | **0.00** | **0.79** | **0.00** | **0.64** | **0.00** |
| How interested in politics | **0.79** | **0.00** | 0.89 | 0.11 | 0.92 | 0.36 |
| Voted last national election | 1.01 | 0.83 | 1.02 | 0.66 | 1.00 | 0.98 |
| Not eligible to vote last election | **0.79** | **0.00** | 0.97 | 0.83 | 0.80 | 0.45 |
| Feel closer to a particular party than all others | **0.87** | **0.00** | 0.99 | 0.75 | 0.91 | 0.44 |
| Political action participation index | **0.87** | **0.00** | **0.92** | **0.00** | **0.93** | **0.04** |
| | | | | | | |
| Belgium | **0.66** | **0.00** | **1.16** | **0.00** | **0.67** | **0.00** |
| Switzerland | **0.65** | **0.00** | **1.21** | **0.00** | **0.71** | **0.00** |
| Germany | **0.47** | **0.00** | **0.97** | **0.15** | 0.98 | 0.69 |
| Denmark | **1.51** | **0.00** | **2.27** | **0.00** | 0.97 | 0.64 |
| Estonia | **1.44** | **0.00** | **2.77** | **0.00** | **0.76** | **0.00** |
| Spain | **0.86** | **0.00** | **0.41** | **0.00** | **0.69** | **0.00** |
| Finland | **2.18** | **0.00** | **2.02** | **0.00** | **1.17** | **0.03** |
| France | **0.80** | **0.00** | **1.36** | **0.00** | **0.43** | **0.00** |
| UK | **0.88** | **0.00** | 1.03 | 0.43 | **0.32** | **0.00** |
| Hungary | **5.09** | **0.00** | **2.81** | **0.00** | **2.69** | **0.00** |
| R of Ireland | 0.97 | 0.26 | **1.38** | **0.00** | 1.04 | 0.35 |
| Lithuania | **0.85** | **0.00** | 1.05 | 0.43 | **0.56** | **0.00** |
| Netherlands | **0.87** | **0.00** | 0.99 | 0.81 | **1.40** | **0.00** |
| Norway | **0.53** | **0.00** | **0.76** | **0.00** | **0.47** | **0.00** |
| Poland | **0.52** | **0.00** | **1.18** | **0.00** | **0.22** | **0.00** |
| Portugal | **0.59** | **0.00** | 1.02 | 0.71 | **0.68** | **0.00** |
| Sweden | **0.16** | **0.00** | **0.30** | **0.00** | **0.60** | **0.00** |
| Slovenia | **0.52** | **0.00** | **1.14** | **0.00** | **0.57** | **0.00** |
| Observations | 27,352 | | | | | |
| Pseudo R squared | 0.15 | | | | | |
| SE adjusted clusters | 19 | | | | | |

Notes: RRR corresponds to relative risk ratios. Bold denotes statistically significant estimate with 95% CI

Table 4 (Part 1)

**Predicted marginal effects of explanatory factors on probability of preferring inclusion of respective inflows**
**(Manuscript Figures 3-5)**

|  | General inclusionists | General restrictionists | Europe inclusionists | Non Europe inclusionists |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Female | -0.5% | 0.3% | -0.1% | 0.3% |
| Age: up to 35 | 0.1% | 0.4% | -0.2% | -0.3% |
| Age: over 60 | **-3.6%** | **1.9%** | **1.7%** | 0.1% |
| Low education | **-2.3%** | 0.9% | 1.0% | **0.4%** |
| High education | **6.8%** | **-6.1%** | -0.2% | -0.5% |
| Low skilled occupation | **-3.0%** | **2.5%** | 0.3% | 0.2% |
| Highly skilled occupation | **2.8%** | **-2.6%** | 0.3% | **-0.5%** |
| In paid work | 0.3% | -0.3% | 0.1% | 0.0% |
| In education | **6.2%** | **-9.0%** | **2.6%** | 0.2% |
| Unemployed | **2.7%** | **-4.1%** | **1.7%** | -0.2% |
| In suburbs or outskirts of big city | -0.5% | -0.6% | 0.9% | 0.2% |
| In a town or small city | -1.0% | -0.8% | 1.4% | 0.3% |
| In a country village or farm | -1.0% | -0.6% | **1.6%** | 0.1% |
| Subjective health bad | **-2.4%** | **2.9%** | -0.8% | 0.2% |
| Religious | 1.1% | **-2.0%** | **0.6%** | **0.3%** |
| Difficult to cope on present household income | **-4.1%** | **5.8%** | **-1.4%** | -0.3% |

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Table 4 (Part 2)

**Predicted marginal effects of explanatory factors on probability of preferring inclusion of respective inflows**
**(Manuscript Figures 3-5)**

| | General inclusionists | General restrictionists | Europe inclusionists | Non-Europe inclusionists |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feel close to country | -1.4% | 0.9% | 1.2% | -0.7% |
| Some cultures better than others | **-6.3%** | **4.8%** | **1.3%** | 0.1% |
| EU unification gone too far | **-12.7%** | **13.2%** | **-0.7%** | 0.1% |
| Distrustful of EU parliament | **-4.1%** | **4.3%** | -0.3% | 0.2% |
| How interested in politics | **3.7%** | **-3.9%** | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| Voted last national election | -0.4% | 0.3% | 0.0% | 0.2% |
| Feel closer to a particular party than all other parties | **2.1%** | **-2.6%** | 0.5% | 0.0% |
| Political action participation scale (7-item cumulative scale) | **2.3%** | **-2.2%** | -0.1% | 0.0% |
| Important to have good educational qualifications | **-4.1%** | **3.3%** | 0.3% | 0.5% |
| Important to speak country's official language | **-3.5%** | **3.6%** | -0.1% | 0.0% |
| Important to have Christian background | **-7.3%** | **5.2%** | **1.9%** | 0.1% |
| Important to be white | **-13.9%** | **12.2%** | 1.3% | 0.3% |
| Important to have work skills needed in country | **-10.4%** | **8.5%** | **2.1%** | -0.2% |
| Important to be committed to way of life in country | **-9.3%** | **8.6%** | **0.8%** | -0.2% |

