REMINDER

ROLE OF EUROPEAN MOBILITY AND ITS IMPACTS
IN NARRATIVES, DEBATES AND EU REFORMS

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European Media and Migration-Related News: Comparing Discourse with Reality

WORKING PAPER

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727072 REMINDER

Executive Summary

The aim of this study is to identify possible divergences between discourses in European media about migration (immigration and emigration) and objective reality. This research also seeks to expand upon existing knowledge of the production processes behind news about migration (general migration and intra-European migration). In order to do so, it analyzes the degree to which both the salience and framing of news about migration are aligned with Real-World Developments (hereafter RWDs) and key events. Accordingly, we use semi-automated approaches to computational media analysis for six European countries: Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Poland and Romania.

In our report, we analyze (i) the evolution of European attitudes to immigration, drawing upon the "competitive threat" theoretical model; (ii) the role of the media as key institutions in public discourse as far as migration is concerned; (iii) media discourse in comparison with reality. We highlight that research on this topic is lacking in four key areas: studies of the relation between real-world trends and the media's coverage of migration; studies of the frames used in migration news; cross-national comparisons of two or more countries; and, lastly, empirical analyses of the influence key events and RWDs exert on news production focusing on migration, especially intra-EU migration.

Based on our key findings, the media do tend to follow trends in the real world, both as regards the arrival of immigrants and asylum applications, and socioeconomic data, and also, to a lesser extent, as regards key events involving international terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, there are differences in the ways that these external factors affect the coverage of news about migration, depending on the country under consideration. Future studies should continue carrying out comparative analyses of different countries to understand the reasons shaping common as well as divergent patterns.

Index

Introduction

According to data from the United Nations, 3.4% of the world's population were migrants by the end of 2017, which translates to 257 million residents living in countries other than their place of origin. The issues of immigration and integration have consequently become recurring topics of debate in the political and public spheres in most Western democracies (McLaren et al., 2017; Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007). The arrival of the twenty-first century brought with it changes to the way immigration was publicly debated, both in terms of the amount of attention paid to the issue and to the tone and focus of such debates. Some authors have explained these changes by reference to international events such as 9/11, the war in Iraq and the terrorist attacks in Europe during the post-9/11 period, including those which took place in Madrid, London and Paris, among others (Böhmelt et al., 2019; Brancato et al., 2016; Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007). Among others, the media is found as one of the main influencing factors of public opinion, as it is a key source of information about immigration (Benson, 2013:p.1) that often presents an incomplete picture of the issue (Blinder, 2015). Likewise, within the specific environment of the EU in the wake of the refugee crisis of 2015, the debate about both free movement and the Schengen Zone has been identified as one of the key factors leading to the vote for Brexit (Hobolt, 2016).[1]

The terrorist attacks, the war in Iraq and the refugee crisis are classified as "key events" within the academic literature describing the processes of news production. Such events can generate news waves, a phenomenon that often leads to a mismatch between actual media coverage and the real world the media are supposed to be covering (Vasterman, 2005). In such cases, a discrepancy is created between the

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[1]The principle of the free movement of persons allows citizens of the EU to live in, travel to or work in any other member state of the EU, in addition to Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Most EU countries, along with other third states, likewise subscribe to the Schengen Agreement, which reflects a commitment to eliminate border controls as well as physical barriers.

amount of attention the media pays to certain events and the real changes in the frequency or importance of such events, which often have not changed (Kepplinger & Habermeier, 1995).

Such mismatches between news production and the real world can occur not only with respect to key events, whatever their nature, but also to Real World Indicators. Thus, for example, empirical analysis has shown that, when it comes to the immigration issue, in some cases the increase of media attention to the topic is negatively correlated with real data on immigration. In other words, even when the number of arriving immigrants decreases, the amount of coverage of this issue can increase in particular contexts (Van Klingeren et al., 2015). A similar phenomenon is occurring with regard to the heightened attention paid to the refugee crisis by online media in the Czech Republic. This attention does not reflect the scarce number of asylum applications received by that country (Tkaczyk, 2017). Furthermore, dominant patterns in the news coverage of immigration are not necessarily related to developments in reality (Jaobs et al., 2018). This would suggest that the criteria of selection and framing as applied to the news do not always reflect the frequency, importance and features of events in the real world.

Such anomalies in the processes of news production lead one to ask to what degree media accurately represent the true nature of reality. Furthermore, the capacity of the media to transmit images forces us to ask to what degree, in their discourses, these media project and, within the framework of the knowledge they transmit, follow the lead of the real world, both in terms of key events and objective data on immigration. In other words, do media act as a window onto the world or does their daily work serve to foster a world of their own? Hence, in this paper we empirically compare the relationship of Real-World Indicators and relevant key events with the visibility and patterns of the media's coverage of immigration in six countries of the European Union.

In this study we first briefly describe the evolution of European attitudes to immigration and examine the "competitive threat" theoretical model. Second, we focus on the media as key institutions in public discourses about immigration. We refer to factors that affect the attention, selection and media treatment of news about immigration. To this end, we sketch out some of the most important theories concerning news production: journalistic influences, media attention routines and

framing theory. Thirdly, we analyze the present state of research comparing discourse from media with reality. Lastly, before turning to the empirical analysis and the conclusions of the research, we discuss the data and variables used in the study as well as the methodology used to carry it out.

Public Opinion and the Media: Attention to Immigration

Citizen Attitudes to Immigration

In 2017, according to data from Eurostat, approximately 2.4 million people from third countries came to the European Union. In addition, 1.9 million citizens of the European Union changed their country of residence to another Member State. The immigration figures in the European Union from 2016 are also significant: 2 million immigrants arrived from third countries and 1.3 million citizens changed their country of residence within the European Union. These figures are only one example of a global migration phenomenon that is on the rise throughout the world (Benson, 2013).

Migration is therefore a key issue in contemporary societies. In general, it can be argued that currently public opinion on immigrants is unfavorable in the Western world (Benesch et al., 2019; Gorodzeisky, 2013; Hatton, 2016; McLaren et al., 2017). Specifically, in the European Union, immigration is perceived by citizens as the main problem confronting the region, according to 2018 data from Eurobarometer. Concern over the issue has increased by two points since the spring of 2018, and now is expressed by 40% of the population. Currently, immigration is a topic that worries citizens of the EU above and beyond terrorism (20%), the condition of member States' public finances (19%), the economy (18%), the climate change (16%) and unemployment (13%) (Standard Eurobarometer, 2018).

The fact that immigration is regarded as the main problem confronting the nations of the European Union is a relatively recent phenomenon which took root in 2015, the year of the so-called "refugee crisis." It was then that immigration gained prominence as the issue which has most worried citizens, overtaking what had theretofore, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, been at the top of the list: the economy[2] (Standard Eurobarometer, 2018). Still, this change cannot be exclusively attributed to the arrival

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[2] During the first months of 2017, immigration was regarded as the second main problem after terrorism, only to retake first place immediately afterward.

of refugees from the war in Syria, given that immigration was already being mentioned as one the six main problems facing the EU even before the crisis of 2008 (Standard Eurobarometer, 2008).

To understand contradictory attitudes to immigration, it is useful to draw upon the "competitive threat" theoretical model (Billiet et al., 2014; Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018; Riek et al., 2006). This model comes from theories about intergroup relationships. One of the first authors to refer to this model was Herbert Blume (1958), who explained that challenges to certain interests of the dominant group result in defensive reactions, which quite often express themselves as racial prejudices. Thus, with the arrival of immigrants (an outgroup) a feeling of threat takes root in the population that receives them (the in-group). The perceived threats are understood as a specific factor in fomenting such racial prejudices.

Some of these prejudices, particularly those which are the most widespread throughout society, link immigrants to increasing rates of crime and to terrorism in recipient nations (safety challenge). Also common is the belief that immigrants undermine those nations' welfare systems (economic challenge) (Ceobanu, 2011; Hainmueller et al., 2015; Jacobs et al., 2018).

Research on attitudes to immigration has had two focuses: one developed by economically-oriented scholars, and a second that draws upon social psychology. The first approach has received most of the attention (Billiet et al., 2014). It focuses on the economic situation of the host country, building upon the notion that scarce material resources (such as employment, housing and health care) help catalyze anti-immigrant sentiment (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1983). The second approach focuses on symbolic resources (such as national values and cultural identity), thereby highlighting not so much material threats but rather perceived cultural threats (Valentino et al., 2017). Nevertheless, researchers have recently begun to consider these two approaches as complementary instead of mutually exclusive (Riek et al., 2006).

Whether the perceived threat is caused by economic or cultural factors, the surveys conducted by Eurobarometer suggest that anti-immigrant attitudes do not remain stable over time. In 2012, ethnic prejudices appeared to be diminishing, with immigration mentioned as one of the main problems facing the EU by only 8% of its citizens. Yet, as we have pointed out, in the autumn of 2018 worries about

8

immigration were cited by up to 40% of the European population. The level had peaked in the autumn of 2015, when 58% of the population of Europe mentioned the issue as one of the two most important problems in the EU (Standard Eurobarometer, 2018).

As we have said, the tipping point for anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe appears to have been the influx of refugees from the war in Syria, the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. This hypothesis is consistent with the "competitive threat" theoretical model, proponents of which claim that attitudes to immigrants are driven by economic conditions both at the micro (individual) and macro (country) levels (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018). With regard to individual variables, the perceived threat becomes greater when citizens of the in-group share characteristics and positions with the out-group. Accordingly, competition for resources (such as jobs, for example) is experienced with greater intensity (Billiet et al., 2014). As for national variables, the perceived threat depends on the economic conditions and the size of the immigrant group as compared to that of the host society (Quillian, 1995). Thus, for example, a significant increase in the number of immigrants or asylum seekers, or a rise in the unemployment rate, will heighten anti-immigrant sentiment. Sniderman et al. (2000) calls these changes to social and economic conditions "external shocks." Still, how does the public know about such external shocks?

Media Coverage of the Migration Phenomenon: Media Attention and Framing

One of the main purposes of the media is to report on key events and developments in society (Jacobs et al., 2018). It is often the case that what citizens know about immigration depends on the information provided to them by the media (Benson, 2013:1; van Klingeren et al., 2015). In this case, media act as an extension of citizens' direct experiences (Joyce & Harwood, 2014). With respect to attitudes to immigration, a large number of studies have shown that the media have a significant impact on such attitudes (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2009; McLaren et al., 2018; Schemer, 2012; Vergeer et al., 2000). Although the citizenry may have some direct experience with immigration—which would be an obtrusive issue (Zucker, 1978)—the media shines a

spotlight on certain specific matters (such as immigration's effects on economic conditions and security).