**Table 5**

**Estimation results from Multinomial Logistic Regression (Equation 1)**
**- Replication with alternative classification of cases**

| | General restrictionists | | Pro-Europe inclusionists | | Pro outside Europe inclusionists | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | RRR | P | RRR | P | RRR | P |
| Female | 0.97 | 0.61 | 0.97 | 0.64 | 1.01 | 0.90 |
| Born in country | 1.12 | 0.20 | 1.11 | 0.42 | 1.16 | 0.42 |
| Member of ethnic minority | 1.09 | 0.31 | 1.10 | 0.33 | 1.01 | 0.93 |
| Aged between 36 and 60 yo | 1.25 | 0.00 | 1.17 | 0.01 | 1.27 | 0.00 |
| Aged over 60 yo | 1.62 | 0.00 | 1.76 | 0.00 | 1.93 | 0.00 |
| Suburbs or outskirts of big city | 1.05 | 0.57 | 1.09 | 0.29 | 1.06 | 0.55 |
| Town or small city | 1.08 | 0.20 | 1.11 | 0.14 | 1.07 | 0.29 |
| Country village | 1.18 | 0.04 | 1.21 | 0.02 | 1.15 | 0.21 |
| EU unification gone too far | 1.47 | 0.00 | 2.32 | 0.00 | 3.22 | 0.00 |
| Distrustful of EU parliament | 1.01 | 0.77 | 1.12 | 0.05 | 1.53 | 0.00 |
| Feel close to country | 1.54 | 0.00 | 1.72 | 0.00 | 1.03 | 0.84 |
| Religious | 0.97 | 0.52 | 0.95 | 0.49 | 0.82 | 0.01 |
| Some cultures better than others | 1.34 | 0.00 | 1.74 | 0.00 | 1.83 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: speak language | 1.37 | 0.00 | 1.47 | 0.00 | 1.65 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: Christian | 1.17 | 0.02 | 1.62 | 0.00 | 1.91 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: be white | 1.02 | 0.83 | 1.85 | 0.00 | 3.35 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: committed to way of life | 1.79 | 0.00 | 2.40 | 0.00 | 2.29 | 0.00 |
| Paid work | 1.25 | 0.00 | 1.18 | 0.02 | 1.17 | 0.05 |
| Education | 1.18 | 0.19 | 0.94 | 0.61 | 0.81 | 0.24 |
| Unemployed, looking for job | 1.18 | 0.27 | 0.96 | 0.76 | 1.06 | 0.70 |
| Low skilled ISCO 7/9 | 0.96 | 0.53 | 1.10 | 0.11 | 1.14 | 0.07 |
| Highly skilled ISCO 1/3 | 0.85 | 0.02 | 0.79 | 0.00 | 0.66 | 0.00 |
| Armed forces occupations ISCO 0 | 1.01 | 0.99 | 1.23 | 0.56 | 1.11 | 0.75 |
| Difficult on present hh income | 1.08 | 0.25 | 1.20 | 0.01 | 1.63 | 0.00 |
| Subjective health bad | 0.97 | 0.73 | 1.03 | 0.79 | 1.37 | 0.01 |
| Important for imm: good educational qualifications | 1.23 | 0.01 | 1.42 | 0.00 | 1.42 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: work skills needed in country | 1.48 | 0.00 | 2.29 | 0.00 | 2.03 | 0.00 |
| Up to lower secondary ed ISCED 0-II | 0.85 | 0.02 | 0.97 | 0.65 | 1.24 | 0.01 |
| Bachelors or higher ISCED V-VI | 0.80 | 0.00 | 0.63 | 0.00 | 0.53 | 0.00 |
| How interested in politics | 0.84 | 0.00 | 0.73 | 0.00 | 0.66 | 0.00 |
| Voted last national election | 1.11 | 0.09 | 1.08 | 0.32 | 0.98 | 0.81 |
| Not eligible to vote last election | 0.88 | 0.43 | 0.89 | 0.43 | 0.67 | 0.07 |
| Feel closer to a particular party than all others | 0.91 | 0.19 | 0.86 | 0.03 | 0.82 | 0.01 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Political action participation index | 0.86 | 0.00 | 0.81 | 0.00 | 0.82 | 0.00 |
| | | | | | | |
| Belgium | 1.42 | 0.00 | 1.04 | 0.47 | 1.01 | 0.92 |
| Switzerland | 1.14 | 0.00 | 0.92 | 0.02 | 0.44 | 0.00 |
| Germany | 0.68 | 0.00 | 0.51 | 0.00 | 0.39 | 0.00 |
| Denmark | 1.65 | 0.00 | 2.44 | 0.00 | 1.38 | 0.00 |
| Estonia | 1.30 | 0.00 | 2.13 | 0.00 | 1.36 | 0.00 |
| Spain | 0.56 | 0.00 | 0.47 | 0.00 | 0.42 | 0.00 |
| Finland | 1.05 | 0.40 | 2.26 | 0.00 | 1.13 | 0.10 |
| France | 1.47 | 0.00 | 1.21 | 0.00 | 1.08 | 0.03 |
| UK | 1.32 | 0.00 | 1.12 | 0.02 | 1.01 | 0.87 |
| Hungary | 1.28 | 0.00 | 5.34 | 0.00 | 7.91 | 0.00 |
| R of Ireland | 0.94 | 0.03 | 1.04 | 0.28 | 0.92 | 0.03 |
| Lithuania | 1.05 | 0.34 | 0.90 | 0.18 | 0.82 | 0.01 |
| Netherlands | 1.30 | 0.00 | 1.09 | 0.07 | 1.17 | 0.00 |
| Norway | 1.19 | 0.00 | 0.72 | 0.00 | 0.32 | 0.00 |
| Poland | 1.09 | 0.06 | 0.80 | 0.00 | 0.31 | 0.00 |
| Portugal | 1.81 | 0.00 | 1.17 | 0.00 | 0.80 | 0.00 |
| Sweden | 0.54 | 0.00 | 0.15 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.00 |
| Slovenia | 1.15 | 0.00 | 0.79 | 0.00 | 0.70 | 0.00 |
| | | | | | | |
| Observations | 27,352 | | | | | |
| Pseudo R squared | 0.14 | | | | | |
| SE adjusted clusters | 19 | | | | | |

REMINDER

# Table 6

**Estimation results from Multinomial Logistic Regression (Equation 1)
- Replication with ESS1**

|  | General restrictionists | | Europe inclusionists | | Non-Europe inclusionists | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | RRR | P | RRR | P | RRR | P |
| Female | **0.90** | **0.01** | **0.87** | **0.02** | 1.05 | 0.68 |
| Born in country | **1.36** | **0.00** | 0.87 | 0.20 | 0.86 | 0.47 |
| Ethnic minority member | 0.92 | 0.50 | 0.96 | 0.78 | 1.37 | 0.35 |
| Age: 36 to 60 | **1.13** | **0.01** | 1.09 | 0.29 | 1.06 | 0.71 |
| Age: over 60 | **1.24** | **0.00** | **1.27** | **0.03** | **1.58** | **0.04** |
| Suburbs of big city | 1.02 | 0.83 | 0.89 | 0.31 | **0.63** | **0.00** |
| Town or small city | 1.04 | 0.63 | 0.99 | 0.96 | 0.77 | 0.18 |
| Country village or farm | **1.14** | **0.04** | 1.09 | 0.31 | 0.91 | 0.55 |
| Distrustful of EU parliament | **1.47** | **0.00** | **1.25** | **0.00** | 1.16 | 0.18 |
| Religious | **0.79** | **0.00** | 0.92 | 0.22 | **0.80** | **0.02** |
| Important for imm: speak language | **1.39** | **0.00** | **1.23** | **0.00** | 1.18 | 0.13 |
| Important for imm: Christian | **1.36** | **0.00** | **1.60** | **0.00** | **1.91** | **0.00** |
| Important for imm: white | **2.23** | **0.00** | **1.73** | **0.00** | 1.27 | 0.08 |
| Important for imm: way of life | **1.50** | **0.00** | **1.45** | **0.01** | **1.28** | **0.03** |
| Activity: paid work | 0.91 | 0.08 | 0.85 | 0.11 | 0.94 | 0.58 |
| Activity: education or training | **0.51** | **0.00** | 0.76 | 0.05 | 0.72 | 0.13 |
| Activity: unemployed and looking for job | 0.98 | 0.92 | 0.72 | 0.10 | 1.41 | 0.21 |
| Occupation: low skilled | 1.08 | 0.09 | 1.07 | 0.25 | 0.95 | 0.67 |
| Occupation: high skilled | **0.82** | **0.00** | 0.93 | 0.23 | **0.81** | **0.02** |
| Occupation: army occupations | 0.99 | 0.97 | 1.58 | 0.15 | 0.95 | 0.94 |
| Difficult to cope on income | **1.19** | **0.00** | 1.07 | 0.33 | 1.18 | 0.15 |
| Poor subjective health | **1.30** | **0.00** | 0.94 | 0.64 | 1.45 | 0.06 |
| Important for imm: good qualifications | **1.33** | **0.00** | **1.33** | **0.00** | **1.25** | **0.01** |
| Important for imm: skills needed | **1.49** | **0.00** | **1.53** | **0.00** | **1.28** | **0.03** |
| Education: up to lower secondary | 1.03 | 0.64 | 1.04 | 0.64 | 1.27 | 0.09 |
| Education: Bachelors or higher | **0.65** | **0.00** | **0.81** | **0.00** | **0.66** | **0.00** |
| Very or quite interested in politics | **0.79** | **0.00** | 0.91 | 0.13 | 0.88 | 0.12 |
| Voted in last national election | 1.06 | 0.25 | 1.05 | 0.49 | 1.00 | 0.97 |
| Feels close to a party more than all others | **0.90** | **0.00** | 1.08 | 0.19 | 0.90 | 0.38 |
| Political action participation index | **0.91** | **0.00** | **0.92** | **0.00** | 0.96 | 0.36 |
| Belgium | **0.33** | **0.00** | **0.79** | **0.00** | **1.33** | **0.00** |
| Switzerland | **0.21** | **0.00** | **0.78** | **0.00** | **1.85** | **0.00** |

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| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Czech R | **0.29** | **0.00** | **0.70** | **0.00** | **1.77** | **0.00** |
| Germany | **0.29** | **0.00** | **0.73** | **0.00** | **1.47** | **0.00** |
| Denmark | **0.55** | **0.00** | **1.85** | **0.00** | **1.78** | **0.00** |
| Spain | **0.44** | **0.00** | **0.48** | **0.00** | 0.89 | 0.10 |
| Finland | **0.71** | **0.00** | **1.19** | **0.00** | **1.22** | **0.00** |
| UK | **0.48** | **0.00** | **0.93** | **0.04** | **1.56** | **0.00** |
| Hungary | **2.98** | **0.00** | **2.13** | **0.00** | **1.72** | **0.00** |
| R of Ireland | **0.23** | **0.00** | **0.65** | **0.00** | **1.80** | **0.00** |
| Netherlands | **0.39** | **0.00** | **0.55** | **0.00** | **1.59** | **0.00** |
| Norway | **0.30** | **0.00** | 1.06 | 0.07 | **2.69** | **0.00** |
| Poland | **0.24** | **0.00** | **0.49** | **0.00** | **1.63** | **0.00** |
| Portugal | **0.71** | **0.00** | **0.46** | **0.00** | **0.67** | **0.00** |
| Sweden | **0.07** | **0.00** | **0.30** | **0.00** | **0.67** | **0.00** |
| Slovenia | **0.25** | **0.00** | **0.66** | **0.00** | **2.30** | **0.00** |
| Observations | 24,122 | | | | | |
| Pseudo R squared | 0.14 | | | | | |
| SE adjusted clusters | 17 | | | | | |

Notes: ESS1-2002. RRR corresponds to relative risk ratios. Bold denotes statistically significant estimate with 95% CI

**Table 7**

**Estimation results from Multinomial Logistic Regression (Equation 1)
- Replication with ESS1 & alternative dep A classification**