The media typically presents immigrants in stereotypical ways and from a negative point of view (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2009; Schemer, 2014; van Klingeren et al., 2015). Furthermore, the media tends to associate them with different kinds of problems and threats. As we have already pointed out, this happens at the social level, linking immigrants with violence, criminality and terrorist acts (Checa & Arjona, 2011). It also occurs at the economic level, where they are associated with a welfare state under pressure as well as with increasing levels of competition in the job market (Caviedes, 2015). Such associations correspond, as we have previously indicated, with some of the prejudices held by the public.

Migration can also be presented by the media as a crisis-driven issue (Beutin et al., 2005) that accordingly increases the public's perception that there is a crisis. Nevertheless, one cannot claim media coverage of immigration is always identical. The amount of attention as well as tone and focus can change over time, influencing the population's attitudes to immigration (van Klingeren et al., 2015).

The attention that journalists and the media pay to immigration, like the attention that they pay to any other real issue, is determined by diverse factors distributed within a hierarchy of influences (Reese, 2001). These may or may not be related to the media themselves (Shoemaker & Reese, 2011). Thus, within journalistic culture, such values as objectivity and impartiality are often cited (Hanitzsch, 2007). However, the daily reality of journalism shows that there are a series of commercial, organizational and editorial imperatives, among many other factors, that often divert the public's attention away from "real" problems (Behr & Iyengar, 1985).

If attention is paid to organizational influences linked to journalistic routines, it must be kept in mind that reality is too large and complex to be completely represented by the media. Thus, it becomes necessary to put into motion a selection process, by means of which journalists act as gatekeepers (Soroka, 2012). In this way, journalists decide which events make the news (issue visibility). Time constraints and the availability of sources are other factors in journalistic routines that influence the gatekeeping process.

One of the keys to understanding whether an event will be covered by journalists may be found in the news value they attribute to the real world event. Galtung and Ruge (1965) point out that events in the real world present a series of news factors that determine the chances that such events will be turned into news items. Some of these factors, which are understood to be consistent across time, are negativity, intensity, cultural proximity and frequency.

However, some events have the ability to change the routines the media follow when focusing their attention on a given issue. These so-called key events, such as natural catastrophes and accidents, might be genuine events independent of news coverage, but they can also be interviews, official advice about risk, or surprising revelations made by investigative journalists (Vasterman, 2005). These key events can modify journalistic criteria for selecting news and generate news issues that until that time had received little attention. They may also add a new dimension to an already well-known issue (Brosius & Eps, 1995).

Key events give rise to so-called news waves and, in extreme cases, to media hype. In these situations, journalistic coverage loses contact with the real world and becomes an auto-referential system (Kepplinger & Habermeier, 1995) wherein the coverage of an event is not only disproportionate but also serves to increase media attention paid to other similar events, leading to the sense that the frequency of these events in the real world is increasing when the only thing that has really changed is the attention lavished on them by the media (Vasterman, 2005). This happens because a key event acts as a kind of prototype. When a similar event occurs, coverage of that event becomes indispensable, because it conforms to the previous model and because of its updated newsworthiness (Brosius & Epps, 1995). These news waves not only show the false stability of news selection criteria but also suggest that the supposed correspondence that the public assumes exists between the frequency of a news item and its importance, and the frequency of events in the real world, is not always real (Kepplinger & Habermeier, 1995).

Other variables that affect journalists' selection of news are their own predispositions, their knowledge, beliefs and attitudes (Donsbach, 2004). Thus, it has been demonstrated that those news items that line up with the opinion of the journalist have a higher perceived news value than those that contradict that opinion (Kepplinger et al.,1991). This not only has consequences for decisions about whether

11

to publish a news item (issue salience) but also on the ways such news items are handled (framing). Thus, if public attitudes to immigration can be affected by the socio-economic situation, then so can journalists suffer from this influence as well. Indeed, the journalist's perception may be reflected both in the selection of what makes the news and in the ways in which that news is framed if selected.

Framing theory has contributed to agenda-setting theory by adding to the understanding of issue salience the idea of how these salient issues are presented (Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007). According to Entman (1993:55), framing is the process of selecting "some aspects of perceived reality and making them more salient in the communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem, definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation." Thus, this process fundamentally involves selecting and emphasizing specific aspects, expressions and images of a news item in such a way that it thereby adds to it a point of view. News frames can be described as products of journalists' shared reality. Journalists thus develop common assumptions by means of which they understand the world (Donsbach, 2004). This can be understood in light of group dynamics and group norms. These often play an important role in the hierarchy of influences on journalists (Donsbach, 2004) as they select newsworthy events and frame them.

Two of the most common frames of migration news are security and economic frames. This has had important consequences for public opinion (Jacobs et al., 2018). As Igartua & Cheng (2009:739-740) have argued, "the type of frame stressed in a news story has a significant effect on cognitive channeling, on the perception of the importance of immigration as a problem, on attitudes toward immigration and on beliefs about the consequences of immigration for the country."

In this study, we therefore aim to expand knowledge about the processes of production existing behind news about immigration, for which we analyze to what degree the salience and framing of news about immigration is aligned with Real-World Developments and key events. Accordingly, the goal of this study to learn whether the media act as a window onto the world or, on the contrary, whether they follow their own logic and rhythm when they cover migration, which is one of the key issues of the twenty-first century.

Previous Research: Media, Key Events and Real-World Developments

Little previous research has examined the existing relation between real-world trends and media coverage of immigration. Even scarcer are the studies that analyse the frames used in news about migration (Jacobs et al., 2018). Likewise, few studies have performed empirical analyses of the influences on the production of news that consider both key events and Real-World Developments (Jacobs et al., 2018; Vliegenthart & Boomgaarden, 2007). Moreover, of those that do analyze the presence of one type of influence or other on the reality of the media coverage of migration (Lubbers et al., 1998; van Klingeren et al., 2015; Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007), none have differentiated between news referring to intra-European immigration (resulting from the free movement principle) and to immigration originating in third countries.

Research on the Relation between the Media and Real-World Developments

In general, research on the influence of Real-World Developments (also called Real-World Indicators or RWD from here on) upon the coverage of news about immigration shows that if such influence exists, it is weak. Most studies analyze variations in news salience or news attention, beginning with the number of asylum applications and residence permits (Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008; Lubbers et al., 1998; Tkaczyk, 2017; Vliegenthart & Boomgaarden, 2007) and/or according to the flow of immigrants (Checa & Arjona, 2011; Jacobs et al., 2018; van Klingeren et al., 2015; Vliegenthart & Boomgaarden, 2007). Broadly speaking, these studies note that there is no relationship between increased numbers of arriving immigrants and heightened media attention to migration (salience). Moreover, in the Netherlands (van Klingeren et al., 2015) and Flanders (Jacobs et al., 2018), these two variables are negatively correlated. One exception to the rule is indicated by Lubbers et al. (1998), who found that Dutch newspapers do pay more attention to minorities when the number of residence

permits (but not asylum applications) which are granted increases. Likewise, Checa and Arjona (2011) claim that greater numbers of immigrants account for the significant increase in news coverage of the issue in Spain.

Jacobs et al. (2018) investigate the relationship between the salience of immigration as a news topic, and data about immigration flows. Furthermore, they compare dominant patterns in immigration news –in terms of crime and socioeconomic issues- with real world indicators about crime levels and economic performance (unemployment rates and the Composite Leading Indicator, or CLI from here onward) in Holland and Flanders. Of these, only crime levels had a positive impact in Dutch (but not in Flemish) news whereas economic indicators were weakly related to the ways in which news about immigration was covered.

Widening the scope, we find that other authors have analyzed the determinants of economic news coverage using economic indicators. What is more, as Vliegenthart and Boomgaarden (2007) claim, the relationship between RWD and media coverage has been studied principally within this context. Curiously, if changes to statistical indicators regarding the economic situation of the country (unemployment rates or changes to the inflation rate, among others) cannot completely explain the variation in media coverage in terms of economics, most authors definitely find that the media, at least partly, do appear to be impacted by national economic conditions (Goidel & Langley, 1995; Kepplinger & Habermeier, 1995; Sanders et al., 1993; Wu et al., 2002). On the other hand, Mosley (1984) concludes that the media do not offer an objective image of economic indicators.

Research on the Influence of Key Events upon Media Coverage

If, as we have seen, the results of previous studies suggest that news about immigration is generally not developed from trends reflecting objectively real data, the opposite occurs when it comes to key events involving the visibility of immigration-related news. In general, academic research has revealed that key events are more important than RWD when explaining variations in media attention (Jacobs et al., 2018; Vliegenthart & Boomgaarden, 2007).

Thus, with respect to so-called unpremeditated events (Vliegenthart & Boomgaarden, 2007) – in other words, wars, terrorist attacks, accidents and natural catastrophes – the previous literature shows that international events such the war in Iraq or the former Yugoslavia, terrorist attacks or murders such as that of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands, or boats sinking in the Mediterranean, influence the media's agenda (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2009; Jacobs et al., 2018; Tkaczyk , 2017; Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007; Vligehnthart & Boomgaarden, 2007). Similarly, Kroon et al. (2016) have concluded that, in hard news[3] articles, attention to Roma people is clustered around several key events but above all around those that occur in close geographic proximity. These unpremeditated key events increase media attention in the short term (Tkaczyk, 2017; Vligenthart & Boomgaarden, 2007).

Institutional events, i.e. those that are embedded in the institutional system of a country (Vliegenthart & Boomgaarden, 2007), can also exert influence on both media attention and the frames that are used. Thus, with regard to parliamentary elections, while Vliegenthart and Roggeband (2007) found that the effects of parliamentary elections are limited, Allen (2016) argues that media coverage of immigration increases after the election of a conservative government. Political activity related to immigration also resulted in increased media attention to the issue (Allen, 2016; Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2009; Checa & Arjona, 2011). According to Vliegenthart and Boomgaarden (2007), institutional events, unlike unpremeditated events, take longer to capitalize but endure over time.

Similarly, the literature indicates that external events have a significant impact on how issues are framed. Jacobs et al. (2018) found that whenever a terrorist key event occurs, Dutch and Flemish newspapers will report on terrorism more often. For their part, Vliegenthart and Roggeband (2007) found that 9/11 increased threat-framing and that, weeks before the parliamentary elections of 1998 and 2003 in the Neetherlands, the media more often used frames habitually employed by parliamentarians.