| | General restrictionists | | Pro-Europe inclusionists | | Pro outside Europe inclusionists | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | RRR | P | RRR | P | RRR | P |
| Female | 0.93 | 0.23 | 0.85 | 0.01 | 0.95 | 0.52 |
| Born in country | 1.33 | 0.01 | 1.52 | 0.00 | 1.55 | 0.00 |
| Ethnic minority member | 0.86 | 0.29 | 0.86 | 0.35 | 1.00 | 0.99 |
| Age: 36 to 60 | 1.07 | 0.23 | 1.14 | 0.06 | 1.23 | 0.01 |
| Age: over 60 | 1.37 | 0.01 | 1.56 | 0.00 | 1.85 | 0.00 |
| Suburbs of big city | 1.14 | 0.16 | 1.07 | 0.56 | 0.96 | 0.83 |
| Town or small city | 1.20 | 0.00 | 1.17 | 0.06 | 1.05 | 0.71 |
| Country village or farm | 1.31 | 0.00 | 1.39 | 0.00 | 1.21 | 0.18 |
| Distrustful of EU parliament | 1.00 | 0.96 | 1.29 | 0.00 | 1.68 | 0.00 |
| Religious | 1.13 | 0.20 | 0.94 | 0.57 | 0.78 | 0.01 |
| Important for imm: speak language | 1.26 | 0.00 | 1.60 | 0.00 | 1.55 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: Christian | 1.19 | 0.22 | 1.66 | 0.00 | 1.75 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: white | 0.98 | 0.87 | 1.81 | 0.00 | 3.29 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: way of life | 2.12 | 0.00 | 2.74 | 0.00 | 2.12 | 0.00 |
| Activity: paid work | 1.11 | 0.12 | 1.03 | 0.61 | 0.85 | 0.13 |
| Activity: education or training | 0.75 | 0.01 | 0.51 | 0.00 | 0.35 | 0.00 |
| Activity: unemployed and looking for job | 0.71 | 0.05 | 0.69 | 0.03 | 0.82 | 0.35 |
| Occupation: low skilled | 1.03 | 0.75 | 1.10 | 0.19 | 1.18 | 0.10 |
| Occupation: high skilled | 0.90 | 0.11 | 0.79 | 0.00 | 0.72 | 0.00 |
| Occupation: army occupations | 1.06 | 0.90 | 1.05 | 0.92 | 1.74 | 0.12 |
| Difficult to cope on income | 0.95 | 0.48 | 1.06 | 0.47 | 1.42 | 0.00 |
| Poor subjective health | 0.93 | 0.51 | 1.12 | 0.25 | 1.35 | 0.03 |
| Important for imm: good qualifications | 1.10 | 0.03 | 1.43 | 0.00 | 1.49 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: skills needed | 1.63 | 0.00 | 2.17 | 0.00 | 1.83 | 0.00 |
| Education: up to lower secondary | 1.03 | 0.74 | 1.07 | 0.45 | 1.24 | 0.05 |
| Education: Bachelors or higher | 0.82 | 0.03 | 0.61 | 0.00 | 0.51 | 0.00 |
| Very or quite interested in politics | 0.76 | 0.00 | 0.66 | 0.00 | 0.63 | 0.00 |
| Voted in last national election | 1.16 | 0.02 | 1.22 | 0.00 | 0.98 | 0.84 |
| Feels close to a party more than all others | 0.79 | 0.00 | 0.80 | 0.00 | 0.71 | 0.00 |
| Political action participation index | 0.86 | 0.00 | 0.83 | 0.00 | 0.83 | 0.00 |
| | | | | | | |
| Belgium | 1.03 | 0.64 | 0.37 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.96 |
| Switzerland | 1.04 | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.00 | 0.37 | 0.00 |
| Czech R | 1.22 | 0.00 | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.70 | 0.00 |
| Germany | 1.09 | 0.02 | 0.39 | 0.00 | 0.71 | 0.00 |
| Denmark | 1.19 | 0.00 | 0.86 | 0.00 | 0.84 | 0.00 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spain | 0.47 | 0.00 | 0.26 | 0.00 | 0.31 | 0.00 |
| Finland | 0.94 | 0.14 | 0.76 | 0.00 | 0.78 | 0.00 |
| UK | 1.53 | 0.00 | 0.68 | 0.00 | 1.61 | 0.00 |
| Hungary | 0.88 | 0.00 | 2.48 | 0.00 | 4.15 | 0.00 |
| R of Ireland | 1.14 | 0.00 | 0.31 | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0.00 |
| Netherlands | 2.05 | 0.00 | 0.71 | 0.00 | 1.81 | 0.00 |
| Norway | 1.38 | 0.00 | 0.56 | 0.00 | 0.89 | 0.00 |
| Poland | 1.17 | 0.00 | 0.33 | 0.00 | 0.46 | 0.00 |
| Portugal | 2.05 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.97 | 3.01 | 0.00 |
| Sweden | 0.58 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.00 |
| Slovenia | 1.26 | 0.00 | 0.38 | 0.00 | 0.90 | 0.12 |
| Observations | 24,122 | | | | | |
| Pseudo R squared | 0.12 | | | | | |
| SE adjusted clusters | 17 | | | | | |

Notes: ESS1-2002. RRR corresponds to relative risk ratios. Alternative classification of cases

Table 8

**Estimation results from Multinomial Logistic Regression (Equation 1)**
**- Replication with ESS1 & alternative wording "richer" countries**

| | General restrictionists | | Europe inclusionists | | Non-Europe inclusionists | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | RRR | P | RRR | P | RRR | P |
| Female | 1.20 | 0.00 | 0.97 | 0.59 | 1.22 | 0.01 |
| Born in country | 1.32 | 0.01 | 0.99 | 0.94 | 0.78 | 0.09 |
| Ethnic minority member | 1.10 | 0.40 | 1.01 | 0.97 | 1.15 | 0.56 |
| Age: 36 to 60 | 1.06 | 0.31 | 1.11 | 0.10 | 1.32 | 0.05 |
| Age: over 60 | 1.17 | 0.03 | 1.27 | 0.00 | 1.44 | 0.05 |
| Suburbs of big city | 0.96 | 0.53 | 0.95 | 0.60 | 0.83 | 0.27 |
| Town or small city | 1.13 | 0.09 | 0.93 | 0.40 | 1.05 | 0.72 |
| Country village or farm | 1.25 | 0.01 | 1.00 | 0.98 | 1.32 | 0.01 |
| Distrustful of EU parliament | 1.34 | 0.00 | 1.22 | 0.00 | 1.03 | 0.63 |
| Religious | 0.91 | 0.01 | 0.91 | 0.15 | 0.98 | 0.90 |
| Important for imm: speak language | 1.31 | 0.00 | 1.27 | 0.00 | 1.40 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: Christian | 1.26 | 0.00 | 1.48 | 0.00 | 1.58 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: white | 1.62 | 0.00 | 1.64 | 0.00 | 1.60 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: way of life | 1.43 | 0.00 | 1.51 | 0.01 | 1.34 | 0.00 |
| Activity: paid work | 0.87 | 0.01 | 0.82 | 0.00 | 0.77 | 0.01 |
| Activity: education or training | 0.52 | 0.00 | 0.77 | 0.01 | 0.79 | 0.25 |
| Activity: unemployed and looking for job | 0.90 | 0.42 | 0.71 | 0.01 | 1.06 | 0.81 |
| Occupation: low skilled | 1.15 | 0.01 | 1.16 | 0.02 | 1.14 | 0.17 |
| Occupation: high skilled | 0.76 | 0.00 | 0.80 | 0.00 | 0.59 | 0.00 |
| Occupation: army occupations | 0.98 | 0.91 | 0.50 | 0.13 | 1.32 | 0.47 |
| Difficult to cope on income | 1.24 | 0.00 | 0.98 | 0.82 | 1.11 | 0.42 |
| Poor subjective health | 1.07 | 0.26 | 0.96 | 0.76 | 0.87 | 0.32 |
| Important for imm: good qualifications | 0.95 | 0.23 | 1.07 | 0.33 | 1.01 | 0.93 |
| Important for imm: skills needed | 1.14 | 0.02 | 1.40 | 0.00 | 1.05 | 0.61 |
| Education: up to lower secondary | 1.24 | 0.00 | 1.11 | 0.12 | 1.43 | 0.00 |
| Education: Bachelors or higher | 0.64 | 0.00 | 0.85 | 0.05 | 0.68 | 0.00 |
| Very or quite interested in politics | 0.73 | 0.00 | 0.87 | 0.01 | 0.75 | 0.00 |
| Voted in last national election | 1.03 | 0.59 | 1.01 | 0.92 | 0.82 | 0.03 |
| Feels close to a party more than all others | 0.87 | 0.00 | 0.92 | 0.05 | 0.91 | 0.29 |
| Political action participation index | 0.93 | 0.00 | 0.95 | 0.01 | 0.96 | 0.16 |
| | | | | | | |
| Belgium | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.70 | 0.00 | 1.12 | 0.00 |
| Switzerland | 0.35 | 0.00 | 0.61 | 0.00 | 0.85 | 0.00 |
| Czech R | 0.19 | 0.00 | 0.26 | 0.00 | 1.07 | 0.43 |
| Germany | 0.36 | 0.00 | 0.47 | 0.00 | 0.99 | 0.78 |
| Denmark | 0.35 | 0.00 | 0.94 | 0.08 | 0.78 | 0.00 |

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| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spain | 0.39 | 0.00 | 0.32 | 0.00 | 0.71 | 0.00 |
| Finland | 0.73 | 0.00 | 0.92 | 0.04 | 0.73 | 0.00 |
| UK | 0.46 | 0.00 | 0.68 | 0.00 | 1.12 | 0.01 |
| Hungary | 1.47 | 0.00 | 1.19 | 0.00 | 1.09 | 0.12 |
| R of Ireland | 0.28 | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.74 | 0.00 |
| Netherlands | 0.56 | 0.00 | 0.59 | 0.00 | 0.98 | 0.63 |
| Norway | 0.46 | 0.00 | 1.12 | 0.00 | 1.69 | 0.00 |
| Poland | 0.16 | 0.00 | 0.35 | 0.00 | 0.76 | 0.00 |
| Portugal | 0.57 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.00 | 0.53 | 0.00 |
| Sweden | 0.16 | 0.00 | 0.34 | 0.00 | 0.58 | 0.00 |
| Slovenia | 0.20 | 0.00 | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.68 | 0.00 |
| Observations | 24,008 | | | | | |
| Pseudo R squared | 0.10 | | | | | |
| SE adjusted clusters | 17 | | | | | |

Notes: ESS1-2002. RRR corresponds to relative risk ratios. Wording specifies from richer countries rather than poorer countries

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## Dependent Variable B (Origin – Skill)

**Table 1**
**Estimation results from Multilevel Mixed Effects Logistic Regression (Equation 2)**

| Fixed effects parameters | Odds Ratio | Std. Err. | P>|z| |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Skilled from Europe* | | | |
| Allow skilled immigrants from outside Europe | 0.72 | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Allow unskilled immigrants from Europe | 0.26 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Allow unskilled immigrants from outside Europe | 0.16 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Female | 0.90 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Born in country | 1.06 | 0.07 | 0.34 |
| Member of ethnic minority | 1.19 | 0.09 | 0.03 |
| Aged between 36 and 60 yo | 1.10 | 0.04 | 0.02 |
| Aged over 60 yo | 1.06 | 0.06 | 0.27 |
| Suburbs or outskirts of big city | 0.97 | 0.05 | 0.58 |
| Town or small city | 0.96 | 0.04 | 0.29 |
| Country village | 0.88 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| EU unification gone too far | 0.62 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Distrustful of EU parliament | 0.84 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Feel close to country | 0.97 | 0.05 | 0.59 |
| Religious | 1.05 | 0.03 | 0.10 |
| Some cultures better than others | 0.76 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: speak language | 0.78 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: Christian | 0.81 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: be white | 0.61 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: committed to way of life | 0.69 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Paid work | 0.95 | 0.04 | 0.27 |
| Education | 1.24 | 0.09 | 0.00 |
| Unemployed, looking for job | 0.95 | 0.08 | 0.53 |
| Low skilled ISCO 7/9 | 0.87 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Highly skilled ISCO 1/3 | 1.24 | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Armed forces occupations ISCO 0 | 0.99 | 0.23 | 0.97 |
| Difficult on present hh income | 0.78 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Subjective health bad | 0.84 | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: good educational qualifications | 0.93 | 0.03 | 0.04 |
| Important for imm: work skills needed in country | 0.66 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Up to lower secondary ed ISCED 0-II | 0.89 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Bachelors or higher ISCED V-VI | 1.44 | 0.06 | 0.00 |
| How interested in politics | 1.33 | 0.04 | 0.00 |

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| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voted last national election | 0.97 | 0.04 | 0.46 |
| Not eligible to vote last election | 1.18 | 0.10 | 0.04 |
| Feel closer to a particular party than all others | 1.16 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| Political action participation index | 1.10 | 0.01 | 0.00 |

| **Random effects parameters** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Country sample: Independent variance | Estimate | 95% Conf. Interval | |
| Skilled from Europe (_cons) | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.16 |
| Skilled from outside Europe | 0.12 | 0.06 | 0.26 |
| Unskilled from Europe | 0.18 | 0.09 | 0.37 |
| Unskilled from outside Europe | 0.25 | 0.13 | 0.48 |
| LR test vs. logistic regression: | chi2(4) = 1296.14 | P > chi2 = 0.0000 | |
| Intra-class correlation for level 2: | .071 | | |

| **Mixed effects logistic regression summary** | |
|---|---|
| Number of observations | 28,985 |
| Number of groups (countries) | 20 |
| Minimum obs per group | 880 |
| Maximum obs per group | 1,449 |
| Average obs per group | 2,625 |
| Wald chi2(36) | 3102.1 |
| Probability > chi2 | 0.00 |