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[3] "Hard news" is considered to be that related to "foreign and domestic politics, economy and finance" (Reinemann et al., 2011:231).

These outcomes are similar to those found with respect to other issues. Thus, Kepplinger and Habermeier (1995) found that after natural catastrophes and accidents, newspapers went on to cover similar events with greater frequency. Brosius and Eps (1995) identified the same trend with respect to right-wing violence in Germany as did Vasterman (2005) regarding violent crimes in the Netherlands.

Therefore, in light of the literature that has been developed so far, we propose two working hypotheses:

H1. The coverage that media offer of issues related to migration, both in terms of salience and framing, are not influenced in any significant way by Real-World Developments.

H2. Unpremeditated key events and, to a lesser degree, institutional key events, have an impact both on the salience and framing of news about migration in the media.

As we have seen, there have been few studies attempting to discover the degree of discrepancy or convergence between the media discourse on migration and the objective reality of the issue. The most complete examples can be found in research carried out by Vliegenthart and Boomgaarden (2007) and Jacobs et al. (2018). In the first, the authors compare the effects of RWD with those of key events on the prominence of immigration-related coverage in Dutch newspapers over a period of twelve years (1991-2002). In the second, the authors compare the salience of immigration as a news topic and references made by media about issues such as crimes, terrorism and socioeconomic conditions in two different cases: Flanders and the Netherlands over the course of 17 years (1999-2015).

This article is based on previous studies and expands their analyses to six countries of the EU, which can be divided into three groups according to their respective characteristics. Those from the first group (the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden) have generally been receivers of immigrants. The second group has been above all senders of migrants (Poland and Romania). The third, Spain, was, during the first temporal phase we analyze (until the financial crisis of 2008), a receiver of immigrants, before it subsequently became a country of emigrants as well. To date, no article has carried out a comparative analysis of so many countries. Moreover, this is the first article that specifically focuses on news about migration between the countries of the European Union as well as that from third countries into the EU.

16

Data and Method

The six countries under examination here, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Poland and Romania, have different media systems as well as distinct political contexts and approaches to the migration issue. Presented below is a brief history of migration in each of the countries concerned (to read more, see: Eberl et al., 2019).

Spain. The Spanish media system can be classified as belonging to the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). During the 1990s and 2000s it was a recipient country for immigrants, as well as for irregular immigration, both from Europe and from third countries (from Africa and Latin America, mainly). After 2008, the so-called "brain drain" began: a migratory phenomenon wherein well-educated young people left Spain for other countries of the EU (mainly the United Kingdom and Germany) in search of employment.

The United Kingdom belongs to the Democratic Corporatist model media system (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). This country began receiving asylum applications, mainly from outside of Europe, at the beginning of the 2000s. It experienced an increase in immigration from within the EU when Poland joined the European Union in 2004. This peaked in 2007 and in 2014 when the transitional labor market arrangements for Romania and Bulgaria were lifted.

Germany. Like the United Kingdom, Germany belongs to the Democratic Corporatist model media system (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). At the beginning of the 2000s, the German government put into place a policy aimed at attracting talent from outside Europe. At the same time, it also decided to wait seven years before opening its labor borders to the new countries of Eastern Europe after the Eastern enlargement of 2004. During the refugee crisis, Germany became the main destination for asylum applications.

Sweden. This country is another example of the Democratic Corporatist Model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Sweden was traditionally a recipient country for refugees during the 1990s and 2000s. The years 2008 and 2009, however, witnessed street uprisings in multi-ethnic districts. After Swedish Prime Minister Frederik Reinfeldt issued a call for tolerance in 2014, Sweden became one of the main destinations for asylum-seekers, a

phenomenon that occurred in parallel with greater numbers of votes for the anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats.

Poland. With its communist past, this country is not categorized in the classification scheme proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004). Still, other authors have attempted to give it its own classification, assigning it, together with Romania, to the group of post-communist countries of Eastern Europe (Castro-Herrero et al., 2017). If, since 2008, Poland has received labor migration from the Ukraine, it has never really been an immigrant country. Although its emigration figures are always higher than its immigration figures, the former increased significantly after the opening of the European labor market. Despite this, the Law and Justice Party's rhetoric has fueled anti-immigrant sentiment.

Romania, as indicated, belongs to the same media system model as Hungary (Castro-Herrero et al., 2017). It is a multi-ethnic, primarily emigrant country, especially of young people and highly skilled people. Although this trend has recently decreased, the number of refugees arriving in the country has not increased, even during the crisis of 2015.

Data set

To carry out the comparison between data about the real world and media coverage, an automated analysis was performed on news about migration published in the six EU countries for the years 2003–2017. The data has been retrieved and examined within the "Role of European Mobility and its Impacts in Narratives, Debates and EU Reforms" (REMINDER) project. Of these six countries, 17 media were selected. The news related to migrations was collected from several media archives: *APA DeFacto*, *EMIS*, *LexisNexis* and *Webretriever*. To carry this out, native speakers carried out six Boolean search strings, one for each language, based on keywords specifically designed to capture news about immigration, emigration, migration in general and freedom of movement.[4] Their average Recall and Precision scores were $\underline{R}$= 0.81 and $\underline{P}$= 0.85.

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[4] Eberl et al. (2019) contains the table compiling the six Boolean search strings designed for gathering news on migration.

In this way, 978,673 articles were initially identified. However, it is well know that such news archives may contain a number of duplicate articles due to faulty archiving, regional mutations of news outlets, or archiving of minimally-edited articles. In order to exclude those, a deduplication procedure was applied. To identify highly similar texts (e.g., Pouliquen, Steinberger, Ignat, Käsper, & Temnikova, 2004:959) we relied on a cosine similarity measure which compares textual contents and calculates a similarity score. For each language a threshold value[5] was set and if for any two articles said value was reached, the shorter of the two was excluded. After the elimination of duplicates a total of 844,230 articles remained. Out of this total corpus of data, in order to save financial resources, a sample of 73,370 articles was drawn for translation. Stratified by outlet and half-year period, all media within the temporal period concerned were represented in the database. Moreover, an oversampling of small units was chosen so that, during periods when media coverage was scarce, sufficient data remained in the sample for additional analysis (Eberl et al., 2019). All non-English language texts were translated to English via the Google Translate API to facilitate the annotation of the data by means of English-language instruments for automated content analysis. Each article was annotated based on various dictionaries that were developed and validated specifically for the application to the present data. Terms and phrases that appear in these dictionaries referred to different concepts of interest corresponding to our dependent variables, the salience of subtopics related to migration and migration-related frames[6].

Thus, the final data set was ultimately compiled as follows in Table 1. In total, the data included news from 17 European media outlets.

Table 1. Number of news selected by outlet and country

Country	Newspaper	News (n)
Spain	El País	5,126

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[5] Following a qualitative inspection of a sample of articles and their calculated cosine similarity, three of the authors determined country-specific thresholds (Spain: 0.98; UK: 0.96; Germany: 0.95; Sweden: 0.95; Poland: 0.95; Hungary: 0.95; Romania: 0.95).

[6] For a more detailed explanation of the machine translation approach, the development of the dictionaries, and the application and operationalization of the frames see Eberl et al. (2019).

	El Mundo	4,371
United Kingdom	Daily Mail (online)	4,577
	Daily Mirror (online)	4,273
	The Daily Telegraph	4,061
	The Guardian	4,884
Germany	Frankfurter Rundschau	4,387
	Die Tageszeitung (Taz)	4,669
	Der Spiege: spiegel.de (online)	4,477
Sweden	SvenskaDagbladet	4,257
	DagensNyheter	4,343
	Aftonbladet	4,981
	Expressen	5,497
Poland	Dziennik Gazeta Prawna	4,187
	Rzeczpospolita	4,105
Romania	Romania Libera	1,860
	ZiarulFinanciar	3,315

The extracted news dated from the period beginning January 1, 2003 and ending December 31, 2017. This allows for an analysis of the impact of diverse indicators related to immigration and contextual socioeconomic factors, such as the number of key events that took place over the course of those fifteen years. They were divided into two groups. The first included Jihadi terrorist attacks (perpetrated in the heart of

20

the EU as well as abroad) and the second comprised elections (both national parliamentary elections and European Parliamentary ones).

After translating the news into English, we proceeded to annotate each article based on various dictionaries that were developed. Terms and phrases that appear in these dictionaries referred to different concepts of interest corresponding to our dependent variables. They measure, on the one hand, the salience of subtopics related to migration and, on the other, migration-related frames.[7]

Measurement: Dependent Variables

As we have indicated, the two groups of dependent variables in our study involve, in the first case, salience (two variables) and frames in migration coverage (three variables). Specifically, we analyze the relationship between key events and RWD with respect to those five dependent variables:

a) The salience of migration-related news coverage in general. The visibility of the migration topic itself is computed in absolute numbers within a particular outlet and within a particular period of time, a particular half-year period that is. Based on the selection criteria of the Boolean search strings mentioned above, the quantity of news published by the media referring to migration is identified. It includes articles concerned with both immigration and emigration in the EU, as well as from or to third countries.

b) The salience of intra-European (Intra-EU or Schengen) migration coverage. To distinguish between news referring migration in general and news referring to intra-European migration (or, in other words, immigration or emigration between EU member states or within the Schengen area, as well as free movement), we developed a dictionary capturing specifically this sub-area of migration. It was manually validated (F = 0.79). An article identified by this dictionary contained at least one reference to intra-European migration. It might also refer to other kinds of migration but it had to refer at least once to

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[7] To read an extensive explanation about our machine translation approach, the development of the dictionary, the application and operationalization of the frames, see Eberl et al. (2019).

migration between countries of the EU. This variable was measured in absolute terms within a particular outlet and within a particular semester.

c) Frames. As previously indicated, and following the "competitive threat" theoretical model, the welfare state, the economy and the security frames dominate media coverage of migration (Eberl et al., 2018). Hence, we focus on economic, welfare, and security frames. Three dictionaries developed and validated particularly for our data (F=0.81) were used to measure the presence of these three frames. To determine whether a frame was present in an article, it was sufficient to identify in said article a phrase related to the frame. To measure it, frame-related articles were aggregated from the media and the countries on a biannual basis. The average number of articles referring to a specific frame during the period of time concerned was computed. We measured the presence of frames in a relative way, in contrast with the salience variables studied.