**Table 2**
**Estimation results - observed versus predicted inflow preferences**

| | Predicted | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Observed** | Restrict | Allow | Total |
| Restrict _n_ | **8,505** | 3,933 | 12,438 |
| % | **68** | 32 | 100 |
| Allow _n_ | 3,509 | **10,748** | 14,257 |
| % | 25 | **75** | 100 |
| Total | 12,014 | 14,681 | 26,695 |
| % | 45 | 55 | 100 |

Notes: based on estimation sample of citizens as predicted in Equation (2); bold values correspond to successfully predicted cases

Table 3 (Part 1)

**Predicted probabilities of preferring inclusion at different levels of explanatory factors by wording treatment with EU/Europe breakdown (Manuscript Figures 7-10)**

|  | Skilled from Europe | Skilled from EU | Skilled from outside Europe | Unskilled from Europe | Unskilled from EU | Unskilled from outside Europe |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Under 35 | 70% | 76% | 67% | 40% | 48% | 36% |
| 35 to 60 | 67% | 75% | 67% | 38% | 48% | 34% |
| Over 60 | 62% | 70% | 61% | 34% | 42% | 30% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Low education | 59% | 64% | 55% | 32% | 34% | 25% |
| Medium education | 64% | 72% | 63% | 34% | 43% | 30% |
| High education | 79% | 85% | 79% | 52% | 63% | 49% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| In paid work | 68% | 75% | 67% | 39% | 48% | 36% |
| In education | 76% | 81% | 76% | 50% | 56% | 45% |
| Unemployed and looking for work | 62% | 71% | 60% | 36% | 38% | 31% |
| Inactive | 63% | 70% | 61% | 33% | 41% | 29% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Army occupations | 71% | 75% | 68% | 47% | 46% | 34% |
| Low skilled occupations | 58% | 63% | 55% | 29% | 33% | 24% |
| Medium skilled occupations | 65% | 70% | 61% | 34% | 41% | 29% |
| High skilled occupations | 76% | 81% | 74% | 47% | 56% | 43% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Good subjective health | 67% | 74% | 66% | 38% | 47% | 34% |
| Bad subjective health | 53% | 64% | 52% | 26% | 34% | 24% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Not religious | 66% | 73% | 65% | 37% | 46% | 33% |
| Religious | 66% | 73% | 65% | 38% | 46% | 34% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Comfortable on present income | 69% | 75% | 67% | 39% | 48% | 36% |
| Difficult to cope on present income | 57% | 64% | 54% | 31% | 35% | 24% |

Part 1 of 3 (table continued on next page)

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Table 3 (Part 2)

**Predicted probabilities of preferring inclusion at different levels of explanatory factors by wording treatment (Manuscript Figures 7-10)**

| | Skilled from Europe | Skilled from EU | Skilled from outside Europe | Unskilled from Europe | Unskilled from EU | Unskilled from outside Europe |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not very/not at all | 68% | 72% | 65% | 37% | 46% | 34% |
| Close/very close | 66% | 73% | 65% | 37% | 46% | 33% |
| | | | | | | |
| All cultures are equal | 70% | 76% | 69% | 41% | 50% | 37% |
| Some cultures better than others | 60% | 69% | 60% | 32% | 40% | 29% |
| | | | | | | |
| EU unification should go further | 72% | 79% | 72% | 43% | 53% | 40% |
| EU unification gone too far | 58% | 65% | 55% | 29% | 35% | 25% |
| | | | | | | |
| Trusts EU parliament | 69% | 78% | 70% | 41% | 52% | 38% |
| Distrusts EU parliament | 64% | 68% | 60% | 34% | 40% | 29% |
| | | | | | | |
| Hardly/not at all interested in politics | 61% | 67% | 57% | 32% | 37% | 26% |
| Very/quite interested in politics | 73% | 78% | 72% | 45% | 52% | 40% |
| | | | | | | |
| Did not vote in last national election | 62% | 69% | 60% | 33% | 40% | 28% |
| Voted in last national election | 68% | 74% | 67% | 39% | 47% | 35% |
| | | | | | | |
| Does not feel close to any party | 63% | 70% | 61% | 34% | 40% | 29% |
| Feels closer to a party more than others | 70% | 76% | 69% | 41% | 50% | 37% |
| | | | | | | |
| Political participation scale = 0 | 65% | 36% | 72% | 44% | 77% | 50% |
| Political participation scale = 4 | 71% | 43% | 78% | 51% | 82% | 57% |
| Political participation scale = 7 | 63% | 31% | 71% | 39% | 75% | 45% |

Table 3 (Part 3)

**Predicted probabilities of preferring inclusion at different levels of explanatory factors by wording treatment (Manuscript Figures 7-10)**

| | Skilled from Europe | Skilled from EU | Skilled from outside Europe | Unskilled from Europe | Unskilled from EU | Unskilled from outside Europe |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unimportant to have good educational qualifications | 72% | 80% | 73% | 43% | 55% | 42% |
| Important | 63% | 70% | 61% | 34% | 41% | 29% |
| | | | | | | |
| Unimportant to speak country's official language | 77% | 83% | 77% | 49% | 61% | 46% |
| Important | 62% | 69% | 60% | 33% | 39% | 28% |
| | | | | | | |
| Unimportant to have Christian background | 71% | 76% | 69% | 42% | 49% | 37% |
| Important | 56% | 60% | 52% | 28% | 31% | 21% |
| | | | | | | |
| Unimportant to be white | 72% | 76% | 69% | 42% | 48% | 37% |
| Important | 50% | 52% | 44% | 24% | 23% | 16% |
| | | | | | | |
| Unimportant to have work skills needed in country | 79% | 84% | 79% | 52% | 61% | 48% |
| Important | 62% | 68% | 59% | 33% | 39% | 27% |
| | | | | | | |
| Unimportant to be committed to way of life | 80% | 85% | 80% | 52% | 64% | 49% |
| Important | 63% | 70% | 61% | 33% | 42% | 29% |