Measurement: Independent Variables

Three groups of independent variables were used. The first group was the level of immigration, the level of emigration and the number of asylum applications. The second group consisted of four other kinds of RWD related to the frames being analyzed (GDP, CLI, the Social Protection Expenditure and the homicide rate and prison population). Lastly, we used two different groups of key events (unpremeditated and institutional).

For the levels of immigration, emigration and asylum applications, we obtained inflow and outflow figures from Eurostat. These variables refer to long-term international immigration in each of the six countries being studied. Records of the the influx of asylum applications according to nationality were received from the OECD for all the countries concerned except Romania, which didn't appear in the database. Since our study uses biannual data, we have chosen to add annual data twice, as suggested for these cases by van Klingeren et al. (2015).

With respect to RWD, the following three variables were also included:

a) The country's economic performance is gauged by GDP per capita, measured in millions of euros. As reported by Eurostat, this comprises trimestral data published over the period 2003-2017. To convert it into biannual data, we calculated the average from the two first trimesters and from the second two semesters of each year. Moreover, we included the Composite Leading Indicator (CLI), a measurement developed by the OECD that aggregates a set of macroeconomic indicators into one index. As the OECD indicates, the CLI is designed to provide early signs of turning points in business cycles and thereby provide qualitative rather than quantitative information about short-term economic changes. CLI data is available on a monthly basis. To convert it into biannual data, we calculated the average of the first six months of the year along with that of the second six months of the year in all the countries concerned except for Romania, for which no data exists.

b) To measure the welfare situation in the countries under examination, we included the Social Protection Expenditure from Eurostat, which appeared in millions of Euros. Again, these figures from Eurostat were only available on an annual basis, so we added this annual data twice, one for every semester of each natural year. The data from 2017, however, is not yet available. Hence the period studied for this variable covers 14, not 15 years (from 2003 to 2016).

c) Regarding security and national crime, data was obtained about the homicide rate and prison population per 100,000 inhabitants from the European Council's Annual Penal Statistics portal (survey 1). Although it would have been worthwhile to get data on the ratio of foreigners in prison, this was not available for the years of the period studied.

With respect to key events, we obtained two kinds of data: unpremeditated events and institutional ones. In these cases, our independent variables are dummy variables that refer to the occurrence of one or more relevant event in any given semester. Some authors have measured the effects of unpremeditated events (terrorist attacks) for shorter periods of time, and institutional events (national and European elections) over longer periods of time (for example, see Vligenthart and Boomgaarden, 2007). However, to maintain aggregation, we decided upon unity for each semester in order to be able to carry out joint analyses using the RWDs. This particularity, together with the lack of monthly or trimestral RWD data, must be considered when analyzing the results of this research.

23

As for unpremeditated key events, we focus on Jihadi terrorist attacks, given that, in recent years, the association of Muslims and the terrorist threat has been strengthened after said attacks, especially if they were carried out within national territory (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017). The data was extracted from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), an open source that collected statistical information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 until 2017. According to the definition given by the GTD (2019), terrorism is the "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation". Adhering to this definition, we chose those attacks characterized as Islamic terrorism that resulted in fatalities, excluding failed attacks and ambiguous cases.

With respect to Islamic Jihadi terrorism, two variables were used. The first involves terrorism that takes place inside national territory. The second includes terrorism on the international stage. Below, we offer a description of these variables:

a) To measure Islamic Jihadi terrorism inside national territory, all the attacks, regardless of the number of fatalities, in the six countries being studied were selected. Thus, what was significant were those attacks carried out by the following perpetrators according to the GTD's categorization: Muslim extremists, Jihadi-inspired extremists, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and Al-Qaida in Iraq. The relationships of terrorist attacks selected by country are detailed in Table 2.

Table 2. Terrorists attacks included in the analysis in the 6 studied countries.

Country	Date key events	City	Attack site and type
Spain	March 11, 2004	Madrid	Light rail trains
	August 17 and 18, 2017	Catalonia	On the Rambla in Barcelona and in Cambrils
United Kingdom	July 7, 2005	London	London
	June 20, 2007	Glasgow	Glasgow airport

	May 22, 2013	London	The murder of Lee James Rigby, a British Army soldier
	February 18, 2016	Manchester	The murder of an imam in Rochdale
	March 24, 2016	Glasgow	The murder of a Muslim clerk
	March 22, 2017	London	the attack near the British Parliament
	May 22, 2017	Manchester	The attack in Manchester Arena following an Ariana Grande concert
	June 3, 2017	London	London Bridge and Borough Market
Germany	September 17, 2015	Berlin	Islamic extremist stabbed a police officer
	July 18, 2016	Wurzburg	A train going to Wurzburg
	July 24, 2016	Ansbach	The music festival in Ansbach
	December 19, 2016	Berlin	The Christmas market
	July 28, 2017	Hamburg	The supermarket attack
Sweden	December 11, 2010	Stockholm	Two bombs in the center of Stockholm
	April 7, 2017	Stockholm	The massive car attack

* Neither Poland nor Romania have suffered Jihadi attacks according to data compiled by GTD; therefore, in these two cases, it was not possible to construct this variable.

a) With respect to cases of international terrorism, we selected only those attacks in which there were at least 20 fatalities in geographic zones of interest for the countries comprising our case studies, or in other words, North America, Western Europe and Eastern Europe (following the differentiations allowed by the GTD)[8]. In this case, the perpetrators are the following: Al-Qaida, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Islambouli Brigades of al-Qaida, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Jihadi-inspired extremists and Muslim extremists. For this variable, the cases selected are shown in Table 3.[9]

Table 3. Terrorists attacks compiled in the international terrorism variable

Place of the attack	Date of attack	Number of victims
Madrid (Spain)	March 11, 2004	191
Rostov on Don (Russia)	August 24, 2004	90
London (United Kingdom)	July 7, 2005	56
Paris (France)	January 7, 8 and 9, 2015	20
Brussels and Zavantem (Belgium)	March 22, 2016	35
Paris (France)	November 13, 2015	137
Cambrils and Barcelone (Spain)	August 17 and 18, 2017	21
Manchester (UK)	May 22, 2017	23

[8] We have been taken into account the regions in which allied nations (both politically and economically) of our studied countries are located.

[9] Attacks that took place inside the United Kingdom and Spain are not compiled within the international terrorism variable for these countries. In these cases, they are compiled within the national terrorism variable.

With respect to national elections, the results are detailed in Table 4 according to country.

Table 4. National elections considered in the study.

Country	Elections date	Governing party	Prime minister/President	Other data
Spain	March 14, 2004	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	Jose L. Rodríguez Zapatero	Two new political groups appear in 2015: the leftist Podemos and the liberal-conservative Citizens
	March 9, 2008	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party		
	November 20, 2011	The conservative People's Party	Mariano Rajoy	
	December 20, 2015	The conservative People's Party		
	June 26, 2016	The conservative People's Party		
United Kingdom	May 5, 2005	Labour Party	Tony Blair	
	May 6, 2010	Conservative and Unionist Party	David Cameron	
	May 7, 2015	Conservative and Unionist Party		
	June 8, 2017	Conservative and Unionist Party	Theresa May	
Germany	September 18, 2005	CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union in Bavaria)	Angela Merkel	After the elections of 2017, the extreme-right and xenophobic party AfD (Alternative for Germany), which opposes receiving immigrants, obtained representation for the first time in the Bundestag
	September 27, 2009	CDU/CSU		
	September 22, 2013	CDU/CSU		
	September 24, 2017	CDU/CSU		
Sweden	September 17, 2006	The liberal conservative Moderate Coalition Party	Fredrik Reinfeldt	For the elections of September 19, 2010 the Swedish ultra-right party SD (Swedish Democrats) won seats in Parliament
	September 19, 2010	The Alliance (Moderate Party, Liberal People's Party, Centre Party and Christian Democrats)		
	September 14, 2014	The Red-Green party	Stefan Löfven	

Poland	September 25, 2005	Christian Democrat and Eurosceptic Law and Justice Party	Donald Tusk	In the elections of October 25, 2015, the extreme right Kukiz'15 Party in alliance with the National Movement, won representation in the Polish parliament.
	October 21, 2007	PO (Civic Platform) Party		
	October 9, 2011	PO (Civic Platform) Party		
	October 25, 2015	Law and Justice Party	Beata Szydło	
Romania	November 30, 2008	Democratic Liberal Party	Emil Boc	
	December 9, 2012	Social Liberal Union	Victor Ponta	
	December 11, 2016	Social Democratic Party	Sorin Grindeanu	

a) In the case of Spain, during the period concerned five general elections were held on the following dates: March 14, 2004; March 9, 2008; November 20, 2011; December 20, 2015; and June 26, 2016. The attacks in Madrid, for which Al-Qaida claimed responsibility, took place three days before the elections of 2004. These attacks, in addition to sparking an intense public debate about terrorism and migration and serving to naturalize the association between the two (Bañón Hernández, 2006), may have had a clear impact on the electoral results and the subsequent change of government (Rego Rodríguez, 2006). In 2004 and 2008, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, considered to be a progressive party, won the elections. This government applied a moratorium until January 2009 that demanded residence permits from Romanians and Bulgarians who wished to be employed after the accession of these countries from January 2007. The conservative People's Party regained control of the government in 2011. In the elections of 2015, two new political groups entered the Spanish scene: the leftist Podemos and the liberal-conservative Citizens parties. These elections once again were repeated in 2016 after the inability of the parties to form a government. On this occasion, the People's Party once again managed to gain control of the government thanks to the support of Citizens.

b) In the United Kingdom, general elections were held on four occasions. On May 5, 2005, the Labour Party came out the winner, whereas after the other elections, which took place on May 6, 2010; May 7, 2015; and June 8,

2017, the winners were the Conservative and Unionist Party. Prime Minister David Cameron resigned in June of 2016 after the referendum on Britain's remaining in the European Union. In the elections of 2010, the Eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party and the ultra-right British National Party came in as the fourth and fifth most voted-for parties respectively although they did not win representation in the Chamber of Commons. However, the change in government after the elections of 2010 would translate into tougher migration policies when the seven-year moratorium stipulated in the treaties about the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU, which had been adhered to by the United Kingdom since 2007, was finally lifted (Devitt, 2012).