End of table

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Table 4

**Estimation results - random effect of wording treatment on probability of preferring inclusion at country level**

|  | Skilled from Europe | Unskilled from Europe | Skilled from outside Europe | Unskilled from outside Europe |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AT | -12% | 3% | 1% | -18% |
| BE | -15% | 17% | 25% | 40% |
| CH | 60% | 15% | -22% | -20% |
| CZ | -65% | 13% | 24% | 59% |
| DE | 99% | -37% | 9% | -61% |
| DK | -5% | 2% | 9% | 0% |
| EE | -25% | 71% | -40% | -5% |
| ES | -59% | -40% | 7% | 31% |
| FI | -27% | -72% | -32% | -73% |
| FR | 68% | 5% | 9% | -3% |
| GB | 26% | -32% | 35% | -34% |
| HU | -112% | -32% | -5% | 2% |
| IE | -11% | 4% | -37% | -22% |
| LT | -7% | 30% | -16% | 22% |
| NL | -51% | -4% | 23% | 24% |
| NO | 23% | 25% | -12% | -7% |
| PL | 25% | 10% | -5% | -2% |
| PT | 16% | -13% | 28% | 52% |
| SE | 47% | 10% | -11% | 59% |
| SI | 22% | 28% | 9% | -37% |

Notes: values expressed as percentage points

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Table 5 (Part 1)

**Predicted probabilities of preferring inclusion at different levels of individual demographic factors by wording treatment**

| | Skilled from Europe | Skilled from outside Europe | Unskilled from Europe | Unskilled from outside Europe |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Under 35 | 74% | 67% | 45% | 36% |
| **35 to 60** | 72% | 67% | 45% | 34% |
| Over 60 | 68% | 61% | 40% | 30% |
| | | | | |
| Low education | 62% | 55% | 33% | 25% |
| **Medium education** | 69% | 63% | 40% | 30% |
| **High education** | 84% | 79% | 60% | 49% |
| | | | | |
| **In paid work** | 73% | 67% | 45% | 36% |
| In education | 80% | 76% | 55% | 45% |
| Unemployed and looking for work | 68% | 60% | 38% | 31% |
| Inactive | 68% | 61% | 39% | 29% |
| | | | | |
| Army occupations | 74% | 68% | 46% | 34% |
| Low skilled occupations | 61% | 55% | 32% | 24% |
| Medium skilled occupations | 68% | 61% | 39% | 29% |
| High skilled occupations | 80% | 74% | 53% | 43% |
| | | | | |
| **Good subjective health** | 72% | 66% | 44% | 34% |
| **Bad subjective health** | 61% | 52% | 32% | 24% |
| | | | | |
| **Not religious** | 71% | 65% | 43% | 33% |
| **Religious** | 71% | 65% | 44% | 34% |
| | | | | |
| **Comfortable on present income** | 73% | 67% | 45% | 36% |
| **Difficult to cope on present income** | 61% | 54% | 33% | 24% |

Notes: predictive margins of fixed parameters expressed as percentages; bold denotes a statistically significant overall effect on Pr(preferring inclusion) at 95% CI

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Table 5 (Part 2)

**Predicted probabilities of preferring inclusion at different levels of explanatory factors by wording treatment**

| | Skilled from Europe | Skilled from outside Europe | Unskilled from Europe | Unskilled from outside Europe |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not very/not at all | 71% | 65% | 43% | 34% |
| Close/very close | 71% | 65% | 43% | 33% |
| | | | | |
| **All cultures are equal** | 75% | 69% | 47% | 37% |
| **Some cultures better than others** | 67% | 60% | 38% | 29% |
| | | | | |
| **EU unification should go further** | 77% | 72% | 50% | 40% |
| **EU unification gone too far** | 63% | 55% | 33% | 25% |
| | | | | |
| **Trusts EU parliament** | 76% | 70% | 49% | 38% |
| **Distrusts EU parliament** | 67% | 60% | 38% | 29% |
| | | | | |
| **Hardly/not at all interested in politics** | 65% | 57% | 35% | 26% |
| **Very/quite interested in politics** | 77% | 72% | 51% | 40% |
| | | | | |
| Did not vote in last national election | 66% | 60% | 37% | 28% |
| Voted in last national election | 73% | 67% | 45% | 35% |
| | | | | |
| **Does not feel close to any party** | 67% | 61% | 38% | 29% |
| **Feels closer to a party more than others** | 74% | 69% | 47% | 37% |
| | | | | |
| **Political participation scale = 0** | 70% | 63% | 41% | 31% |
| **Political participation scale = 4** | 76% | 71% | 49% | 39% |
| **Political participation scale = 7** | 81% | 75% | 55% | 45% |
| | | | | |
| **Unimportant to have good educational qualifications** | 78% | 73% | 51% | 42% |
| **Important** | 68% | 61% | 39% | 29% |
| | | | | |
| **Unimportant to speak country's official language** | 82% | 77% | 57% | 46% |
| **Important** | 67% | 60% | 37% | 28% |
| | | | | |
| **Unimportant to have Christian background** | 75% | 69% | 47% | 37% |
| **Important** | 58% | 52% | 30% | 21% |
| | | | | |
| **Unimportant to be white** | 75% | 69% | 47% | 37% |
| **Important** | 51% | 44% | 24% | 16% |
| | | | | |
| **Unimportant to have work skills needed in country** | 83% | 79% | 59% | 48% |
| **Important** | 66% | 59% | 37% | 27% |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Unimportant to be committed to way of life** | 84% | 80% | 60% | 49% |
| **Important** | 68% | 61% | 39% | 29% |

Notes: predictive margins of fixed parameters expressed as percentages; bold denotes a statistically significant overall effect on Pr(preferring inclusion) at 95% CI