c) In Germany, the union of the conservative parties CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union in Bavaria) was the winner of the four elections held in the country during the period of our study. The elections took place on September 18, 2005; September 27, 2009; September 22, 2013; and September 24, 2017. Nevertheless, the latest governments are the result of a coalition with the SPD (the Social Democratic Party of Germany). Since Angela Merkel's coalition came to power, restrictive migration policies have been put into place (Boswell & Hough, 2008) and the moratorium has been extended from 2011 until 2013 (Laubenthal, 2012). After the elections of 2017, the extreme-right and xenophobic party AfD (Alternative for Germany), which opposes receiving immigrants, obtained representation for the first time in the Bundestag.

d) In Sweden, three elections have been held. On September 17, 2006 the liberal conservative Moderate Coalition Party won the elections. After the elections held on September 19, 2010, four center-right parties (the Moderate Party, Liberal People's Party, Centre Party and Christian Democrats) ran together and won the elections with a party called The Alliance. For these same elections, the ultra-right Swedish SD (Sweden Democrats) gained seats in Parliament due to certain levels of racism among sectors of the population (Spehar, Bucken-Knapp, & Hinnfors, 2011; Dahlstedt, & Neergaard, 2019; Quirico, 2012). Lastly, as for the elections on September 14, 2014, the Red-Green party, a union of three leftist parties—the Social Democrats, the Left Party and the Green Party—came to power.

e) In Poland during the period under consideration, four elections were held. On September 25, 2005, the conservative, Christian Democrat and Eurosceptic Law and Justice Party won the elections. For those held on October 21, 2007 and October 9, 2011, the PO (Civic Platform) Party, which is generally considered center-right, came out on top, only to cede power back four years later, on October 25, 2015, to the Law and Justice Party. In these last elections, the extreme-right Kukiz'15 Party in alliance with the National Movement, another party originating in movements on the far right, won representation in the Polish parliament.

f) The first elections held in Romania after it joined the European Union were held on November 30, 2008. The winner was the liberal conservative Democratic Liberal Party. Four years later, on December 9, 2012, a coalition of the center-right and the center-left, the Social Liberal Union, won the elections. Finally, for the elections held on December 11, 2016, the government changed again when the center-left Social Democratic Party achieved victory.

As for elections to the European Parliament, these were held on June 13, 2004; June 7, 2009; and May 25, 2014. They are shown in Table 4. In the case of the United Kingdom, these dates vary by a few days. For its part, Romania joined the European Union in January of 2007, which is why this variable only offers dates subsequent to this one. During all these years, the party that gained most seats was the European People's Party, although after the elections held in 2014 the party lost over 50 seats with respect to previous elections.

While the year 2004 was marked by an expansion toward Eastern Europe and the approval of integration policies for immigrants from the EU,[10] in 2009, because of the economic crisis among other reasons, the EU began to apply more restrictive policies as far as migration and asylum were concerned.[11] In

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[10] The immigrant integration policy in the European Union was approved by the European Council on September 19, 2004. Last accessed on 02/08/2019. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/82745.pdf

[11] Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32009L0050#. Last accessed on 02/08/2019.

30

2014, the extreme-right entered the European Parliament after elections in which Poland didn't present candidates from the European left.

Table 5. European elections considered in the study

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS		
Date	**Country**	**Winning political party**
June 13, 2004	Germany | Spain | Sweden |Poland	European People's Party
June 10, 2004	United Kingdom	
June 7, 2009	Germany | Spain | Sweden |Poland | Romania	European People's Party
Juan 4, 2009	United Kingdom	
May 25, 2014	Germany | Spain | Sweden |Poland | Romania	European People's Party
May 22, 2014	United Kingdom	

Analysis and results

Analysis

Data from the independent and the dependent variables were coded with SPSS (version 19). To test the hypotheses, the following correlations in terms of RWDs and key events for each country were established: the salience of migration-related news coverage; the salience of intra-European migration coverage; and the salience of the economy, welfare and security frames. We determined whether they were positively or negatively correlated using Pearson's correlation coefficient (Igártua Perosanz, 2006). We then compared the results obtained from the six countries under consideration.

Findings: The Impact of the Real World on News about Migration

The existing connections between the real world and news about different types of migration (immigration, emigration, migration within the EU and freedom of movement) are detailed in Table 1. It shows the correlations between RWDs/key events and the salience of migration news coverage. As can be observed, distinct RWDs are correlated with the coverage of news about migration. Thus, as far as immigration flow figures are concerned, putting to one side Romania, all the countries studied show correlation, but this is especially strong in Spain ($r(30)=0.81$, $p<0.001$), Germany ($r(30)=0.80$, $p<0.001$) and, coming in at third place, Sweden ($r(30)=0.69$, $p<0.001$).

As for emigrant flow figures, Poland shows the only positive correlation ($r(28)=0.52$, $p<0.05$). The size of this relationship is considered medium (Sampiere et al, 1998). Especially noteworthy is the negative figure in the case of Spain ($r(30)= -0.80$, $p<0.001$). In this country, the greater the number of citizens leaving the country, the lower the likelihood that there will be news about migration. The magnitude of this correlation, in this case, is strong.

Table 1. Correlations between RWDs and Key Events and the Salience of Migration-Related News

Salience of migration-related news coverage	SPAIN	UK	Germany	Sweden	Poland	Romania
RWD						
Migration figures						
Immigration Flow	0.81***	0.41*	0.80***	0.69***	0.44*	-0.14
Emigration Flow	-0.80***	-0.11	0.18	0.36	0.51**	-0.07
Asylum seekers	-0.22	0.22	0.81***	0.50**	-0.13	----
Economy figures						
GDP	-0.37*	0.77**	0.54**	0.63***	0.73***	0.67***
CLI	0.24	0.19	0.05	0.07	-0.19	----
Welfare figures						
Social protection expenditure	-0.73***	0.57**	0.52**	0.60**	0.70***	0.54**
Security/Crime figures						
Prison population rate	0.15	-0.54**	-0.42*	-.065***	-0.25	-0.39*
Homicide rate	0.76***	-0.05	0.2	0.32	-0.71***	-0.75***
Key events						
National terrorism	0.03	0.37*	0.56**	0.12	----	----
International terrorism	0.02	0.55**	0.60***	0.54**	0.19	0.44*
National elections	0.09	0.10	-0.06	0.00	0.16	0.20
EP elections	0.10	-0.12	-0.10	-0.15	-0.12	-0.11

* $p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$

For its part, the asylum seekers indicator correlates only in two countries: Germany and Sweden ($r(30)=0.81$, $p=0.000$; $r(30)=0.50$, $p<0.01$, respectively). In these cases, the relationship is positive, and high in Germany and medium in Sweden.

Regarding the economic figures, we found that the CLI indicator does not correlate in any country. However, the GDP shows a positive correlation in all the countries of our study except for Spain, where it correlates negatively ($r(30)=0.37$, $p<0.05$). In this country, the lower the GDP, the greater the probability that the media will refer to migration. In the other five countries, the greater the GDP, the greater the probability

that the media will publish news about migration. This probability is especially high in the cases of Poland (r(30)=0.73, p<0.001), Romania (r(30)=0.67, p<0.001) and Sweden (r(30)=0.63, p<0.001).

The same trend can be observed with respect to the statistic related to welfare: the social protection expenditure. This indicator is positively correlated in different degrees in the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Poland and Romania. The only case in which the association is high and negative is that of Spain (r(28)= -0.73, p=0.000). In Poland, the correlation is also high (r(28)=0.70, p=0.001), but of a positive nature.

As for security/crime figures, we can observe that, in each country, at least one of the two statistics correlates with the salience of migration-related news coverage. We find the only high correlation with prison populate rate in Sweden. It is negative. Of particular note is the case of Spain (r(30)=0.76, p=0.001), which shows the highest positive correlation with homicide. Hence, it can be deduced that, in this country, the greater the homicide rate, the greater the probability that the media will pay attention to migration. The opposite is seen in the case of Romania and Poland, where the correlation is also high but of a negative nature (r(30)= -0.75, p=0.001 and r(30)= -0.71, p=0.001 respectively). In the other countries, an association with the homicide index doesn't exist.

With regard to key events, we found the only high correlation in the case of Germany (r(30)=0.60, p=0.001) where it is associated to international terrorism. Also connected to international terrorism we found medium size correlations in the United Kingdom, Sweden and Romania. As for attacks perpetrated inside national territory, this is only positively correlated, albeit not strongly, in Germany, in the first place (r(30)=0.56, p=0.01); and in the United Kingdom, in the second place (r(30)=0.37, p<0.05). For their part, neither national nor European elections appear to be significantly correlated with the salience of migration-related news coverage.

The Relationship between the Real World the Salience of Intra-EU Migration Coverage

When we examine the relationship between the coverage of news about intra-European migration and data and events in the real world, we again find that it is RWDs and not key events that are the most habitually correlated. Table 2 shows these associations.

Table 2. Correlations between RWDs & Key Events and the Salience of intra-EU Migration News

Salience of Intra-European migration coverage	SPAIN	UK	Germany	Sweden	Poland	Romania
RWD						
Migration figures						
Immigration Flow	0.07	0.49**	0.40*	0.43*	-0.02	-0.10
Emigration Flow	0.07	0.00	-0.19	0.40*	-0.13	-0.04
Asylum seekers	0.24	0.11	0.37*	0.77***	-0.22	----
Economy figures						
GDP	0.30	0.69***	0.43*	0.44*	0.16	0.64***
CLI	0.29	0.18	0.21	-0.01	0.40*	----
Welfare figures						
Social protection expenditure	0.21	0.56**	0.46*	0.58**	0.10	0.53**
Security/Crime figures						
Prison population rate	-0.13	-0.49**	-0.47**	-0.51**	-0.20	-0.37
Homicide rate	-0.28	-0.21	-0.16	0.29	-0.13	-0.69
Key events						
National terrorism	0.09	0.35	0.05	-0.07	----	----
International terrorism	0.07	0.35	0.14	0.46*	0.25	0.28
National elections	0.31	0.02	-0.22	0.00	-0.07	0.17
EP elections	0.26	-0.07	-0.17	0.12	0.07	-0.11

* $p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$

Beginning with these migration figures, we find that, unlike what happens in news about migration in general, when the media specifically mentions intra-EU migration, the positive correlation with immigration flow occurs only in those countries which, over the course of the 15 years studied, have been the recipients of labor migration involving European citizens: the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden (r(28)=0.49, p<0.01; r(30)=0.40, p<0.05; r(30)=0.43, p<0.05). This means that, in periods when immigration is on the rise in these three countries, whose media belong to the Democratic Corporatist Model, the coverage of news about intra-European immigration increases. The intensity of these correlations can be considered medium. Curiously, there is no correlation between news coverage of intra-European migration and emigration flows in any of the three countries (Spain, Poland and Romania) that, throughout the period being studied, are the sources of many citizens leaving for other European countries. In Sweden this correlation is small for both immigration and emigration flows (r(30)=0.43, p<0.05 and r(30)=0.40, p<0.05, respectively).

Just as in the case of news about migration in general, the statistic about the number of asylum applications received does correlate in Sweden and in Germany (but to a lesser degree) with the salience of news about intra-European migration (r(30)=0.77, p=0.000 and r(30)=0.37, p>0.05, respectively). The size of this correlation is strong for Sweden and weak for Germany.

As for statistics referring to the state of the national economy, we observe that GDP correlates highly in the United Kingdom and in Romania (r(30)=0.69, p=0.000; r(30)=0.64, p=0.000, respectively). Hence, in these countries the greater the GDP, the higher the probability that migration will enter the media's agenda. The CLI does not correlate in any country except Poland (r(30)=0.40, p<0.05), where the magnitude is small. In other words, during periods in which the indicator goes up, suggesting the arrival of an economic boom period, the probability that Polish media will refer to intra-European migration also increases.

Once again, in the four countries in which the GDP correlates with the salience of news about intra-European migration, the welfare indicator, or social protection total expenditure, also correlates in the same direction. As far as security/crime figures are concerned, the prison population rate indicator correlates negatively with a medium intensity in the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden (r(30)= -0.49, p<0.01; r(30)= -0.47, p<0.01; r(30)= -0.51, p<0.01).

Lastly, with respect to key events, we find that the quantity of news about intra-European migration does not increase during periods in which there are terrorist attacks or in which national or European elections are held. The only exception is Sweden, where international terrorist events correlate (although weakly) with news coverage about intra-European migration ($r(30)=0.46$, $p<0.05$).

The Economic Focus in News about Immigration

Concerning the economy frame, we once again find that RWDs have a closer relationship than do key events to media tendencies to publish migration-related news with focus on the economy or the national budget. Table 3 shows the results of the correlations between the economy frame, RWDs and key events.

We observe the strongest correlations with migration figures in Germany, in particular with immigration flows and asylum seekers. If we also consider medium and small size associations we can say that the statistics about arriving immigrants only correlate in those countries that, during the fifteen years under consideration, were exclusively recipient countries for immigrants: Sweden, in third place; the United Kingdom, in second place; and, as noted, Germany in first place ($r(30)=0.45$, $p<0.05$; $r(28)= 0.54$, $p<0.01$; and $r(30)=0.69$, $p=0.000$, respectively). This statistic does not correlate in the cases of Spain and Romania, unlike the other cases we have seen so far. In other words, in this order, Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden, during periods of higher immigration flow, are more likely to witness the economic consequences of the phenomenon being underscored in the news.

The rest of the statistics examined that involve other kind of migration flows (emigration flows and asylum seekers) do not correlate in any of the countries concerned. There are two exceptions: the indicator about asylum applications, once again does correlate in Germany and Sweden. We again find the strongest association in Germany ($r(30)=0.74$, $p=0.000$). This suggests that economic issues are underscored in the discourse of the media in these two countries during periods when asylum applications increase.

The indicators about the state of the economy strongly and positively correlate in the United Kingdom and Germany (r(30)=0.65, p=0.000; r(30)=0.74, p=0.000, respectively) as far as the GDP is concerned, and also in Poland (medium size association), in this case with respect to the CLI (r(30)=0.50, p<0.01).

Table 3. Correlations between the Economy Frame, Key Events and RWDs

Economy frame	SPAIN	UK	Germany	Sweden	Poland	Romania
RWD						
Migration figures						
Immigration Flow	0.08	0.54**	0.69***	0.45*	0.04	-0.25
Emigration Flow	0.09	-0.04	-0.27	0.31	-0.09	0.22
Asylum seekers	-0.09	0.05	0.70***	0.50**	-0.01	----
Economy figures						
GDP	0.23	0.65***	0.74***	0.34	-0.01	-0.29
CLI	-0.08	0.15	-0.12	-0.03	0.50**	----
Welfare figures						
Social protection expenditure	0.09	0.65***	0.73***	0.57**	0.00	-0.21
Security/Crime figures						
Prison population rate	0.28	-0.45*	-0.70	-0.41*	-0.49**	0.04
Homicide rate	-0.05	-0.32	-0.13	0.21	0.06	0.26
Key events						
National terrorism	-0.18	-0.05	0.56**	-0.11	----	----
International terrorism	0.03	0.33	0.62***	0.15	0.35	-0.09
National elections	-0.08	0.13	0.12	0.17	0.09	-0.12
EP elections	-0.13	-0.12	-0.13	-0.01	0.34	0.22

* p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

The welfare indicator strongly correlates in the United Kingdom and Germany when news about migration focuses on the economy (r(28)=0.65, p=0.000; and r(30)=0.73, p=0.000, respectively). The correlation is medium size in Sweden (r(30)=0.57, p<0.01). Nevertheless, this trend is not exclusive to the economy frame, since this correlation was already observed when we examined the relationship between the Real-World

indicator and the salience of news about migration in general as well as intra-European migration. Furthermore, the indicator referring to the prison population rate again negatively correlates in various countries (the United Kingdom, Sweden and Poland), which suggests that the lower the number of people in prison per capita, the greater the probability that news about migration in said countries will refer to the economic consequences of migration.

Finally, as for key events, we find that terrorism correlates with the economy frame of news about migration only in the specific case of Germany (r(30)=0.56, p<0.01, a medium association for national terrorism; and r(30)=0.62, p=0.000, a strong relation, for international terrorism). These relationships suggest that when terrorist attacks occur, news about migration in Germany tends to sharpen its focus on the economic consequences of migration.

The Welfare Frame and its Relationship with World Indicators and Key Events

The welfare frame, as it has been conceptualized in this study, refers to the focus in news about migration on matters related to public education, healthcare, housing, unemployment support, state subsidies, pension/retirement, etc. (Eberl et al., 2019). When news media use this focus, we find a greater relationship with RW developments than with key events. These correlations are shown in Table 4. As can be observed, we find that none of them show a high association between the variables. All the correlations are of medium or low intensity.

With respect to migration figures, in the United Kingdom and Germany (r(28)=0.47, p<0.05; r(30)=0.51, p<0.01, respectively) an increase in the numbers of arriving immigrants has a relationship with an increase in the quantity of news that uses the welfare frame. In Germany, this positive correlation also occurs with respect to asylum applications (r(30)=0.41, p<0.05). The magnitude of these relationships is considered medium. However, in Spain the correlation is negative both in the cases of asylum applications as well as emigrant flow (r(30)= -0.46, p<0.05; r(30)= -0.44, p<0.05, respectively). This means that, in periods in which both the number of Spanish citizens

leaving the country and the quantity of asylum application decreases, it is more likely that the news will focus on the welfare frame when speaking about migration.

Table 4. Correlations between the welfare frame, RWDs and key events

Welfare frame	*SPAIN*	*UK*	*Germany*	*Sweden*	*Poland*	*Romania*
RWD						
Migration figures						
Immigration Flow	0.31	0.47*	0.51**	-0.13	-0.10	-0.13
Emigration Flow	-0.44*	-0.20	-0.23	0.11	-0.29	-0.41
Asylum seekers	-0.46*	0.14	0.41*	0.30	0.10	----
Economy figures						
GDP	-0.56**	0.57**	0.35	-0.16	-0.32	0.22
CLI	-0.32	0.23	-0.09	-0.06	0.46*	----
Welfare figures						
Social protection expenditure	-0.55**	0.58**	0.48**	0.28	-0.32	0.37
Security/Crime figures						
Prison population rate	0.14	-0.23	-0.38*	0.10	-0.34	0.02
Homicide rate	0.52**	-0.37*	-0.16	-0.17	0.36	-0.26
Key events						
National terrorism	0.07	0.09	0.37*	-0.29	----	----
International terrorism	-0.23	0.38*	0.34	-0.21	0.35	-0.02
National elections	-0.14	0.17	-0.11	0.11	0.31	-0.08
EP elections	0.11	-0.02	0.14	0.01	-0.02	0.07

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

As for the economy figures, we again find positive correlations in the United Kingdom with respect to the GDP ($r(30) = 0.57$, $p = 0.001$) and in Poland with respect to the CLI ($r(30) = 0.46$, $p < 0.05$). However, this time we find a negative correlation with respect to the Spanish GDP ($r(30) = -0.56$, $p = 0.001$), where we can observe that, in periods in which the economic situation is getting worse, the probability that news about migration will refer to its impact on the welfare state is greater.

As for the indicator related to welfare in our study, the social protection expenditure, we find positive correlations in the United Kingdom and Germany (r(28)= 0,58, p=0.001; r(28)= 0.48, p<0.01, respectively). In other words, when spending on social protections increases, the probability that the media will place a greater focus on the consequences of migration on the welfare state increases. The opposite occurs in Spain, where the correlation is significant but negative (r(28)= -0.55, p<0.01). That is, when social spending diminishes, the likelihood that the media will use the welfare frame increases.

In Spain, one of the indicators about security/crime, i.e. the homicide rate, correlates positively with the welfare frame (r(30)=0.50, p<0.01). In other words, in periods that experience an increase in the homicide rate, the probability that the media will refer to the welfare state in news about migration also increases. The size of this correlation is medium. By contrast, the correlation is negative in the United Kingdom with respect to this same variable (r(30)= -0.37, p<0.05) and in Germany with respect to the prison population rate (r(30)= -0.38, p<0.01).

Lastly, when we examine the possible relationship of the occurrence of a key event with the media's tendency to use a welfare frame when speaking about migration, we see that elections do not appear to bare any relationship at all to this factor, whereas terrorism only does so in two cases. The first is national terrorism in the case of Germany, where the positive correlation is of medium size (r(30)=0.37, p<0.05). The second is the United Kingdom, where it is international terrorism that shows a positive correlation, which is also of medium size (r(30)=0.38, p<0.05).

The Relation Between Events in the Real World and the Security/Crime Frame in News about Migration

The last frame analyzed in this study refers to the security and/or crime-related aspects of migration. In this case, we see for the first time that key events have comparatively greater weight than RWDs. Table 5 presents the correlation between RWDs and key events and news about migration in which the focus is placed on issues

of security and crime. As can be observed, only in Spain and Romania do we find highly significant correlations.