Table 6

**Estimation results – Replication with Logistic Regression & Clustered SE**

| | Odds Ratio | Std. Err. | P>\|z\| |
|---|---|---|---|
| Allow skilled immigrants from outside Europe | 0.72 | 0.06 | 0.00 |
| Allow unskilled immigrants from Europe | 0.26 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Allow unskilled immigrants from outside Europe | 0.16 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Female | 0.91 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| Born in country | 1.06 | 0.11 | 0.58 |
| Member of ethnic minority | 1.19 | 0.10 | 0.03 |
| Aged between 36 and 60 yo | 1.10 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| Aged over 60 yo | 1.07 | 0.07 | 0.32 |
| Suburbs or outskirts of big city | 0.97 | 0.06 | 0.67 |
| Town or small city | 0.96 | 0.07 | 0.59 |
| Country village | 0.88 | 0.07 | 0.11 |
| EU unification gone too far | 0.62 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Distrustful of EU parliament | 0.84 | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Feel close to country | 0.98 | 0.07 | 0.73 |
| Religious | 1.05 | 0.04 | 0.16 |
| Some cultures better than others | 0.77 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: speak language | 0.78 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: Christian | 0.81 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: be white | 0.61 | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: committed to way of life | 0.70 | 0.06 | 0.00 |
| Paid work | 0.96 | 0.03 | 0.19 |
| Education | 1.24 | 0.09 | 0.00 |
| Unemployed, looking for job | 0.95 | 0.06 | 0.48 |
| Low skilled ISCO 7/9 | 0.88 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| Highly skilled ISCO 1/3 | 1.24 | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Armed forces occupations ISCO 0 | 0.97 | 0.22 | 0.90 |
| Difficult on present hh income | 0.78 | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Subjective health bad | 0.84 | 0.06 | 0.01 |
| Important for imm: good educational qualifications | 0.93 | 0.04 | 0.05 |
| Important for imm: work skills needed in country | 0.66 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| Up to lower secondary ed ISCED 0-II | 0.89 | 0.04 | 0.01 |

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| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bachelors or higher ISCED V-VI | 1.44 | 0.06 | 0.00 |
| How interested in politics | 1.32 | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Voted last national election | 0.97 | 0.03 | 0.45 |
| Not eligible to vote last election | 1.20 | 0.10 | 0.03 |
| Feel closer to a particular party than all others | 1.16 | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Political action participation index | 1.10 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| | | | |
| Belgium | 1.25 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Switzerland | 1.91 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Czech R | 0.74 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Germany | 2.29 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| Denmark | 1.14 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| Estonia | 1.04 | 0.04 | 0.27 |
| Spain | 0.65 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Finland | 0.59 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| France | 2.26 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| UK | 1.37 | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Hungary | 0.34 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| R of Ireland | 0.85 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Lithuania | 1.14 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| Netherlands | 0.75 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| Norway | 1.50 | 0.06 | 0.00 |
| Poland | 1.47 | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Portugal | 1.56 | 0.06 | 0.00 |
| Sweden | 2.27 | 0.07 | 0.00 |
| Slovenia | 1.48 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| Observations | 28985 | | |
| Pseudo R squared | 0.20 | | |
| SE adjusted clusters | 20 | | |

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Table 7

**Estimation results – Replication with mixed effects logistic and treatment fixed only**

| Fixed effects parameters | Odds Ratio | Std. Err. | P>\|z\| |
|---|---|---|---|
| Allow skilled immigrants from outside Europe | 0.717 | 0.028 | 0.00 |
| Allow unskilled immigrants from Europe | 0.259 | 0.010 | 0.00 |
| Allow unskilled immigrants from outside Europe | 0.156 | 0.006 | 0.00 |
| Female | 0.907 | 0.027 | 0.00 |
| Born in country | 1.057 | 0.068 | 0.39 |
| Member of ethnic minority | 1.192 | 0.093 | 0.03 |
| Aged between 36 and 60 yo | 1.103 | 0.043 | 0.01 |
| Aged over 60 yo | 1.072 | 0.056 | 0.18 |
| Up to lower secondary ed ISCED 0-II | 0.976 | 0.051 | 0.64 |
| Bachelors or higher ISCED V-VI | 0.963 | 0.039 | 0.35 |
| Highly skilled ISCO 1/3 | 0.886 | 0.036 | 0.00 |
| Low skilled ISCO 7/9 | 0.621 | 0.018 | 0.00 |
| Armed forces occupations ISCO 0 | 0.844 | 0.025 | 0.00 |
| Paid work | 0.976 | 0.050 | 0.63 |
| Education | 1.051 | 0.032 | 0.10 |
| Unemployed, looking for job | 0.767 | 0.022 | 0.00 |
| Suburbs or outskirts of big city | 0.780 | 0.028 | 0.00 |
| Town or small city | 0.812 | 0.031 | 0.00 |
| Country village | 0.606 | 0.027 | 0.00 |
| Subjective health poor | 0.696 | 0.027 | 0.00 |
| Religious | 0.962 | 0.040 | 0.36 |
| Difficult on present hh income | 1.245 | 0.092 | 0.00 |
| Feel close to country | 0.954 | 0.077 | 0.56 |
| Some cultures better than others | 0.878 | 0.033 | 0.00 |
| EU unification gone too far | 1.242 | 0.045 | 0.00 |
| Distrustful of EU parliament | 0.971 | 0.221 | 0.90 |
| How interested in politics | 0.781 | 0.030 | 0.00 |
| Voted last national election | 0.842 | 0.049 | 0.00 |
| Feel closer to a particular party than all others | 0.927 | 0.032 | 0.03 |
| Political action participation index | 0.664 | 0.024 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: good educational qualifications | 0.894 | 0.033 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: speak language | 1.438 | 0.057 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: Christian | 1.324 | 0.042 | 0.00 |
| Important for imm: be white | 0.973 | 0.037 | 0.47 |
| Important for imm: work skills needed in country | 1.198 | 0.097 | 0.03 |
| Important for imm: committed to way of life | 1.159 | 0.035 | 0.00 |

| Random effects parameters | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Country sample: Identity variance | | Estimate | 95% Conf. Interval |
| Country random intercept | | 0.231 | 0.123  0.434 |
| LR test vs. logistic regression: | chibar2(01) = 1085.61 | Prob>=chibar2 = | 0.00 |

| Mixed effects logistic regression summary | |
| --- | --- |
| Number of observations | 28,985 |
| Number of groups (countries) | 20 |
| Wald chi2 (37) | 4597.48 |
| Probability > chi2 | 0.00 |
| | |
| LR test between main estimation (treatment both fixed and random) and this one (treatment fixed only) | |
| LR chi2(3) | 210.53 |
| Prob > chi2 | 0.00 |

# REMINDER

## ROLE OF EUROPEAN MOBILITY AND ITS IMPACTS IN NARRATIVES, DEBATES AND EU REFORMS

The REMINDER project is exploring the economic, social, institutional and policy factors that have shaped the impacts of free movement in the EU and public debates about it.

The project is coordinated from COMPAS and includes participation from 14 consortium partners in 9 countries across Europe