Table 5. Correlations between RW Developments & Key Events and the Security/Crime frame

Security/Crime Frame	SPAIN	UK	Germany	Sweden	Poland	Romania
RWD						
Migration figures						
Immigration Flow	0.31	-0.01	0.58**	-0.03	0.19	0.15
Emigration Flow	-0.64***	-0.11	0.30	-0.06	0.11	-0.33
Asylum seekers	0.11	0.57**	0.43*	0.19	0.12	----
Economy figures						
GDP	-0.51**	0.39*	0.33	-0.12	0.20	0.54**
CLI	0.23	0.02	0.06	-0.12	0.10	----
Welfare figures						
Social protection expenditure	-0.61**	0.10	0.13	0.15	0.19	0.44*
Security/Crime figures						
Prison population rate	-0.44*	-0.22	-0.19	0.07	-0.40*	-0.15
Homicide rate	0.50**	0.40*	0.18	0.19	-0.11	-0.70***
Key events						
National terrorism	0.08	-0.09	0.37*	-0.23	----	----
International terrorism	-0.01	0.56**	0.43*	0.24	0.52**	0.45*
National elections	-0.15	0.08	-0.03	-0.30	0.32	0.06
EP elections	0.16	-0.14	-0.18	0.04	-0.14	-0.25

* p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

As far as the migration figures are concerned, we find positive correlations with the security frame when there is an increase in the number of immigrants (r(30)=0.58, p=0.001) and asylum applications (r(30)=0,43, p<0.05) in Germany. The use of this frame also increases in the United Kingdom when the number of asylum applications goes up (r(30)=0.57, p=0.001). In the case of Spain, this frame negatively correlates with the level of emigration of its own citizens (r(30)= -0.64, p=0.000), suggesting that

when emigration decreases, the use of the frame increases. The strength of these relationships can be considered medium.

As for indicators about the economy, the CLI does not correlate in any country, whereas GDP correlates positively in the United Kingdom and Romania (r(30)=0.39, p<0.05; r(30)=0.54, p<0.01, respectively). This suggests that, during economic booms, it becomes more likely that the media will refer to the security frame. On the other hand, in Spain the contrary occurs, given that the correlation is negative (r(30)= -0.51, p<0.01). In other words, when the economic situation worsens, it is more likely that news about migration will refer to the consequences of the phenomenon in terms of security and crime. The indicator about welfare, the social protection expenditure, only correlates in the cases of Romania (r(28)=0.44, p<0.05) and Spain (r(28)= -0.61, p=0.001), but it does so in the same direction as did GDP, positively for the first and negatively for the second.

As for RWDs linked to matters of crime and security, the prison population rate indicator shows negative correlations in Spain (r(30)= -0.44, p<0.05) and Poland (r(30)= -0.40, p<0.05). In other words, when the rate of people in prison decreases, it is more likely that the media will refer to matters of security and crime in news about migration. By contrast, the homicide indicator offers positive correlations in Spain (r(30)=0.50, p<0.01) and the United Kingdom (r(30)=0.40, p<0.05). In these cases, when the homicide rate goes up, it becomes more likely that the media will mention matters of security and crime when speaking about migration. There would appear to be a contradiction in trends involving homicide indicators in Spain, since one correlates positively and the other negatively. However, in Romania the homicide rate correlates negatively (r(30)= -0.70, p=0.000) and the size of this relationship is significant. In this country, therefore, when the homicide rate decreases, it becomes more likely that the media will refer to security issues when speaking about migration.

Lastly, we find that key events related to terrorist attacks correlate positively in four countries: the United Kingdom, where attacks perpetrated on the international stage correlate (r(30)= 0.56, p<0.01); in Germany, where attacks carried out on both national and international soil correlate (r(30)=0.37, p<0.05; r(30)=0.43, p<0.05; respectively); and in Poland (r(30)=0.52, p<0.01) and Romania (r(30)=0.45, p<0.05), where international terrorism correlates (this variable was the only one that could be measured, since these last two countries have not suffered any Jihadi terrorist attack

within their own territory). In other words, when Jihadi-inspired terrorist attacks occur, the news emphasizes the impact of migration on security when speaking about the issue. The only two countries in which this variable does not correlate are Spain and Sweden. For its part, the variable referring to elections, both for national parliaments and the European Parliament, does not correlate in any of our test case countries.

Discussion

The goal of this study is to ascertain the degree to which the media, in their processes of journalistic production, follow the trends of the real world when they cover news about migration. The media often serve to extend the experience of citizens and shape public opinion about this phenomenon. The ultimate purpose of this project is thus to locate possible deviations between discourses in European media about migration (immigration and emigration) and objective data about reality. Accordingly, in this study we first analyzed the correlations that appear between the real world (subdivided into RWD and key events) and the salience of migration-related news coverage (of both migration in general and intra-European migration). Second, we examined the dominant patterns in news about immigration with respect to issues that are key to the topic: the economy, welfare and security/crime.

Our research has thus required the collection of data from statistical sources such as Eurostat and the OECD. These entities offer comparable data for the six countries we studied, which is an important advantage. Nevertheless, the way these two sources deliver the data placed limitations on the research because, among the so-called independent variables – that is, the indicators of the real world – some are only available on an annual basis. Although in these cases we converted the data into its biannual equivalents, and the number of available cases by which to perform statistical analyses for each country remained acceptable, it did not allow us to carrying out some of the more complex analyses. Such analyses would have served to construct models detailing the salience and frames used in news about migration as a whole, rather than examining only individual relationships. In any case, the lack of monthly or trimestral RWD data is an important limitation. Some variations in both the quantity and the approach to migration news may go unnoticed if these variations have a short-term effect. Future research should attempt to solve this limitation by aggregating data from shorter time periods (monthly or quarterly).

Until the present analysis, there has been very little research on this issue and there are hardly any comparative analyses of different countries in this regard. Those that do exist, in fact, have focused on the differences between only two countries; in this study, despite the methodological limitations, we analyze six. Nor are there many

studies that combine key events with RWDs. None, until now, have added to the research an analysis of the particularities of news about migration motivated by EU free movement. It is precisely here that our study serves to fill this void.

The Relationship Between the Real World and the Salience of Migration News

Regarding statistical indicators about the arrival of immigrants and asylum applications, our results show that news about immigration are related to real world trends. Hence, with the exception of Romania, in the countries concerned migration is a more salient news topic during periods in which actual immigration flows are high. The result is in line with Lubbers et al. (1998) and Checa and Arjona (2011), who found that, in the Netherlands and Spain, more attention was paid to immigration when the number of arriving immigrants increased. However, during periods of greater immigrant flow, news about intra-European migration only increased in those countries in which the immigration of citizens from the European Union was noteworthy during the fifteen years we examined in this study; that is, in the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden. Moreover, in these countries the correlations were weaker when the salience of EU-migration news was examined, which suggests that the arrival of immigrants is more closely correlated with an increase in news about immigration from third countries.

Similarly, an increase in the number of asylum applications also appears to be a factor involved in the heightened coverage of news about migration in general and intra-European migration, but this time only in the cases of Germany and Sweden. Of the countries analyzed in this study, these two, along with the United Kingdom, received the greatest number of asylum applications between 2003 and 2017. However, since 2010, it has been precisely in Germany and Sweden where the number of applications has increased and indeed widely surpassed those received by the United Kingdom, which until then had been the prime recipient of such applications. Hence, for example, according to data from the OECD, in 2015, the year in which the so-called "refugee crisis" began, Germany received 441,900 asylum applications and Sweden

46

156,460. The United Kingdom received 39,970. In the cases of Germany and Sweden, the reality with respect to asylum seekers is stark, and the media follow its lead.

Nevertheless, this trend does not apply with respect to figures about emigration. Only in Poland does news about migration increase when emigration increases. Although this follows a certain logic, given that Poland is mainly a country where more migrants are sent than they are received, the same does not occur in either Romania or Spain, which are also emigrant countries. Moreover, in Spain the correlation is negative. This may owe to the fact that, in this country, according to data from Eurostat, increased emigration coincides with decreased immigration, due to the crisis. The media may lessen their coverage of immigration following trends in the real world, while at the same time creating a void in news about emigration.

Although emigrating Spanish, Romanian and Polish citizens usually choose EU countries as their destinations, news about intra-European migration does not increase during periods when greater numbers of people from these countries emigrate. Only in Sweden, a country that by contrast mainly receives immigrants, is this correlation produced. With respect to emigration data, therefore, we cannot claim that the media follow reality's lead.

As for indicators involving economy and welfare, on the one hand it can be observed that the CLI does not help predict the salience of news about migration, as Jacobs et al. (2018) found when they analyzed two western European cases (Flanders and the Netherlands). This is probably because it points to future changes in the economy, and the realization of its prediction is thus produced with a greater temporal distance than the other indicators. GDP and social protection expenditure do appear to be significant, on the other hand. We subsume them into one in the discussion since they generally behave in the same way throughout the countries studied here.[12] Thus, news about migration increases during periods in which GDP and social expenditure is greater (indicating an economic boom) in the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Poland and Romania, whereas in Spain it does so when GDP and social expenditure is

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[12] In fact, GDP and social protection expenditure correlate positively in all the countries in a very strong way (the Pearson's correlation coefficient is, in every case, above or equal to 0.85). This high correlation indicates that the two variables are measuring similar issues. Future research should search for new variables with which to measure the situation and evolution of the welfare state.

lower (indicating an economic downturn). This same trend appears with regard to news about intra-European migration, although the relationship is generally weaker. The sole exception is Poland where coverage correlates positively with the CLI, rather than GDP. Future research should analyze why this indicator works in this country but not in the other countries studied here.

In the exclusive case of Spain, the established relationship accords with the competitive threat theoretical model, which claims that, when resources are scarcer, competition with the out-group is experienced with greater intensity. This may be manifest as a greater concern in public debates with the consequences of migration on resources, and thus greater attention paid by the media to the phenomenon. On the other hand, in the cases of the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden, the positive relationship may be due to the fact that the better a country's economic situation, the greater the likelihood that is will be chosen as a destination for immigration (Martin, 2009; Mayda, 2010). This may increase public debate about immigration, both from third countries and from other EU nations.

In Poland, the public and media debate about migration may increase with an upturn in the economy, given the prospect of more immigrants arriving there from the Ukraine (Fogel, 2015; Sadowski & Szczawinska, 2017), or the possible return of emigrant nationals.

This last alternative would also help explain why, during periods when the economy is healthy in Romania, acountry that has traditionally been a source of emigrants, more attention is paid to migration in general as well as to intra-European migration. This could be because, in Romania, most migrant nationals are young citizens with higher education who are weary of the slow economic reforms and policies of the country (Stegherr, 2017). The new economic outlook may inspire their return or animate public debate about it.

For indicators related to crime and security used in our study, we found that, with the exception of Spain, media attention paid to migration decreases when the homicide and imprisonment rates increase, which would seem to suggest that in these countries no direct links are made between immigrants and insecurity or, at least, that the media find other topics to focus on instead of migration during such periods. However, in Spain there does appear to be a tendency to link immigrants with crime statistics.

48

Unlike what occurs with crime that takes place inside national territory, terrorism does appear to cause increased media attention to migration, except in Poland and Spain. This is especially relevant concerning terrorism carried out on the international stage, where we observe more significant and stronger correlations with increased media attention than with terrorism perpetrated inside national territory. Due to the methodology used in this study, international terrorism refers to that which causes large numbers of fatalities. Hence, taking into consideration news value theory (Galtung & Ruge, 1965), it can be claimed that, when it comes to linking terrorist attacks with migration, the intensity of the attacks is more important than how near they are to the countries considered.

The case of Spain merits special attention, given that two Jihadi-inspired terrorist attacks, those in Madrid and Barcelona, have taken place there. However, neither these nor the other terrorist attacks perpetrated throughout Europe have heightened news coverage about migration, nor have they altered the ways in which the media covers migration, given that the security frame shows no correlation. One explanation may be that Spanish media have longstanding experience covering news about terrorism, given that which was carried out over many years by the terrorist group ETA. As Sádaba and Laporte (2006) claim, the way in which news coverage about the terrorism of ETA evolved to emphasize its political rather than moral, cultural or religious dimensions, served as a 'prototype' (in the phrase of Brosius and Epps, 1995) for the coverage of 9/11 and the attacks in Madrid. It is therefore possible to understand why the Spanish journalistic routine would not follow the same parameters as those of other EU countries under consideration here.

With respect to national and European elections, there were no significant results in any country, in contrast to what other authors have noted, who did find some significant though limited effects in this area (Allen, 2016; Vliegenthart & Boomgaarden, 2007). This may be due to certain methodological particularities of our study, given that elections, regardless of which party wins, were here subsumed under a single variable. On the other hand, as Vliegenthart and Boomgaarden (2007) have noted, the effects of elections take a long time to manifest themselves and, due to our methodological approach, the reaction time allowed for these changes to affect coverage by the media might not be sufficient. This owes to the fact that, although our temporal frame is six months long, we used natural semesters (January-June, July-

December) to facilitate the incorporation of RWDs into the study. These statistics are usually measured by Eurostat or the OECD in months, trimesters or, more often, calendar years. This methodological decision assumes that, if elections are held toward the end of a natural semester, there would be insufficient time for a change in the government to crystallize as changes in terms of the quantity or focus of news about migration.

The Relationship Between the Real World and Dominant Patterns in Migration News

When we shine the spotlight on dominant patterns in migration news – that is, on economy, welfare and security/crime – we can confirm that we have found relations between these patterns and real world trends. However, results vary slightly across topics and among countries. Thus, in the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden, news about migration more often has an economic focus during periods in which there is a greater flow of immigration and asylum-seekers,[13] as well as when the economy is doing well (according to GDP indicators and social protection expenditure). Of these three countries, the one that most stands out is Germany, where the strongest and most significant correlations are found. In Spain and Romania, no relationship appears, whereas in Poland the CLI can be related to the economy frame as well as the welfare frame.

The behavior of the media in the United Kingdom and Germany is also similar with respect to the welfare frame, since in both countries the emphasis is placed on this perspective when immigration and social protection expenditure go up. Still, if we compare the two frames, when the economy improves and immigration increases, the

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[13] It remains interesting that the media follow trends in the real world where immigration is concerned, accentuating the economic impact of migration, but do not do so with respect to the departure of emigrants from the country, given the consequent loss of both economic and symbolic capital (as happens when highly-qualified young people emigrate). However, we should be cautious with this result, as the number of news related to emigration is much smaller than the ones concerning immigration.

media place emphasis mainly on the economy frame, where we see more significant, stronger correlations than is the case for the welfare frame.

For its part, with respect to the welfare frame, neither Sweden nor Romania offer evidence that coverage in these countries follows trends in the real world, at least in terms of the indicators that are used here. Spain, for its part, once again sets itself apart from the other countries under consideration. The focus on the consequences of migration for the welfare state increases when, in this country, the rate of emigration and refugee arrival diminishes. But potentially of more interest is that the focus of the media on welfare issues escalate during periods of economic downturn (in terms of GDP and social protection expenditure), as well as when the homicide rate goes up. The competitive threat theoretical model is again an aid to understanding tendencies in Spanish the media when it comes to covering news about migration.

However, unlike in Germany and the United Kingdom (where changes in migration flow and the economy are related to an increased use of the economy frame in news about migration), in Spain these same precedents (even when they are reversed) lead to the increased salience of the welfare frame. This may owe to the fact that, in Spain, immigration is one of the most frequently discussed matters in relation to the welfare state (del Pino, 2007).

By contrast with what occurs in Spain, crime is negatively related to news that focuses on the impact of migration on the economy and welfare state in the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden and Poland. Hence, high crime rates make it less likely that migration will be linked to socioeconomic issues. While this result may seem difficult to explain, the same pattern was also found by Jacobs et al. (2018) in the Netherlands. Future research should attempt to explain the relationship undergirding this link.

Lastly, in news about migration that emphasizes its consequences for security in terms of RWDs, we observe that, in the cases of Spain and the United Kingdom, when the homicide rate increases so does the security frame in news about migration. Likewise, an increased number of arriving immigrants and asylum seekers in Germany and the United Kingdom, as well as a decrease in the number of emigrants in Spain (which coincides with periods when the number of arriving immigrants is greater), correlate with this frame. In these three countries, immigrants appear to be linked to security problems, given that this frame has a mainly negative tone in our data corpus (Elbert

51

et al., 2019). This association appears to have a greater intensity in Spain, where we find the greatest and most significant correlation among the three.

Lastly, we can confirm that the media accentuate the security frame when approaching migration in the news during periods in which there are large-scale terrorist attacks on the international stage. These results accord with those found by other authors (Jacobs et al, 2018; Vliegenthart & Boomgaarden, 2007). We found the exceptions to be Sweden (where international terrorism was in fact related to an increase in the quantity of news about migration even if this rise was not translated to the security topic concerning migration) and Spain. In this last country, terrorist attacks do not influence either the quantity or mode by which the news covers migration. In Spain, given its geographical position as a point of entry for illegal immigration from the Mediterranean Sea, the consequences of migration for security may be emphasized by the media beginning with other types of unpremeditated events, such as the assaults on the border fences in Ceuta and Melilla by irregular immigrants trying to enter Spanish territory from Africa. There are as many as 20,000 such attempts to enter Spain by irregular immigrants in a single year, as was the case in 2014 (López-Sala, 2015).

Conclusions

In contrast with what has occurred in other studies, in this paper the results show that the media do tend to follow events in the real world in terms of RWDs and key events related to terrorist attacks, but not with respect to national elections or European Parliament elections. Therefore, we must reject our first research hypothesis, which claims that the coverage of migration by the media does not follow RWDs in any significant way. The second hypothesis, which claimed that unpremeditated key events (in this case, terrorist attacks) and, to a lesser degree, institutional key events (national and European Parliament elections) have an impact on news about migration, could only be partially corroborated. In this case, we only confirmed what was proposed about unpremeditated key events.

As for the increase in the salience of migration-related news coverage, we have seen that it is generally related to an increase in immigrant flow and asylum applications as well as to good economic data. The indicators involving national security, however, do not appear to be linked in general, whereas key events related to Islamist terrorism do. Moreover, this is the main difference that we found with news that speaks specifically about intra-European migration. Jihadi-inspired terrorist attacks are not linked with any extra attention on the part of the media to immigration resulting from free movement.

In the tendency to accentuate economic and welfare matters in news about migration, we observed that the media does follow patterns shaped by socioeconomic indicators involving the GDP and the social protection expenditure, and that these are moreover strongly correlated with each other. However, in Poland the indicator that seems to work is the CLI. When the media, nevertheless, emphasize the impact of migration on security issues, this frame does seem to be linked with indicators about national crime, although in most of the cases the direction of this relationship must be researched in the future. Still, it is necessary to underscore that this frame is used especially during periods marked by large-scale terrorist attacks on the international stage.

Lastly, it must be highlighted that, while not all countries fulfill the characteristics described in this conclusion, it is possible nevertheless to discern a series of common patterns in some of them. Hence, speaking broadly, it can be observed that the media

53

in the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden follow similar patterns in the ways they follow trends in the real world. In these countries, the arrival of immigrants and the number of asylum applications as well as (positive) socioeconomic data and terrorist attacks both inside national territory and abroad are closely related to the quantity and/or focus of news about migration. Behind these common patterns can be found these countries' own migration histories and the fact that they belong to the same Democratic Corporatist media system model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004).

That Romania and Poland share the same media system model, that of the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe (Castro-Herrero et al., 2017), as well as similar migration histories, does not mean that we will find common patterns in the ways that the media behave with respect to external factors. Each of these countries has its own relationship to the issue.

Finally, Spain follows its own dynamic, due probably to its distinct media system model (the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist model, Hallin & Mancini, 2014). It is also motivated by its geographical location, which forces it to deal with irregular immigration coming from the Mediterranean Sea, as well as with its status as a traditional destination for emigrants from Latin America, with whom it shares its language and culture. Another possible explanatory factor is its particular relationship with matters related to terrorism.

Ultimately, it may be affirmed that, speaking broadly, the media follow trends in the real world, both those referring to statistics and those referring to unpremeditated key events, and that they therefore do not distance themselves as much from the parameters of reality as we had expected. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to point out that, depending on the country under consideration, there are differences in the ways in which external factors affect the coverage when it comes to news about migration.

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REMINDER

ROLE OF EUROPEAN MOBILITY AND ITS IMPACTS IN NARRATIVES, DEBATES AND EU REFORMS

The REMINDER project is exploring the economic, social, institutional and policy factors that have shaped the impacts of free movement in the EU and public debates about it.

The project is coordinated from COMPAS and includes participation from 12 consortium partners in 8 countries across Europe